

# A Domain Analysis & Description Method

## Principles, Techniques and Modeling Languages

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May 14, 2018: 14:48

### Abstract

We present a *method* for **analysing and describing domains**.

By a **domain** we shall understand a **rationally describable** segment of a **human assisted** reality, i.e., of the world, its **physical parts**, and **living species**. These are **endurants** (“still”), existing in space, as well as **perdurants** (“alive”), existing also in time. Emphasis is placed on **“human-assistedness”**, that is, that there is *at least one (man-made) artifact* and that **humans** are a primary cause for change of endurant **states** as well as perdurant **behaviours**.

*Domain science & engineering* marks a new area of *computing science*. Just as we are *formalising the syntax and semantics of programming languages*, so we are *formalising the syntax and semantics of human-assisted domains*. Just as *physicists* are studying *mother nature*, endowing it with *mathematical models*, so we, *computing scientists*, are studying these *domains*, endowing them with *mathematical models*. A difference between the endeavours of physicists and ours lies in the models: the physics models are based on *classical mathematics, differential equations and integrals*, etc., our models are based on *mathematical logic, set theory, and algebra*.

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Foreword

Dear reader! You are about to embark on a journey. The paper in front of you is long! But it is not the number, 57 pages, or duration of your studying the paper that I am referring to. It is the mind that should be prepared for a journey. It is a journey into a new realm. A realm where we confront the computer & computing scientists with a new universe: a universe in which we build a bridge between the *informal* world, that we live in, the context for eventual, *formal* software, and that *formal* software.

The bridge involves a novel construction, new in computing science: a **transcendental deduction**. We are going to present you with, we immodestly, claim, a new way of looking at the “origins” of software, the domain in which it is to serve. We shall show a method, a set of principles and techniques and a set of languages, some formal, some “almost” formal, and the informal language of usual computing science papers for a systematic to rigorous way of *analysing & describing domains*. We immodestly claim that such a method has not existed before.

But there is an even more fundamental issue “at play” here. It is that of philosophy. Let us briefly review some aspects of philosophy.

*Metaphysics* is a branch of *philosophy* that explores fundamental questions, including the nature of concepts like *being, existence, and reality* ■<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ■ is used to signal the end of a characterisation, a definition, or an example.

Traditional metaphysics seeks to answer, in a “suitably abstract and fully general manner”, the questions: *What is there?* and *And what is it like?*<sup>2</sup>. Topics of metaphysical investigation include existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility.

*Epistemology* is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge<sup>3</sup> ■

Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief. Much of the debate in epistemology centers on four areas: (1) the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to such concepts as truth, belief, and justification, (2) various problems of skepticism, (3) the sources and scope of knowledge and justified belief, and (4) the criteria for knowledge and justification. A central branch of epistemology is *ontology*, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they relate to one another.<sup>4</sup>

We shall base some of our modelling decisions of Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy [Sør94, Sør97, Sør02, Sør16]. A main contribution of Kai Sørlander is, on the philosophical basis of the *possibility of truth* (in contrast to Kant’s *possibility of self-awareness*), to *rationally and transcendently deduce the absolutely necessary conditions for describing any world*.

These conditions presume a *principle of contradiction* and lead to the *ability to reason using logical connectives* and to *handle asymmetry, symmetry and transitivity*. *Transcendental deductions* then lead to *space and time*, not as priory assumptions, as with Kant, but derived facts of any world. From this basis Kai Sørlander then, by further transcendental deductions arrive at kinematics, dynamics and the bases for Newton’s Laws. And so forth.

We build on Kai Sørlander’s basis to argue that the **domain analysis & description** calculi are necessary and sufficient and that a number of relations between domain entities can be understood transcendently and as “variants” of Newton’s Laws!

## 1.2 Precursor

The present paper is a revision of the published [Bjø16f]. The revision considerably simplifies and considerably extends the domain analysis & description calculi of [Bjø16f]. The major revision that prompts this complete rewrite is due to a serious study of Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy. As a result we extend [Bjø16f]’s ontology of endurants: describable phenomena that exists in space, to not only cover those of **physical phenomena**, but also those of **living species**, notably **humans**, and, as a result of that, our understanding of discrete endurants is refined into those of **natural parts** and **artifacts**. A new contribution is that of **intentional “pull”** akin to the *gravitational pull* of physics. Both this paper and [Bjø16f] are the result of extensive “non-toy” example case studies, see Example 1 on Page 5. These were carried out in the years since [Bjø16f] was first submitted (i.e., 2014). The present paper omits the extensive introduction and closing of [Bjø16f], Sects. 1 and 9, as well as the very many “interwoven” examples of [Bjø16f]. Instead Sect. 8 (Pages 40–49) shows one, rather comprehensive, larger example that illustrates many aspects of the methodology. Most notably, however, is a clarified view on the transition from **parts to behaviours**, a **transcendental deduction** from *domain space* to *domain time*.

## 1.3 What is this Paper About?

We present a *method for analysing &<sup>5</sup> describing domains*.

**Definition 1 Domain:** By a **domain** we shall understand a **rationally describable** segment of a **human assisted** reality, i.e., of the world, its **physical parts**, and **living species**. These are **endurants** (“still”), existing in space, as well as **perdurants** (“alive”), existing also in time. Emphasis is placed on **“human-assistedness”**, that is, that there is *at least one (man-made) artifact* and that **humans** are a primary

<sup>2</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>

<sup>3</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology>

<sup>4</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>

<sup>5</sup>By *A&B* we mean one topic, the confluence of topics *A* and *B*.

cause for change of enduring **states** as well as perduring **behaviours**. Among the *entities* we may, in any one specific **domain analysis & description**, include **humans** in so far as their properties can be objectively analysed & described ■

**Definition 2 Domain Description:** By a **domain description** we shall understand a combination of **narration** and **formalisation** of a domain. A **formal specification** is a collection of *sort*, or *type* definitions, *function* and *behaviour* definitions, together with *axioms* and *proof obligations* constraining the definitions. A **specification narrative** is a natural language text which in terse statements introduces the names of (in this case, the domain), and, in cases, also the definitions, of sorts (types), functions, behaviours and axioms; not anthropomorphically, but by emphasizing their properties ■

*Domain descriptions* are (to be) void of any reference to future, contemplated software, let alone IT systems, that may support entities of the domain. As such *domain models*<sup>6</sup> can be studied separately, for their own sake, for example as a basis for investigating possible domain theories, or can, subsequently, form the basis for requirements engineering with a view towards development of (‘future’) software, etc. Our aim is to provide a method for the precise analysis and the formal description of domains.

## 1.4 Structure of this Paper

Sections 2–7 form the core of this paper.

Section 8 brings a “large” example that is forward-referred to in Sects. 2–7 and refers (backwards) to Sects. 2–7.

Section 2 introduces the first concepts of domain phenomena: *endurants* and *perdurants*. Their characterisation, in the form of “definitions”, cannot be mathematically precise, as is usual in computer science papers.

Section 3 analyses the so-called *external qualities* of *endurants* into *natural parts*, *structures*, *components*, *materials*, *living species* and *artifacts*. In doing so it covers the *external qualities analysis prompts*.

Section 4 covers the *external qualities description prompts*

Section 5 analyses the so-called *internal qualities* of *endurants* into *unique identification*, *mereology* and *attributes*. In doing so it covers both the *internal qualities analysis prompts* and the *internal qualities description prompts*

Sections 3–5 have covered what this paper has to say about *endurants*.

Section 6 “bridges” Sects. 3–5 and Sect. 7 by introducing the concept of *transcendental deduction*. These deductions allow us to “transform” *endurants* into *perdurants*: “passive” entities into “active” ones.

The essence of Sects. 6–7 is to “translate” enduring parts into perduring behaviours.

Section 7 – although “only” half as long as the three sections on *endurants* – covers the analysis & description method for *perdurants*. We shall model perdurants, notably *behaviours*, in the form of CSP [Hoa85]. Hence we introduce the CSP notions of *channels* and channel *input/output*. Section 7 then “derives” the types of the behaviour arguments from the internal enduring qualities.

Section 9 summarises the achievements and discusses open issues.

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<sup>6</sup>We use the terms ‘*domain descriptions*’ and ‘*domain models*’ interchangeably.

## 2 Entities: Endurants and Perdurants

### 2.1 A Generic Domain Ontology

Figure 1 shows a so-called “upper ontology”<sup>7</sup> for manifest domains<sup>8</sup> By ontologies we shall here understand *formal representations of a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships between those concepts*. Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy justifies our organising the *entities* of any describable domain, for example<sup>9</sup>, as follows: There are *describable* phenomena and there are phenomena that we cannot describe. The former we shall call *entities*. The *entities* are either *endurants*, “still” entities – existing in *space*, or *perdurants*, “alive” entities – existing also in *time*. *Endurants* are either *discrete* or *continuous* – in which




Figure 1: An Upper Ontology for Domains

latter case we call them *materials*<sup>10</sup>. *Discrete endurants* are *physical parts*, *living species*, or are *structures*. *Structures* consist of one or more endurants. *Physical parts* are either *naturals*, or *artifacts*, i.e. man-made, or *components*<sup>11</sup>, or *sets of identically typed parts*. *Living Species* are either *plants* or *animals*. Among animals we have the *humans*. *Naturals* and *artifacts* are either atomic or composite – consisting of two or more differently typed parts. The categorisation into structures, natural parts, artifactual parts, plants, animals, and components is partly based in Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy, partly pragmatic. The distinc-

<sup>7</sup>An **ontology** encompasses a representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories, properties, and relations of the ... entities that substantiate one, many, or all domains. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On-tology\\_\(information\\_science\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On-tology_(information_science)). An **upper ontology** (also known as a top-level ontology or foundation ontology) is an ontology which consists of very general terms (such as “entity”, “endurant”, “attribute”) that are common across all domains. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper\\_ontology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology)

<sup>8</sup>There are domains that are not ‘manifest’, but not according to Defn. 1 on Page 2.

<sup>9</sup>We could organise the ontology differently: entities are either naturals, artifacts or living species, et cetera. If an upper node (●) satisfies a predicate  $\mathcal{P}$  then all descendant nodes do likewise.

<sup>10</sup>Please observe that *materials* were either *natural* or *artifactual*, but that we do not “bother” in this paper. You may wish to slightly change the ontology diagram to reflect a distinction.

<sup>11</sup>Whether a discrete endurant as we shall soon see, is treated as a part or a component is a matter of pragmatics. Again cf. Footnote 10.

tion between endurants and perdurants, are necessitated by Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy as being in space, respectively in space **and** time; discrete and continuous are motivated by arguments of natural sciences; structures and components are purely pragmatic – as we shall later see; plants and animals, including humans, are necessitated by Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy. The distinction between natural, physical parts, and artifacts is not necessary in Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy, but, we claim, necessary, philosophically, in order to perform the *intentional* “pull” transcendental deduction.

Our reference, here, to Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy, is very terse. We refer to a detailed research report: **A Philosophy of Domain Science & Engineering**, <http://www.imm.dtu.dk/~dibj/2018/-philosophy/filo.pdf>, for carefully reasoned arguments. That report is under continued revision: It reviews the **domain analysis & description** method; translates many of Kai Sørlander’s arguments and relates, in detail, the “options” of the **domain analysis & description** approach to Sørlander’s Philosophy.

## 2.2 Universes of Discourse – Example Sect. 8.1.1 Pg. 40

By a **universe of discourse** we shall understand the same as the **domain of interest**, that is, the *domain* to be *analysed & described* ■

**Example 1 Universes of Discourse:** We refer to a number of Internet accessible experimental reports<sup>12</sup> of descriptions of the following domains:

- **railways** [Bjø00, BGP02, Bjø03],
- **container shipping** [Bjø07],
- **stock exchange** [Bjø10c],
- **document systems** [Bjø17b],
- **oil pipelines** [Bjø13a],
- **“The Market”** [Bjø02],
- **Web systems** [Bjø10b],
- **weather information** [Bjø16e],
- **credit card systems** [Bjø16a],
- **urban planning** [Bjø17c],
- **swarms of drones** [Bjø17a],
- et cetera, et cetera ■

It may be a **“large” domain**, that is, consist of many, as we shall see, *endurants* and *perdurants*, of many *parts*, *components* and *materials*, of many *humans* and *artifacts*, and of many *actors*, *actions*, *events* and *behaviours*.

Or it may be a **“small” domain**, that is, consist of a few such entities.

The choice of “boundaries”, that is, of how much or little to include, and of how much or little to exclude is entirely the choice of the domain engineer cum scientist: the choice is crucial, and is not always obvious. The choice delineates an *interface*, that is, that which is within the boundary, i.e., is in the domain, and that which is without, i.e., outside the domain, i.e., is the **context of the domain**, that is, the **external domain interfaces** ■ Experience helps set reasonable boundaries.

There are two “situations”: Either a **domain analysis & description** endeavour is pursued in order to prepare for a subsequent development of *requirements modeling*, in which case one tends to choose a **“narrow” domain**, that is, one that “fits”, includes, but not much more, the domain of interest for the requirements ■ Or a **domain analysis & description** endeavour is pursued in order to research a domain. *Either* one that can form the basis for subsequent engineering studies aimed, eventually at requirements development; in this case “wider” boundaries may be sought. *Or* one that experimentally “throws a larger net”, that is, seeks a “large” domain so as to explore interfaces between what is thought of as **internal system interfaces**.

Where, then, to start the *domain analysis & description*? Either one can start “bottom-up”, that is, with atomic entities: endurants or perdurants, one-by-one, and work one’s way “out”, to include composite

<sup>12</sup>These are **draft** reports, more-or-less complete. The writing of these reports was finished when sufficient evidence, conforming or refuting one or another aspect of the **domain analysis & description method**.

entities, again endurants or perdurants, to finally reach some satisfaction: *Eureka*, a goal has been reached. Or one can start “top-down”, that is, “casting a wide net”. The choice is yours. Our presentation, however, is “top down”: most general domain aspects first.

## 2.3 Entities

**Characterisation 1 Entity:** By an **entity** we shall understand a **phenomenon**, i.e., something that can be *observed*, i.e., be seen or touched by humans, or that can be *conceived* as an *abstraction* of an entity; alternatively, a phenomenon is an entity, *if it exists, it is “being”*, *it is that which makes a “thing” what it is: essence, essential nature* [LFCO87, Vol. I, pg. 665] ■

**Analysis Prompt 1 *is\_entity*:** *The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $\theta$ ) into entities or non-entities. The method can thus be said to provide the domain analysis prompt:*

- *is\_entity* – where *is\_entity*( $\theta$ ) holds if  $\theta$  is an entity<sup>13</sup> ■

*is\_entity* is said to be a *prerequisite prompt* for all other prompts.

The *entities* that we are concerned with are those with which Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy is likewise concerned. They are the ones that are *unavoidable* in any any description of any possible world. And then, which are those entities? In both [Sør94] and [Sør16] rationally deduces that these entities must be in *space* and *time*, must satisfy laws of physics – like those of Newton and Einstein, but among them are also *living species: plants* and *animals* and hence *humans*. The *living species*, besides still being in *space* and *time*, and satisfying laws of physics, must satisfy further properties – which we shall outline in Sect. 3.4 on Page 11.

## 2.4 Endurants and Perdurants

The concepts of endurants and perdurants are not present in, that is, are not essential to Sørlander’s Philosophy. Since our departure point is that of *computing science* where, eventually, conventional computing processes data, that is: performs functions on data, we shall, however, introduce these two notion: *endurant* and *perdurant*. The former, in a rough sense, “corresponds” to data; the latter, similarly, to processes.

**Characterisation 2 Endurant:** By an **endurant** we shall understand an entity that can be observed or conceived and described as a “complete thing” at no matter which given snapshot of time; alternatively an entity is *endurant* if it is capable of *enduring*, that is *persist*, “*hold out*” [LFCO87, Vol. I, pg. 656]. Were we to “freeze” time we would still be able to observe the entire *endurant* ■

**Example 2 Geography Endurants:** The geography of an area, like some island, or a country, consists of its geography – “the lay of the land”, the geodetics of this land, the meteorology of it, et cetera.

**Example 3 Railway System Endurants:** Example railway system endurants are: a railway system, its net, its individual tracks, switch points, trains, their individual locomotives, et cetera.

**Analysis Prompt 2 *is\_endurant*:** *The domain analyser analyses an entity,  $e$ , into an *endurant* as prompted by the domain analysis prompt:*

- *is\_endurant* –  $\phi$  is an *endurant* if *is\_endurant*( $e$ ) holds.

*is\_entity* is a *prerequisite prompt* for *is\_endurant* ■

**Characterisation 3 Perdurant:** By a **perdurant** we shall understand an entity for which only a fragment exists if we look at or touch them at any given snapshot in time, that is, were we to freeze time we would only see or touch a fragment of the *perdurant*, alternatively an entity is *perdurant* if it endures continuously, over time, persists, lasting [LFCO87, Vol. II, pg. 1552] ■

<sup>13</sup>Analysis prompt definitions and description prompt definitions and schemes are delimited by ■



**Example 4 Geography Perdurants:** Example geography perdurants are: the continuous changing of the weather (meteorology); the erosion of coast lines; the rising of some land and the “sinking” of other land areas; volcano eruptions; earth quakes; et cetera.

**Example 5 Railway System Perdurants:** Example railway system perdurants are: the ride of a train from one railway station to another; and the stop of a train at a railway station from some arrival time to some departure time.

**Analysis Prompt 3 *is\_perdurant*:** *The domain analyser analyses an entity  $e$  into perdurants as prompted by the domain analysis prompt:*

- *$is\_perdurant - e$  is a perdurant if  $is\_perdurant(e)$  holds.*

*$is\_entity$  is a prerequisite prompt for  $is\_perdurant$  ■*

### 3 Endurants: Analysis of External Qualities

#### 3.1 Discrete and Continuous Endurants

**Characterisation 4 Discrete Endurant:** By a **discrete endurant** we shall understand an endurant which is separate, individual or distinct in form or concept ■

The notion of *discreteness* is not extended to *perdurants*.

**Example 6 Discrete Endurants:** The individual endurants of Example 3 on the facing page were all discrete. Here are examples of discrete endurants of pipeline systems. A pipeline and its individual units: pipes, valves, pumps, forks, etc.

**Analysis Prompt 4 *is\_discrete*:** *The domain analyser analyses endurants  $e$  into discrete entities as prompted by the domain analysis prompt:*

- *$is\_discrete - e$  is discrete if  $is\_discrete(e)$  holds ■*

**Characterisation 5 Continuous Endurant:** By a **continuous endurant** we shall understand an endurant which is prolonged, without interruption, in an unbroken series or pattern ■

We shall prefer to refer to continuous endurants as *materials* and otherwise cover materials in Sect. 3.6. The notion of a *continuous endurant* is not extended to *perdurants*.

**Example 7 Materials:** Examples of materials are: water, oil, gas, compressed air, etc. A container, which we consider a discrete endurant, may contain a material, like a gas pipeline unit may contain gas.

**Analysis Prompt 5 *is\_continuous*:** *The domain analyser analyses endurants  $e$  into continuous entities as prompted by the domain analysis prompt:*

- *$is\_continuous - e$  is continuous if  $is\_continuous(e)$  holds ■*

Continuity shall here not be understood in the sense of mathematics. Our definition of ‘continuity’ focused on *prolonged, without interruption, in an unbroken series or pattern*. In that sense materials shall be seen as ‘continuous’.

The mathematical notion of ‘continuity’ is an abstract one.

The endurant notion of ‘continuity’ is physical one.

#### 3.2 Discrete Endurants – Example Sect. 8.1 Pg. 40

We analyse discrete endurants into *physical parts, living species and structures*.

### 3.2.1 Physical Parts

**Characterisation 6 Physical Parts:** By a *physical part* we shall understand a discrete endurant existing in time and subject to laws of physics, including the *causality principle* and *gravitational pull*<sup>14</sup>.

**Analysis Prompt 6 *is\_physical\_part*:** The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $\eta$ ) into *physical part*. The method can thus be said to provide the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_physical\_part* – where *is\_physical\_part*( $\eta$ ) holds if  $\eta$  is a *physical part* ■

Section 3.3 continues our treatment of physical parts.

### 3.2.2 Living Species

**Definition 3 Living Species, I:** By a *living species* we shall understand a discrete endurant existing in time, subject to laws of physics, and additionally subject to *causality of purpose*<sup>15</sup> Definition 9 on Page 11 elaborates.

**Analysis Prompt 7 *is\_living\_species*:** The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $e$ ) into *living species*. The method can thus be said to provide the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_living\_species* – where *is\_living\_species*( $e$ ) holds if  $e$  is a *living species* ■

Living species have a *form* they can *develop* to reach; they are *causally* determined to *maintain* this form; and they do so by *exchanging matter* with an *environment*. We refer to [Bjø18a] for details.

Section 3.4 continues our treatment of living species.

### 3.2.3 Structures – Example Sect. 8.1.2 Pg. 40

**Definition 4 Structure:** By a **structure** we shall understand a discrete endurant which the domain engineer chooses to describe as consisting of one or more endurants, whether discrete or continuous, but to **not** endow with **internal qualities**: unique identifiers, mereology or attributes ■

*Structures* are “conceptual endurants”. A *structure* “gathers” one or more endurants under “one umbrella”, often simplifying a presentation of some elements of a domain description. Sometimes, in our domain modelling, we choose to model an endurant as a *structure*, sometimes as a *physical part*; it all depends on what we wish to focus on in our domain model. As such structures are “compounds” where we are interested only in the (external and internal) qualities of the elements of the compound, but not in the qualities of the structure itself.

**Example 8 Structures:** As shown in the main example, Sect. 8, a model of transport is structured into a *road net structure* and an *automobile structure*. The *road net structure* is then structured as a pair: a *structure of hubs* and a *structure of links*. These latter structures are then modelled as set of hubs, respectively links. We could have modelled the *road net structure* as a *composite part* with *unique identity*, *mereology* and *attributes* which could then serve to model a *road net authority*. We could have modelled the *automobile structure* as a *composite part* with *unique identity*, *mereology* and *attributes* which could then serve to model a *department of vehicles* ■

The concept of *structure* is new. That is, it was not present in [Bjø16f]. Whether to analyse & describe a discrete endurant into a structure or a physical part is a matter of choice. If we choose to analyse a discrete endurant into a *physical part* then it is because we are interested in endowing the part with *qualities*, the unique identifiers, mereology and one or more attributes. If we choose to analyse a discrete endurant into a *structure* then it is because we are **not** interested in endowing the endurant with *qualities*.

<sup>14</sup>This characterisation is the result of our study of relations between philosophy and computing science, notably influenced by Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy. We refer to our research report [Bjø18a, [www.imm.dtu.dk/~dibj/2018/philosophy/filo.pdf](http://www.imm.dtu.dk/~dibj/2018/philosophy/filo.pdf)].

<sup>15</sup>See Footnote 14.



**Analysis Prompt 8** *is\_structure*: The domain analyser analyse endurants, *e*, into structure entities as prompted by the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_structure* ■

We shall now treat the external qualities of discrete endurants: *physical parts* (Sect. 3.3) and *living species* (Sect. 3.4). After that we cover *components* (Sect. 3.5), *materials* (Sect. 3.6) and *artifacts* (physical man-made parts, Sect. 3.3.2). We remind the reader that in this section, i.e. Sect. 3, we cover only the *analysis calculus* for *external qualities*; the *description calculus* for *external qualities* is treated in Sect. 4. The analysis and description calculi for internal qualities is covered in Sect. 5.

### 3.3 Physical Parts – Example Sect. 8.1 Pg. 40

Physical parts are either *natural parts*, or *components*, or *sets of parts* of the same type, or are *artifacts* i.e. man-made parts. The categorisation of physical parts into these four is pragmatic. *Physical parts* follow from Kai Sørlander’s Philosophy. *Natural parts* are what Sørlander’s Philosophy is initially about. *Artifacts* follow from *humans* acting according to their *purpose* in making “physical parts”. *Components* is a simplification of natural and man-made parts. *Set of parts* is a simplification of composite natural and composite man-made parts as will be made clear in Sect. 4.2.

#### 3.3.1 Natural Parts

**Characterisation 7 Natural Parts**: Natural parts are in *space* and *time*; are subject to the *laws of physics*, and also subject to the *principle of causality* and *gravitational pull*.

The above is a factual characterisation of natural parts. The below is our definition – such as we shall model natural parts.

**Definition 5 Natural Part**: By a **natural part** we shall understand a *physical part* which the domain engineer chooses to endow with all three **internal qualities**: unique identification, mereology, and one or more attributes ■

#### 3.3.2 Artifacts

**Characterisation 8 Man-made Parts: Artifacts**: Artifacts are man-made either discrete or continuous endurants. In this section we shall only consider discrete endurants. Man-made continuous endurants are not treated separately but are “lumped” with [natural] materials. Artifacts are in *space* and *time*; are subject to the *laws of physics*, and also subject to the *principle of causality* and *gravitational pull*.

The above is a factual characterisation of discrete artifacts. The below is our definition – such as we shall model discrete artifacts.

**Definition 6 Artifact**: By an **artifact** we shall understand a *man-made physical part* which, like for *natural parts*, the domain engineer chooses to endow with all three **internal qualities**: unique identification, mereology, and one or more attributes ■

We shall assume, cf. Sect. 5.3 [*Attributes*], that *artifacts* all come with an *attribute* of kind *intent*, that is, a set of purposes for which the artifact was constructed, and for which it is intended to serve. We continue our treatment of artifacts in Sect. 3.7 below.

#### 3.3.3 Parts

**Example 9 Parts**: The examples of Example 2 on Page 6 are all natural parts, and of Example 3 on Page 6 are all artifacts ■

Except for the *intent* attribute of artifacts, we shall, in the following, treat *natural* and *artificial* parts on par, i.e., just as physical parts.

**Analysis Prompt 9** *is\_part*: The domain analyser analyse endurants,  $e$ , into part entities as prompted by the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_part* ■

### 3.3.4 Atomic and Composite Parts

A distinguishing quality of natural and artifactual parts is whether they are atomic or composite. Please note that we shall, in the following, examine the concept of parts in quite some detail. That is, parts become the domain endurants of main interest, whereas components, structures and materials become of secondary interest. This is a choice. The choice is based on pragmatics. It is still the domain analyser cum describers' choice whether to consider a discrete endurant a part or a component, or a structure. If the domain engineer wishes to investigate the details of a discrete endurant then the domain engineer choose to model<sup>16</sup> the discrete endurant as a part otherwise as a component.

### 3.3.5 Atomic Parts

**Definition 7 Atomic Part:** **Atomic parts** are those which, in a given context, are deemed to *not* consist of meaningful, separately observable proper *sub-parts*. A **sub-part** is a *part* ■

**Analysis Prompt 10** *is\_atomic*: The domain analyser analyses a discrete endurant, *i.e.*, a part  $p$  into an atomic endurant:

- *is\_atomic*:  $p$  is an atomic endurant if *is\_atomic*( $p$ ) holds ■

**Example 10 Atomic Road Net Parts:** From one point of view all of the following can be considered atomic parts: hubs, links<sup>17</sup>, and automobiles.

### 3.3.6 Composite Parts

**Definition 8 Composite Part:** **Composite parts** are those which, in a given context, are deemed to *indeed* consist of meaningful, separately observable proper *sub-parts* ■

**Analysis Prompt 11** *is\_composite*: The domain analyser analyses a discrete endurant, *i.e.*, a part  $p$  into a composite endurant:

- *is\_composite*:  $p$  is a composite endurant if *is\_composite*( $p$ ) holds ■

*is\_discrete* is a prerequisite prompt of both *is\_atomic* and *is\_composite*.

**Example 11 Composite Automobile Parts:** From another point of view all of the following can be considered composite parts: an automobile, consisting of, for example, the following composite parts: the engine train, the chassis the car body, the doors and the wheels. These can again be considered composite parts.

<sup>16</sup>We use the term *to model* interchangeably with the composite term *to analyse & describe*; similarly *a model* is used interchangeably with *an analysis & description*.

<sup>17</sup>Hub  $\equiv$  street intersection; link  $\equiv$  street segments with no intervening hubs.

### 3.4 Living Species

We refer to Sect. 3.2.2 for our first characterisation (Page 8) of the concept of *living species*<sup>18</sup>: a discrete enduring existing in time, subject to laws of physics, and additionally subject to *causality of purpose*<sup>19</sup>

**Definition 9 Living Species, II:** Living species must have some *form they can be developed to reach*; which they must be *causally determined to maintain*. This *development and maintenance* must further in an *exchange of matter with an environment*. It must be possible that living species occur in one of two forms: one form which is characterised by *development, form and exchange*; another form which, **additionally**, can be characterised by the *ability to purposeful movement*. The first we call **plants**, the second we call **animals** ■

**Analysis Prompt 12 *is\_living\_species*:** *The domain analyser analyse discrete durants, e, into living species entities as prompted by the domain analysis prompt:*

- *is\_living\_species* ■

#### 3.4.1 Plants

**Example 12 Plants:** Although we have not yet come across domains for which the need to model the living species of plants were needed, we give some examples anyway: grass, tulip, rhododendron, oak tree.

**Analysis Prompt 13 *is\_plant*:** *The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $\ell$ ) into a plant. The method can thus be said to provide the domain analysis prompt:*

- *is\_plant* – where *is\_plant*( $\ell$ ) holds if  $\ell$  is a plant ■

The predicate *is\_living\_species*( $\ell$ ) is a prerequisite for *is\_plant*( $\ell$ ).

#### 3.4.2 Animals

**Definition 10 Animal:** We refer to the initial definition of *living species* above – while ephasizing the following traits: (i) *form animals can be developed to reach*; (ii) *causally determined to maintain*. (iii) *development and maintenance* in an *exchange of matter with an environment*, and (iv) *ability to purposeful movement*.

**Analysis Prompt 14 *is\_animal*:** *The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $\ell$ ) into an animal. The method can thus be said to provide the domain analysis prompt:*

- *is\_animal* – where *is\_animal*( $\ell$ ) holds if  $\ell$  is an animal ■

The predicate *is\_living\_species*( $\ell$ ) is a prerequisite for *is\_animal*( $\ell$ ).

**Example 13 Animals:** Although we have not yet come across domains for which the need to model the living species of animals, in general, were needed, we give some examples anyway: dolphin, goose cow dog, lion, fly.

We have not decided, for this paper, whether to model animals singly or as sets<sup>20</sup> of such.

<sup>18</sup>See analysis prompt 7 on Page 8.

<sup>19</sup>See Footnote 14 on Page 8.

<sup>20</sup>school of dolphins, flock of geese, herd of cattle, pack of dogs, pride of lions, swarm of flies,

### 3.4.3 Humans

**Definition 11 Human:** A human (a person) is an *animal*, cf. Definition 10, with the additional properties of having *language*, being *conscious* of having *knowledge* (of its own situation), and *responsibility*.

**Analysis Prompt 15 *is\_human*:** The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $\ell$ ) into a human. The method can thus be said to provide the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_human* – where *is\_human*( $\ell$ ) holds if  $\ell$  is a human ■

The predicate *is\_animal*( $\ell$ ) is a prerequisite for *is\_human*( $\ell$ ).

We refer to [Bjø18a, Sects. 10.4–10.5] for a specific treatment of living species, animals and humans, and to [Bjø18a] in general for the philosophy background for rationalising the treatment of living species, animals and humans.

We have not, in our many experimental domain modelling efforts had occasion to model humans; or rather: we have modelled, for example, automobiles as possessing human qualities, i.e., “subsuming humans”. We have found, in these experimental domain modelling efforts that we often confer anthropomorphic qualities on artifacts<sup>21</sup>, that is, that these artifacts have human characteristics. You, the reader are reminded that when some programmers try to explain their programs they do so using such phrases as *and here the program does ... so-and-so!*

## 3.5 Components

**Definition 12 Component:** By a **component** we shall understand a discrete endurant which we, the domain analyser cum describer chooses to **not** endow with **mereology** ■

Components are discrete endurants. Usually they come in sets. That is, sets of sets of components of different sorts (cf. Sect. 4.4 on Page 16). A discrete endurant can (itself) “be” a set of components. But physical parts may contain (*has\_components*) components: natural parts may contain natural components, artifacts may contain natural and artifactual components. We leave it to the reader to provide analysis predicates for natural and artifactual “componentry”.

**Example 14 Components:** A natural part, say a land area may contain gravel pits of sand, clay pits tar pits and other “pits”. An artifact, say a postal letter box may contain letters, small parcels, newspapers and advertisement brochures.

**Analysis Prompt 16 *has\_components*:** The domain analyser analyses discrete endurants  $e$  into component entities as prompted by the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *has\_components* ■

We refer to Sect. 4.4 on Page 16 for further treatment of the concept of *components*.

## 3.6 Continuous Endurants $\equiv$ Materials

**Definition 13 Material:** By a **material** we shall understand a continuous endurant ■

Materials are continuous endurants. Usually they come in sets. That is, sets of materials of different sorts (cf. Sect. 4.5 on Page 17). So an endurant can (itself) “be” a set of materials. But physical parts may contain (*has\_materials*) materials: natural parts may contain natural materials, artifacts may contain natural and artifactual materials. We leave it to the reader to provide analysis predicates for natural and artifactual “materials”.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Sect. 3.7 below.

**Example 15 Natural and Man-made Materials:** A **natural part**, say a *land area*, may contain lakes, rivers, irrigation dams and border seas. An **artifact**, say an *automobile*, usually contains gasoline, lubrication oil, engine cooler liquid and window screen washer water.

**Analysis Prompt 17 *has\_materials*:** The **domain analysis prompt**:

- *has\_materials(p)*

yields **true** if part  $p:P$  potentially may contain materials otherwise false ■

We refer to Sect. 4.5 on Page 17 for further treatment of the concept of *materials*. We shall define the terms unique identification, mereology and attributes in Sects. 5.1–5.3.

### 3.7 Artifacts

**Definition 14 Artifacts:** By artifacts we shall understand a man-made physical part or a man-made material ■

**Example 16 More Artifacts:** We have already, in Example 9 on Page 9, referred to some examples of artifacts. Here are some more: ship, container vessels, container, container stack, container terminal port, harbour.

**Analysis Prompt 18 *is\_artifact*:** The domain analyser analyses “things” ( $p$ ) into artifacts. The method can thus be said to provide the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *is\_artifact* – where *is\_artifact(p)* holds if  $p$  is an artifact ■

### 3.8 States – Example Sect. 8.1.6 Pg. 41

**Definition 15 State:** By a *state* we shall understand any number of physical parts or materials.

**Example 17 Artifactual States:** The following endurants are examples of states (including being elements of state compounds): pipe units (pipes, valves, pumps, etc.) of pipe-lines; hubs and links of road nets (i.e., street intersections and street segments); automobiles (of transport systems).

The notion of *state* becomes relevant in Sect. 7.

## 4 Endurants: The Description Calculus

### 4.1 Parts: Natural or Man-made

The observer functions of this section applies to both natural parts and man-made parts (i.e., artifacts).

#### 4.1.1 On Discovering Endurant Sorts

Our aim now is to present the basic principles that let the domain analyser decide on *part sorts*. We observe parts one-by-one.

*( $\alpha$ ) Our analysis of parts concludes when we have “lifted” our examination of a particular part instance to the conclusion that it is of a given sort, that is, reflects a formal concept.*

Thus there is, in this analysis, a “eureka”, a step where we shift focus from the concrete to the abstract, from observing specific part instances to postulating a sort: from one to the many

**Analysis Prompt 19** *observe\_endurant*: The **domain analysis prompt**:

- *observe\_endurants*

directs the domain analyser to observe the sub-endurants of an endurant  $e$  and to suggest their sorts. Let  $observe\_endurants(e) = \{e_1:E_1, e_2:E_2, \dots, e_m:E_m\}$  ■

( $\beta$ ) The analyser analyses, for each of these endurants,  $e_i$ , which formal concept, i.e., sort, it belongs to; let us say that it is of sort  $E_k$ ; thus the sub-parts of  $p$  are of sorts  $\{E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m\}$ . Some  $E_k$  may be natural parts, other artifacts (man-made parts) or structures, and yet others may be components or materials. And parts may be either atomic or composite.

The domain analyser continues to examine a finite number of other composite parts:  $\{p_j, p_\ell, \dots, p_n\}$ . It is then “discovered”, that is, decided, that they all consists of the same number of sub-parts  $\{e_{i_1}, e_{i_2}, \dots, e_{i_m}\}$ ,  $\{e_{j_1}, e_{j_2}, \dots, e_{j_m}\}$ ,  $\{e_{\ell_1}, e_{\ell_2}, \dots, e_{\ell_m}\}$ , ...,  $\{e_{n_1}, e_{n_2}, \dots, e_{n_m}\}$ , of the same, respective, endurant sorts.

( $\gamma$ ) It is therefore concluded, that is, decided, that  $\{e_i, e_j, e_\ell, \dots, e_n\}$  are all of the same endurant sort  $P$  with observable part sub-sorts  $\{E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m\}$ .

Above we have *type-font-highlighted* three sentences: ( $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ ). When you analyse what they “prescribe” you will see that they entail a “depth-first search” for part sorts. The  $\beta$  sentence says it rather directly: “The analyser analyses, for each of these parts,  $p_k$ , which formal concept, i.e., part sort it belongs to.” To do this analysis in a proper way, the analyser must (“recursively”) analyse structures into sub-structures, parts, components and materials, and parts “down” to their atomicity. Components and materials are considered “atomic”, i.e., to not contain further analysable endurants. For the structures, parts (whether natural or man-made), components and materials of the structure the analyser cum describer decides on their sort, and work (“recurse”) their way “back”, through possibly intermediate endurants, to the  $p_k$ s. Of course, when the analyser starts by examining atomic parts, components and materials, then their endurant structure and part analysis “recursion” is not necessary.

#### 4.1.2 Endurant Sort Observer Functions

The above analysis amounts to the analyser first “applying” the *domain analysis* prompt  $is\_composite(e)$  to a discrete endurant,  $e$ , where we now assume that the obtained truth value is **true**. Let us assume that endurants  $e:E$  consist of sub-endurants of sorts  $\{E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m\}$ . Since we cannot automatically guarantee that our domain descriptions secure that  $E$  and each  $E_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq m$ ) denotes disjoint sets of entities we must prove it.

**Domain Description Prompt 1** *observe\_endurant\_sorts*: If  $is\_composite(p)$  holds, then the analyser “applies” the **domain description prompt**

- $observe\_endurant\_sorts(p)$

resulting in the analyser writing down the endurant sorts and endurant sort observers domain description text according to the following schema:

##### 1. *observe\_endurant\_sorts* schema

###### **Narration:**

- [s] ... narrative text on sorts ...
- [o] ... narrative text on sort observers ...
- [ $\eta$ ] ... narrative text on sort type observers ...
- [i] ... narrative text on sort recognisers ...
- [p] ... narrative text on proof obligations ...

###### **Formalisation:**



<p><b>type</b></p> <p>[s] E,</p> <p>[s] <math>E_i</math> <math>i:[1..m]</math> <b>comment:</b> <math>E_i</math> <math>i:[1..m]</math> abbreviates <math>E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m</math></p> <p><b>value</b></p> <p>[o] <b>obs_endurant_sorts</b><math>_E</math>: <math>E \rightarrow E_i</math> <math>i:[1..m]</math></p> <p>[<math>\eta</math>] <b>if</b> <math>\text{is\_part}(e_i)</math>: <math>\eta(e_i) \equiv \llcorner E_i \lrcorner i:[1..m]</math></p> <p>[i] <b>is</b><math>_E</math>: <math>(E_1 E_2 \dots E_m) \rightarrow \mathbf{Bool}</math> <math>i:[1..m]</math></p> <p><b>proof obligation</b> [Disjointness of endurant sorts]</p> <p>[p] <math>\mathcal{P}\mathcal{O} : \forall e:(E_1 E_2 \dots E_m) \cdot \wedge \{\mathbf{is}_E(e) \equiv \wedge \{\sim \mathbf{is}_{E_j}(p) j:[1..m] \setminus \{i\}\}i:[1..m]\}</math></p>
--

$\text{is\_composite}$  is a **prerequisite prompt** of  $\text{observe\_endurant\_sorts}$ . That is, the composite may satisfy  $\text{is\_natural}$  or  $\text{is\_artifact}$  ■

We do not here state guidelines for discharging proof obligations.

## 4.2 Concrete Part Types

**Analysis Prompt 20**  $\text{has\_concrete\_type}$ : The domain analyser may decide that it is expedient, i.e., pragmatically sound, to render a part sort,  $P$ , whether atomic or composite, as a concrete type,  $T$ . That decision is prompted by the holding of the **domain analysis prompt**:

- $\text{has\_concrete\_type}$ .

$\text{is\_discrete}$  is a prerequisite prompt of  $\text{has\_concrete\_type}$  ■

The reader is reminded that the decision as to whether an abstract type is (also) to be described concretely is entirely at the discretion of the domain engineer.

**Domain Description Prompt 2**  $\text{observe\_part\_type}$ : Then the domain analyser applies the **domain description prompt**:

- $\text{observe\_part\_type}(p)$ <sup>22</sup>

to parts  $p:P$  which then yield the part type and part type observers domain description text according to the following schema:

### 2. $\text{observe\_part\_type}$ schema

#### Narration:

[t<sub>1</sub>] ... narrative text on sorts and types  $S_i$  ...

[t<sub>2</sub>] ... narrative text on types  $T$  ...

[t<sub>3</sub>] ... narrative text on type of value observer

[o] ... narrative text on type observers ...

#### Formalisation:

**type**

[t<sub>1</sub>]  $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m, \dots, S_n,$

[t<sub>2</sub>]  $T = \mathcal{E}(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n)$

[t<sub>3</sub>]  $\eta(s_i) \equiv \llcorner S \lrcorner, i:[1..n], s_i:S_i$

**value**

[o] **obs\_part** $_T$ :  $P \rightarrow T$  ■

<sup>22</sup> $\text{has\_concrete\_type}$  is a prerequisite prompt of  $\text{observe\_part\_type}$ .

Here  $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m, \dots, S_n$  may be any types, including part sorts, where  $0 \leq m \leq n \leq 1$ , where  $m$  is the number of new (atomic or composite) sorts, and where  $n - m$  is the number of concrete types (like **Bool**, **Int**, **Nat**) or sorts already analysed & described, and  $\mathcal{E}(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n)$  is a type expression. Usually it is wise to restrict the part type definitions,  $T_i = \mathcal{E}_i(Q, R, \dots, S)$ , to simple type expressions.<sup>23</sup> The type name,  $T$ , of the concrete type, as well as those of the auxiliary types,  $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m$ , are chosen by the domain describer: they may have already been chosen for other sort-to-type descriptions, or they may be new.

### 4.3 On Endurant Sorts

#### 4.3.1 Derivation Chains

Let  $E$  be a composite sort. Let  $E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m$  be the part sorts “discovered” by means of `observe_endurant_sorts(e)` where  $e:E$ . We say that  $E_1, E_2, \dots, E_m$  are (immediately) **derived** from  $E$ . If  $E_k$  is derived from  $E_j$  and  $E_j$  is derived from  $E_i$ , then, by transitivity,  $E_k$  is **derived** from  $E_i$ .

#### 4.3.2 No Recursive Derivations

We “mandate” that if  $E_k$  is derived from  $E_j$  then there  $E_j$  is different from  $E_k$  and there can be no  $E_k$  derived from  $E_j$ , that is,  $E_k$  cannot be derived from  $E_k$ . That is, we do not “provide for” recursive domain sorts. It is not a question, actually of allowing recursive domain sorts. It is, we claim to have observed, in very many *analysis & description* experiments, that there are no recursive domain sorts!<sup>24</sup>

#### 4.3.3 Names of Part Sorts and Types

The **domain analysis & description** text prompts `observe_endurant_sorts`, as well as the below-defined `observe_part_type`, `observe_component_sorts` and `observe_material_sorts`, – as well as the further below defined `attribute_names`, `observe_material_sorts`, `observe_unique_identifier`, `observe_mereology` and `observe_attributes` prompts introduced below – “yield” type names. That is, it is as if there is a reservoir of an indefinite-size set of such names from which these names are “pulled”, and once obtained are never “pulled” again. There may be domains for which two distinct part sorts may be composed from identical part sorts. *In this case the domain analyser indicates so by prescribing a part sort already introduced.*

### 4.4 Components

We refer to Sect. 3.5 on Page 12 for our initial treatment of ‘components’.

**Domain Description Prompt 3** `observe_component_sorts`: *The domain description prompt:*

- `observe_component_sorts(p)`

*yields the component sorts and component sort observer domain description text according to the following schema – whether or not the actual part  $p$  contains any components:*

#### 3. `observe_component_sorts` schema

##### Narration:

[s] ... narrative text on component sorts ...

<sup>23</sup>  $T = A\text{-set}$  or  $T = A^*$  or  $T = ID \rightarrow_n A$  or  $T = A_i | B_i | \dots | C_i$  where  $ID$  is a sort of unique identifiers,  $T = A_i | B_i | \dots | C_i$  defines the disjoint types  $A_i ::= \text{mk}A_i(s:A_s)$ ,  $B_i ::= \text{mk}B_i(s:B_s)$ , ...,  $C_i ::= \text{mk}C_i(s:C_s)$ , and where  $A, A_s, B_s, \dots, C_s$  are sorts. Instead of  $A_i ::= \text{mk}A_i(a:A_s)$ , etc., we may write  $A_i :: A_s$  etc.

<sup>24</sup> Some readers may object, but we insist! If trees are brought forward as an example of a recursively definable domain, then we argue: Yes, trees can be recursively defined, but it is not recursive. Trees can, as well, be defined as a variant of graphs, and you wouldn’t claim, would you, that graphs are recursive?

[o] ... narrative text on component observers ...  
 [i] ... narrative text on component sort recognisers ...  
 [u] ... narrative text on unique identifier ...  
 [p] ... narrative text on component sort proof obligations ...

**Formalisation:****type**

[s]  $K_1, K_2, \dots, K_n$   
 [s]  $K = K_1 | K_2 | \dots | K_n$   
 [s]  $KS = K\text{-set}$

**value**

[o] **obs\_components\_P**:  $P \rightarrow KS$   
 [i] **is\_K<sub>i</sub>**:  $(K_1 | K_2 | \dots | K_n) \rightarrow \mathbf{Bool}$   $i:[1..n]$   
 [u] **uid\_K<sub>i</sub>**

**Proof Obligation:** [Disjointness of Component Sorts]

[p]  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{O}: \forall k_i:(K_1 | K_2 | \dots | K_n) \cdot \bigwedge \{ \mathbf{is\_K}_i(k_i) \equiv \bigwedge \{ \sim \mathbf{is\_K}_j(k_j) | j:[1..n] \setminus \{i\} \} \} i:[1..n]$  ■

We have presented one way of tackling the issue of describing components. There are other ways. We leave those ‘other ways’ to the reader. We are not going to suggest techniques and tools for analysing, let alone ascribing qualities to components. We suggest that conventional abstract modeling techniques and tools be applied.

## 4.5 Materials

We refer to Sect. 3.6 on Page 12 for our initial treatment of ‘materials’. Continuous endurants (i.e., **material**s) are entities,  $m$ , which satisfy:

- $\mathbf{is\_material}(e) \equiv \mathbf{is\_continuous}(e)$

If  $\mathbf{is\_material}(e)$  holds then we can apply the **domain description prompt**:  $\mathbf{observe\_material\_sorts}(e)$ .

**Domain Description Prompt 4** *observe\_material\_sorts*: The **domain description prompt**:

- $\mathbf{observe\_material\_sorts}(e)$

yields the material sorts and material sort observers’ domain description text according to the following schema whether or not part  $p$  actually contains materials:

### 4. observe\_material\_sorts schema

**Narration:**

[s] ... narrative text on material sorts ...  
 [o] ... narrative text on material sort observers ...  
 [i] ... narrative text on material sort recognisers ...  
 [p] ... narrative text on material sort proof obligations ...

**Formalisation:****type**

[s]  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$   
 [s]  $M = M_1 | M_2 | \dots | M_n$   
 [s]  $MS = M\text{-set}$   
 [a]  $A_i = A_{i1} | A_{i2} | \dots | A_{in}$

**value**

[o]	<b>obs_mat_sort</b> $_M$ : $P \rightarrow M$ , [i:1..n]
[o]	<b>obs_materials</b> $_P$ : $P \rightarrow MS$
[i]	<b>is</b> $_M$ : $M \rightarrow \mathbf{Bool}$ [i:1..n]
[a]	<b>attr</b> $_{A_j}$ : $M_i \rightarrow A_j$ [i:...,j:...]
	<b>proof obligation</b> [Disjointness of Material Sorts]
[p]	$\mathcal{P}\mathcal{O}$ : $\forall m_i:M \cdot \bigwedge \{\mathbf{is}_M(m_i) \equiv \bigwedge \{\sim \mathbf{is}_M(m_j) \mid j \in \{1..m\} \setminus \{i\}\} \mid i:[1..n]\}$

Let us assume that parts  $p:P$  embody materials of sorts  $\{M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n\}$ . Since we cannot automatically guarantee that our domain descriptions secure that each  $M_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) denotes disjoint sets of entities we must prove it ■

## 5 Endurants: Analysis & Description of Internal Qualities

We remind the reader that internal qualities cover *unique Identifiers* (Sect. 5.1), *mereology* (Sect. 5.2) and *attributes* (Sect. 5.3).

### 5.1 Unique Identifiers – Example Sect. 8.1.7 Pg. 41

We introduce a notion of unique identification of parts and components. We assume (i) that all parts and components,  $p$ , of any domain  $P$ , have *unique identifiers*, (ii) that *unique identifiers* (of parts and components  $p:P$ ) are *abstract values* (of the *unique identifier* sort  $PI$  of parts  $p:P$ ), (iii) such that distinct part or component sorts,  $P_i$  and  $P_j$ , have distinctly named *unique identifier* sorts, say  $PI_i$  and  $PI_j$ , (iv) that all  $\pi_i:PI_i$  and  $\pi_j:PI_j$  are distinct, and (v) that the observer function **uid** $_P$  applied to  $p$  yields the unique identifier, say  $\pi:PI$ , of  $p$ . The description language function **type.name** applies to unique identifiers,  $p_{ui}:P_{UI}$ , and yield the name of the type,  $P$ , of the parts having unique identifiers of type  $P_{UI}$ .

**Representation of Unique Identifiers:** Unique identifiers are abstractions. When we endow two parts (say of the same sort) with distinct unique identifiers then we are simply saying that these two parts are distinct. We are not assuming anything about how these identifiers otherwise come about.

**Domain Description Prompt 5** *observe\_unique\_identifier*: We can therefore apply the **domain description prompt**:

- *observe\_unique\_identifier*

to parts  $p:P$  resulting in the analyser writing down the unique identifier type and observer domain description text according to the following schema:

#### 5. observe\_unique\_identifier schema

##### Narration:

[s] ... narrative text on unique identifier sort  $PI$  ...  
 [u] ... narrative text on unique identifier observer **uid** $_P$  ...  
 [ $\eta$ ] ... narrative text on type name, an  $RSL^+$ Text observer ...  
 [a] ... axiom on uniqueness of unique identifiers ...

##### Formalisation:

**type**  
 [s]  $PI$   
**value**  
 [u] **uid** $_P$ :  $P \rightarrow PI$   
 [u]  $\eta$   $PI \rightarrow \llcorner P \lrcorner$

**axiom** [Disjointness of Domain Identifier Types]  
 [a]  $\mathcal{A}: \mathcal{U}(PI, PI_i, PI_j, \dots, PI_k)$  ■

We ascribe, in principle, unique identifiers to all parts whether natural or artifactual, and to all components. We find, from our many experiments, cf. Example 1 on Page 5, that we really focus on those domain entities which are artifactual endurants and their behavioural “counterparts”.

## 5.2 Mereology – Example Sect. 8.1.8 Pg. 42

Mereology is the study and knowledge of parts and part relations. Mereology, as a logical/philosophical discipline, can perhaps best be attributed to the Polish mathematician/logician Stanisław Leśniewski [CV99, Bjø14a].

### 5.2.1 Part Relations

Which are the relations that can be relevant for part-hood? We give some examples. (i) Two otherwise distinct parts may “share” values.<sup>25</sup> By ‘sharing’ values we shall, as a generic example, mean that two parts of different sorts has the same attributes but that one ‘defines’ the attribute, like, for example ‘programming’ its values, cf. Defn.8 Page23, whereas the other ‘uses’ these values, like, for example considering them ‘inert’, cf. Defn.3 Page22. (ii) Two otherwise distinct parts may be said to, for example, be topologically “adjacent” or one “embedded” within the other. These examples are in no way indicative of the “space” of part relations that may be relevant for part-hood. The domain analyser is expected to do a bit of experimental research in order to discover necessary, sufficient and pleasing “mereology-hoods”!

### 5.2.2 Part Mereology: Types and Functions

**Analysis Prompt 21** *has\_mereology*: To discover necessary, sufficient and pleasing “mereology-hoods” the analyser can be said to endow a truth value, **true**, to the **domain analysis prompt**:

- *has\_mereology*

When the domain analyser decides that some parts are related in a specifically enunciated mereology, the analyser has to decide on suitable *mereology types* and *mereology observers* (i.e., part relations).

- 1 We define a **mereology type** of a part  $p:P$  as a triplet type expression over set of unique [part] identifiers.
- 2 There is the identification of all those part types  $P_{i_1}, P_{i_2}, \dots, P_{i_m}$  where at least one of whose properties “is\_of\_interest” to parts  $p:P$ .
- 3 There is the identification of all those part types  $P_{io_1}, P_{io_2}, \dots, P_{io_n}$  where at least one of whose properties “is\_of\_interest” to parts  $p:P$  and vice-versa.
- 4 There is the identification of all those part types  $P_{o_1}, P_{o_2}, \dots, P_{o_o}$  for whom properties of  $p:P$  “is\_of\_interest” to parts of types  $P_{o_1}, P_{o_2}, \dots, P_{o_o}$ .
- 5 The the mereology triplet sets of unique identifiers are disjoint and are all unique identifiers of the universe of discourse.

<sup>25</sup>For the concept of attribute value see Sect. 5.3.1 on Page 21.

The three part mereology is just a suggestion. As it is formulated here we mean the three ‘sets’ to be disjoint. Other forms of expressing a mereology should be considered for the particular domain and for the particular parts of that domain. We leave out further characterisation of the seemingly vague notion "is\_of\_interest". It is exemplified in Sect. 8.1.8 Pg. 42.

#### type

```

2  iPI = iPI1 | iPI2 | ... | iPIm
3  ioPI = ioPI1 | ioPI2 | ... | ioPIn
4  oPI = oPI1 | oPI2 | ... | oPIo
1  MT = iPI-set × ioPI-set × oPI-set

```

#### axiom

```

5  ∀ (iset,ioiset,oset):MT •
5  card iset + card ioiset + card oset = card ∪{iset,ioiset,oset}
5  ∪{iset,ioiset,oset} ⊆ unique_identifiers(uod)

```

#### value

```

5  unique_identifiers: P → UI-set
5  unique_identifiers(p) ≡ ...

```

**Domain Description Prompt 6** *observe\_mereology*: If *has\_mereology(p)* holds for parts *p* of type *P*, then the analyser can apply the **domain description prompt**:

- *observe\_mereology*

to parts of that type and write down the mereology types and observer domain description text according to the following schema:

#### 6. *observe\_mereology* schema

<p><b>Narration:</b></p> <p>[t] ... narrative text on mereology type ...</p> <p>[m] ... narrative text on mereology observer ...</p> <p>[a] ... narrative text on mereology type constraints ...</p> <p><b>Formalisation:</b></p> <p><b>type</b></p> <p>[t] MT<sup>26</sup></p> <p><b>value</b></p> <p>[m] <b>obs_mereo_P</b>: P → MT</p> <p><b>axiom</b> [Well-formedness of Domain Mereologies]</p> <p>[a] <math>\mathcal{A}</math>: <math>\mathcal{A}(MT)</math></p>
---

$\mathcal{A}(MT)$  is a predicate over possibly all unique identifier types of the domain description. To write down the concrete type definition for MT requires a bit of analysis and thinking. *has\_mereology* is a **prerequisite prompt** for *observe\_mereology* ■

### 5.2.3 Formulation of Mereologies

The *observe\_mereology* domain descriptor, Page 20, may give the impression that the mereo type MT can be described “at the point of issue” of the *observe\_mereology* prompt. Since the MT type expression may, in general, depend on any part sort the mereo type MT can, for some domains, “first” be described when all part sorts have been dealt with. In [Bjø14b] we we present a model of one form of evaluation of the TripTych analysis and description prompts.

<sup>26</sup>The mereology descriptor, MT will be referred to in the sequel.



### 5.2.4 Some Modelling Observations

It is, in principle, possible to find examples of mereologies of natural parts: rivers: their confluence, lakes and oceans; and geography: mountain ranges, flat lands, etc. But in our experimental case studies cf. Example 1 on Page 5, we have found no really interesting such cases. All our experimental case studies appears to focus on the mereology of artifacts. And, finally, in modelling humans, we find that their mereology encompass all other humans and all artifacts. Humans cannot be tamed to refrain from interacting with everyone and everything.

## 5.3 Attributes – Example Sect. 8.1.9 Pg. 43

To recall: there are three sets of **internal qualities**: unique part identifiers, part mereology and attributes. Unique part identifiers and part mereology are rather definite kinds of internal enduring qualities. Part attributes form more “free-wheeling” sets of **internal qualities**.

### 5.3.1 Technical Issues

We divide Sect. 5.3 into two subsections: *technical issues*, the present one, and *modelling issues*, Sect. 5.3.2.

**Inseparability of Attributes from Parts and Materials:** Parts and materials are typically recognised because of their spatial form and are otherwise characterised by their intangible, but measurable attributes. That is, whereas endurants, whether discrete (as are parts and components) or continuous (as are materials), are physical, tangible, in the sense of being spatial [or being abstractions, i.e., concepts, of spatial endurants], attributes are intangible: cannot normally be touched<sup>27</sup>, or seen<sup>28</sup>, but can be objectively measured<sup>29</sup>. Thus, in our quest for describing domains where humans play an active rôle, we rule out subjective “attributes”: feelings, sentiments, moods. Thus we shall abstain, in our domain science also from matters of aesthetics. We equate all endurants which, besides possible type of unique identifiers (i.e., excepting materials) and possible type of mereologies (i.e., excepting components and materials), have the same types of attributes, with one sort. Thus removing a quality from an endurant makes no sense: the endurant of that type either becomes an endurant of another type or ceases to exist (i.e., becomes a non-entity)!

**Attribute Quality and Attribute Value:** We distinguish between an attribute (as a logical proposition, of a name, i.e.) type, and an attribute value, as a value in some value space.

**Analysis Prompt 22 *attribute types*:** One can calculate the set of attribute types of parts and materials with the following **domain analysis prompt**:

- *attribute\_types*

Thus for a part  $p$  we may have  $attribute\_types(p) = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m\}$ .

**Attribute Types and Functions:** Let us recall that attributes cover qualities other than unique identifiers and mereology. Let us then consider that parts and materials have one or more attributes. These attributes are qualities which help characterise “what it means” to be a part or a material. Note that we expect every part and material to have at least one attribute. The question is now, in general, how many and, particularly, which.

<sup>27</sup>One can see the red colour of a wall, but one touches the wall.

<sup>28</sup>One cannot see electric current, and one may touch an electric wire, but only if it conducts high voltage can one know that it is indeed an electric wire.

<sup>29</sup>That is, we restrict our domain analysis with respect to attributes to such quantities which are observable, say by mechanical, electrical or chemical instruments. Once objective measurements can be made of human feelings, beauty, and other, we may wish to include these “attributes” in our domain descriptions.

**Domain Description Prompt 7 *observe\_attributes*:** *The domain analyser experiments, thinks and reflects about part attributes. That process is initiated by the domain description prompt:*

- *observe\_attributes*.

The result of that **domain description prompt** is that the domain analyser cum describer writes down the attribute (sorts or) types and observers domain description text according to the following schema:

7. *observe\_attributes* schema

<b>Narration:</b>	
[t]	... narrative text on attribute sorts ...
[o]	... narrative text on attribute sort observers ...
[v]	... narrative text on set <b>of</b> attribute <b>value</b> observers ...
[i]	... narrative text on attribute sort recognisers ...
[p]	... narrative text on attribute sort proof obligations ...
<b>Formalisation:</b>	
<b>type</b>	
[t]	$A_i \ [1 \leq i \leq n]$
<b>value</b>	
[o]	$\mathbf{attr\_}A_i: P \rightarrow A_i \ i: [1..n]$
[v]	$\mathbf{obs\_attrib\_values\_}P(p) \equiv \{ \mathbf{attr\_}A_1(p), \mathbf{attr\_}A_2(p), \dots, \mathbf{attr\_}A_n(p) \}$
[i]	$\mathbf{is\_}A_i: (A_1   A_2   \dots   A_n) \rightarrow \mathbf{Bool} \ i: [1..n]$
<b>proof obligation</b> [Disjointness of Attribute Types]	
[p]	$\mathcal{PO}$ : <b>let</b> P be any part sort <b>in</b> [the domain description]
[p]	<b>let</b> a: $(A_1   A_2   \dots   A_n)$ <b>in</b> $\mathbf{is\_}A_i(a) \neq \mathbf{is\_}A_j(a)$ <b>end end</b> $[i \neq j, i, j: [1..n]]$

The **type** (or rather sort) definitions:  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n$ , inform us that the domain analyser has decided to focus on the distinctly named  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n$  attributes.<sup>30</sup> And the **value** clauses  $\mathbf{attr\_}A_1: P \rightarrow A_1, \mathbf{attr\_}A_2: P \rightarrow A_2, \dots, \mathbf{attr\_}A_n: P \rightarrow A_n$  are then “automatically” given: if a part,  $p: P$ , has an attribute  $A_i$  then there is postulated, “by definition” [eureka] an attribute observer function  $\mathbf{attr\_}A_i: P \rightarrow A_i$  etcetera ■

We cannot automatically, that is, syntactically, guarantee that our domain descriptions secure that the various attribute types for an emerging part sort denote disjoint sets of values. Therefore we must prove it.

**Attribute Categories:** Michael A. Jackson [Jac95] has suggested a hierarchy of attribute categories: static or dynamic values – and within the dynamic value category: inert values or reactive values or active values – and within the dynamic active value category: autonomous values or biddable values or programmable values. We now review these attribute value types. The review is based on [Jac95, M.A. Jackson]. *Part attributes* are either constant or varying, i.e., **static** or **dynamic** attributes.

**Attribute Category: 1** By a **static attribute**,  $a: A, \mathbf{is\_static\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand an attribute whose values are constants, i.e., cannot change.

**Attribute Category: 2** By a **dynamic attribute**,  $a: A, \mathbf{is\_dynamic\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand an attribute whose values are variable, i.e., can change. Dynamic attributes are either *inert*, *reactive* or *active* attributes.

**Attribute Category: 3** By an **inert attribute**,  $a: A, \mathbf{is\_inert\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand a dynamic attribute whose values only change as the result of external stimuli where these stimuli prescribe new values.

<sup>30</sup>The attribute type names are not like type names of, for example, a programming language. Instead they are chosen by the domain analyser to reflect on domain phenomena.

**Attribute Category: 4** By a **reactive attribute**,  $a:A$ ,  $\text{is\_reactive\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand dynamic attributes whose value, if they vary, change in response to external stimuli, where these stimuli come from outside the domain of interest.

**Attribute Category: 5** By an **active attribute**,  $a:A$ ,  $\text{is\_active\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand a dynamic attribute whose values change (also) of its own volition. Active attributes are either *autonomous*, *biddable* or *programmable* attributes.

**Attribute Category: 6** By an **autonomous attribute**,  $a:A$ ,  $\text{is\_autonomous\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand a dynamic active attribute whose values change value only “on their own volition”. The values of an autonomous attributes are a “law unto themselves and their surroundings”.

**Attribute Category: 7** By a **biddable attribute**,  $a:A$ ,  $\text{is\_biddable\_attribute}(a)$  we shall understand a dynamic active attribute whose values *are prescribed but may fail to be observed as such*.

**Attribute Category: 8** By a **programmable attribute**,  $a:A$ ,  $\text{is\_programmable\_attribute}(a)$ , we shall understand a dynamic active attribute whose values can be prescribed.

Figure 2 captures an attribute value ontology.




Figure 2: Attribute Value Ontology

### Calculating Attributes:

- 6 Given a part  $p$  we can calculate its static attributes.
- 7 Given a part  $p$  we can calculate its controllable, i.e., the biddable and programmable attributes.
- 8 And given a part  $p$  we can calculate its monitor-able attributes, i.e., the inert, reactive and autonomous attributes.
- 9 These three sets make up all the attributes of part  $p$ .

### value

- 6  $\text{stat\_attr\_typs}: P \rightarrow \llbracket SA_1 \times SA_2 \times \dots \times SAs \rrbracket$
- 7  $\text{ctrl\_attr\_typs}: P \rightarrow \llbracket CA_1 \times CA_2 \times \dots \times CAc \rrbracket$
- 8  $\text{mon\_attr\_typs}: P \rightarrow \llbracket MA_1 \times MA_2 \times \dots \times MA_m \rrbracket$

### axiom

- 9  $\forall p:P \cdot$
- 9 **let**  $\llbracket SA_1 \times SA_2 \times \dots \times SAs \rrbracket = \text{stat\_attr\_typs}(p)$ ,
- 9  $\llbracket CA_1 \times CA_2 \times \dots \times CAc \rrbracket = \text{ctrl\_attr\_typs}(p)$ ,

```

9      ⋈ MA1×MA2×...×MAm ⋈ = mon_attr_typs(p) in
9      card{SA1,SA2,...,SAs}+card{CA1,CA2,...,CAc}+card{MA1,MA2,...,MAm}
9      = card{SA1,SA2,...,SAs,CA1,CA2,...,CAc,MA1,MA2,...,MAm} end

```

10 Given a part  $p$  we can calculate its static attribute values.

11 Given a part  $p$  we can calculate its controllable, i.e., the biddable and programmable attribute values.

#### value

```

10 stat_attr_vals: P → SA1×SA2×...×SAs
10 stat_attr_vals(p) ≡
10   let ⋈ SA1×SA2×...×SAs ⋈ = stat_attr_typs(p) in
10   (attr_SA1(p),attr_SA2(p),...,attr_SAs(p)) end

11 ctrl_attr_vals: P → CA1×CA2×...×CAc
11 ctrl_attr_vals(p) ≡
11   let ⋈ CA1×CA2×...×CAc ⋈ = ctrl_attr_typs(p) in
11   (attr_CA1(p),attr_CA2(p),...,attr_CAc(p)) end

```

### 5.3.2 Basic Principles for Ascribing Attributes

Section 5.3.1 dealt with technical issues of expressing attributes. This section will indicate some modelling principles.

**Natural Parts** are in space and time – and are subject to laws of physics. So basic attributes focus on physical (including chemical) properties. These attributes cover the full spectrum of attribute categories outlined in Sect. 5.3.1.

**Materials:** are in space and time – and are subject to laws of physics. So basic attributes focus on physical, especially chemical properties. These attributes cover the full spectrum of attribute categories outlined in Sect. 5.3.1.

• • •

The next paragraphs, **living species**, **animate entities** and **humans**, reflect Sørlander’s Philosophy [Sør16, pp 14–182].

• • •

**Causality of Purpose:** If there is to be *the possibility of language and meaning* then there must exist primary entities which are *not entirely encapsulated within the physical conditions*; that they are stable and can influence one another. This is only possible if such primary entities are subject to a *supplementary causality directed at the future*: a *causality of purpose*. **Living Species:** These primary entities are here called *living species*. What can be deduced about them ?

**Living Species:** Living species are also in space and time – and are subject to laws of physics. Additionally living species *plants* and *animals* are characterised by *causality of purpose*: they *have some form they can be developed to reach*; and which *they must be causally determined to maintain*; this development and maintenance must further in *an exchange of matter with an environment*. It must be possible that living species occur in one of two forms: one form which is characterised by *development, form and exchange*, and another form which, additionally, can be characterised by the ability to *purposeful movements*. The first we call *plants*, the second we call *animals*.

**Animate Entities:** For an animal to purposefully move around there must be “additional conditions” for such self-movements to be in accordance with the principle of causality: they must have *sensory organs* sensing among others the immediate purpose of its movement; they must have *means of motion* so that it can move; and they must have *instincts*, *incentives* and *feelings* as causal conditions that what it senses can drive it to movements. And all of this in accordance with the laws of physics.

Animals, to possess these three kinds of “additional conditions”, must be built from special units which have an inner relation to their function as a whole; Their *purposefulness* must be built into their physical building units, that is, as we can now say, their *genomes*. That is, animals are built from genomes which give them the *inner determination* to such building blocks for *instincts*, *incentives* and *feelings*. Similar kinds of deduction can be carried out with respect to plants. Transcendentally one can deduce basic principles of evolution but not its details.

**Humans: Consciousness and Learning:** The existence of animals is a necessary condition for there being language and meaning in any world. That there can be *language* means that animals are capable of *developing language*. And this must presuppose that animals can *learn from their experience*. To learn implies that animals can *feel* pleasure and distaste and can *learn*. . . . One can therefore deduce that animals must possess such building blocks whose inner determination is a basis for learning and consciousness.

**Language:** Animals with higher social interaction uses *signs*, eventually developing a *language*. These languages adhere to the same system of defined concepts which are a prerequisite for any description of any world: namely the system that philosophy lays bare from a basis of transcendental deductions and the *principle of contradiction* and its *implicit meaning theory*. A *human* is an animal which has a *language*.

**Knowledge:** Humans must be *conscious* of having *knowledge* of its concrete situation, and as such that human can have knowledge about what he feels and eventually that human can know whether what he feels is true or false. Consequently *a human can describe his situation correctly*. **Responsibility:** In this way one can deduce that humans can thus have *memory* and hence can have *responsibility*, be *responsible*. Further deductions lead us into *ethics*.

•••

**Intentionality** *Intentionality is a philosophical concept and is defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*<sup>31</sup> as “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs.”

**Definition 16 Intentional Pull:** Two or more artifactual parts of different sorts, but with overlapping sets of intents may exert an *intentional “pull”* on one another ■

This *intentional “pull”* may take many forms. Let  $p_x : X$  and  $p_y : Y$  be two parts of *different sorts* ( $X, Y$ ), and with *common intent*,  $i$ . *Manifestations* of these, their common intent must somehow be *subject to constraints*, and these must be *expressed predicatively*. See Sect. 8.3.6, pp. 48–49, for an example.

•••

**Artifacts:** Humans create artifacts – for a reason, to serve a purpose, that is, with **intent**. Artifacts are like parts. They satisfy the laws of physics – and serve a *purpose*, fulfill an *intent*.

•••

<sup>31</sup>Jacob, P. (Aug 31, 2010). *Intentionality*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/intentionality/>) October 15, 2014, retrieved April 3, 2018.

**Assignment of Attributes:** So what can we deduce from the above, a little more than a page ?

The attributes of **natural parts** and **natural materials** are generally of such concrete types – expressible as some **real** with a dimension<sup>32</sup> of the International System of Units: <https://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/units.html>. Attribute values usually enter *differential equations* and *integrals*, that is, classical calculus.

The attributes of **humans**, besides those of parts, significantly includes one of a usually non-empty set of *intents*. In directing the creation of artifacts humans create these with an intent.

**Examples:** These are examples of human intents: they create *roads* and *automobiles* with the intent of *transport*. they create *houses* with the intents of *living*, *offices*, *production*, etc., and they create *pipelines* with the intent of *oil* or *gas transport* ■

Human attribute values usually enter into *modal logic* expressions.

**Artifacts, including Man-made Materials:** Artifacts, besides those of parts, significantly includes a usually singleton set of *intents*.

**Examples:** *roads* and *automobiles* possess the intent of *transport*; *houses* possess either one of the intents of *living*, *offices*, *production*; and *pipelines* possess the intent of *oil* or *gas transport* ■

Artifact attribute values usually enter into *mathematical logic* expressions.

We leave it to the reader to formulate attribute assignment principles for plants and non-human animals.

## 5.4 The Unfolding of an Ontology

We have unfolded an ontology of domain endurants. Figure 3 illustrates this “unfolding”: The upper




Figure 3: Five Stages of Ontology Development

left diagram shows the ontology of *part* and *material* endurants and of perdurants. The upper middle diagram shows the ontology addition of *concrete part sets* and *structures*. The upper right diagram shows the ontology addition of *living species*. The lower left diagram shows the ontology addition of *artifacts*. The lower middle diagram shows the ontology with the *transcendentally deduced “coupling”* of *internal endurant qualities* with *perdurant behaviour arguments*. The lower rightmost diagram shows the fully annotated ontology – and that diagram is the same as Fig. 1 on Page 4.

<sup>32</sup>Basic units are *meter*, *kilogram*, *second*, *Ampere*, *Kelvin*, *mole*, and *candela*. Some derived units are: *Newton*:  $kg \times m \times s^{-2}$ , *Weber*:  $kg \times m^2 \times s^{-2} \times A^{-1}$ , etc.



## 5.5 Some Axioms and Proof Obligations – Example Sect. 8.1.11 Pg. 44

By an **axiom** we shall – in the *context* of **domain analysis & description** – mean a logical expression, usually a predicate, that constrains the types and values, including unique identifiers and mereologies of domain models ■ Axioms, together with the sort, including type definitions, and the unique identifier, mereology and attribute observer functions, define the domain value spaces. We refer to axioms in Item [a] of domain description prompts of *unique identifiers*: 5 on Page 19 and of *mereologies*: 6 on Page 20.

By a **proof obligation** we shall – in the *context* of **domain analysis & description** – mean a logical expression that predicates relations between the types and values, including unique identifiers, mereologies and attributes of domain models, where these predicates must be shown, i.e., proved, to hold ■ Proof obligations supplement axioms. We refer to proof obligations in Item [p] of domain description prompts about *endurant sorts*: 1 on Page 15, about *components sorts*: 3 on Page 17, about *materials sorts*: 4 on Page 18, and about *attribute types*: 7 on Page 22.

The difference between expressing axioms and expressing proof obligations is this:

- **We use axioms** when our formula cannot otherwise express it simply, but when physical or other *properties of the domain*<sup>33</sup> dictates property constraints.
- **We use proof obligations** where necessary constraints are not necessarily physically impossible.
- **Proof obligations** finally arise in the transition from endurants to perdurants where endurant axioms become properties that must be proved to hold.

When considering *endurants* we interpret these as stable, i.e., that although they may have, for example, programmable attributes, when we observe them, we observe them at any one moment, but *we do not consider them over a time*. That is what we turn to next: *perdurants*. When considering a part with, for example, a programmable attribute, at two different instances of time we expect the particular programmable attribute to enjoy any expressed well-formedness properties. We shall, in Sect. 7, see how these programmable attributes re-occur as explicit behaviour parameters, “programmed” to possibly new values passed on to recursive invocations of the same behaviour. If well-formedness axioms were expressed for the part on which the behaviour is based, then a *proof obligation* arises, one that must show that new values of the programmed attribute satisfies the part attribute axiom. This is, but one relation between *axioms* and *proof obligations*. We refer to remarks made in the bullet (●) named **Biddable Access** Page 35.

## 5.6 Discussion of Endurants – Example Sect. 8.1.12 Pg. 44

Domain descriptions are, as we have already shown, formulated, both informally and formally, by means of abstract types, that is, by sorts for which no concrete models are usually given. Sorts are made to denote possibly empty, possibly infinite, rarely singleton, sets of entities on the basis of the qualities defined for these sorts, whether external or internal. By **junk** we shall understand that the domain description unintentionally denotes undesired entities. By **confusion** we shall understand that the domain description unintentionally have two or more identifications of the same entity or type. The question is *can we formulate a [formal] domain description such that it does not denote junk or confusion* ? The short answer to this is no ! So, since one naturally wishes “no junk, no confusion” what does one do ? The answer to that is *one proceeds with great care !*

<sup>33</sup>– examples of such properties are: (i) topologies of the domain makes certain compositions of parts physically impossible, and (ii) conservation laws of the domain usually dictates that endurants cannot suddenly arise out of nothing.

## 6 A Transcendental Deduction – Example Sect. 8.2 Pg. 44

### 6.1 An Explanation

It should be clear to the reader that in **domain analysis & description** we are reflecting on a number of philosophical issues. First and foremost on those of *epistemology* and *ontology*. In this section on a sub-field of epistemology, namely that of a number of issues of *transcendental* nature. We refer to [Hon95, pp 878–880] [Aud95, pp 807–810] [BTJ96, pp 54–55 (1998)].

**Definition 17 Transcendental:** By **transcendental** we shall understand the philosophical notion: **the a priori or intuitive basis of knowledge, independent of experience.**

A priori knowledge or intuition is central: By *a priori* we mean that it not only precedes, but also determines rational thought.

**Definition 18 Transcendental Deduction:** By a **transcendental deduction** we shall understand the philosophical notion: **a transcendental "conversion" of one kind of knowledge into a seemingly different kind of knowledge.**

**Definition 19 Transcendentality:** By **transcendentality** we shall here mean the philosophical notion: the state or condition of being transcendental.

**Example 18 Transcendentality:** We can speak of a bus in at least three *senses*:

- (i) The bus as it is being "maintained, serviced, refueled";
- (ii) the bus as it "speeds" down its route; and
- (iii) the bus as it "appears" (listed) in a bus time table.

The three *senses* are:

- (i) as an **endurant** (here a *part*),
- (ii) as a **perdurant** (as we shall see a *behaviour*), and
- (iii) as an **attribute**<sup>34</sup> ■

Example 18, we claim, reflects *transcendentality* as follows:

- (i) We have knowledge of an *endurant* (i.e., a *part*) being an *endurant*.
- (ii) We are then to assume that the *perdurant* referred to in (ii) is an aspect of the *endurant* mentioned in (i) – where *perdurants* are to be assumed to represent a different kind of knowledge.
- (iii) And, finally, we are to further assume that the *attribute* mentioned in (iii) is somehow related to both (i) and (ii) – where at least this *attribute* is to be assumed to represent yet a different kind of knowledge.

In other words: two (i–ii) kinds of different knowledge; that they relate *must indeed* be based on a *a priori knowledge*. Someone claims that they relate ! The two statements (i–ii) are claimed to relate *transcendentally*.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup>– in this case rather: as a fragment of a bus time table *attribute*

<sup>35</sup>– the *attribute* statement was "thrown" in "for good measure", i.e., to highlight the issue !

## 6.2 Some Special Notation

The *transcendentality* that we are referring to is one in which we “translate” enduring descriptions of *parts* and their *unique identifiers*, *mereologies* and *attributes* into perdurant descriptions, i.e., transcendental interpretations of parts as *behaviours*, part mereologies as *channels*, and part attributes as *attribute value accesses*. The *translations* referred to above, *compile* enduring descriptions into RSL<sup>+</sup>Text. We shall therefore first explain some aspects of this translation.

- Where in the function definition bodies
  - ⊗ we enclose some RSL<sup>+</sup>Text, e.g., rsl<sup>+</sup>\_text, in  $\llbracket \rrbracket$ s,
  - ⊗ i.e.,  $\llbracket \text{rsl}^+ \text{\_text} \rrbracket$
  - ⊗ we mean that text.
- Where in the function definition bodies
  - ⊗ we write  $\llbracket \text{rsl}^+ \text{\_text} \rrbracket$  function\_expression
  - ⊗ we mean that rsl<sup>+</sup>\_text concatenated to the RSL<sup>+</sup>Text
  - ⊗ emanating from function\_expression.
- Where in the function definition bodies
  - ⊗ we write  $\llbracket \rrbracket$  function\_expression
  - ⊗ we mean just rsl<sup>+</sup>\_text
  - ⊗ emanating from function\_expression.
  - ⊗ That is:
    - ⊗  $\llbracket \rrbracket$  function\_expression  $\equiv$  function\_expression and
    - ⊗  $\llbracket \rrbracket \llbracket \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket \rrbracket$ .
- Where in the function definition bodies
  - ⊗ we write  $\{ \llbracket f(x) \rrbracket \mid x:\text{RSL}^+\text{Text} \}$
  - ⊗ we mean the “expansion” of the RSL<sup>+</sup>Text  $f(x)$ ,
  - ⊗ in arbitrary, linear text order,
  - ⊗ for appropriate RSL<sup>+</sup>Texts  $x$ .

## 7 Perdurants – Example Sect. 8.3 Pg. 44

Perdurants can perhaps best be explained in terms of a notion of *state* and a notion of *time*. We shall, in this paper, not detail notions of *time*, but refer to [Hei62, Far90, Bli90, van91].

### 7.1 States, Actors, Actions, Events and Behaviours: A Preview

#### 7.1.1 States – Example Sect. 8.3.1 Pg. 45

**Definition 20 Domain States:** By a **state** we shall understand any collection of **parts** or **components** or **materials** ■

We refer to Sect. 8.1.6 on Page 41.

### 7.1.2 Actors, Actions, Events, Behaviours and Channels

To us perdurants are further, pragmatically, analysed into *actions*, *events*, and *behaviours*. We shall define these terms below. Common to all of them is that they potentially change a state. Actions and events are here considered atomic perdurants. For behaviours we distinguish between discrete and continuous behaviours.

### 7.1.3 Time Considerations

We shall, without loss of generality, assume that actions and events are atomic and that behaviours are composite. Atomic perdurants may “occur” during some time interval, but we omit consideration of and concern for what actually goes on during such an interval. Composite perdurants can be analysed into “constituent” actions, events and “sub-behaviours”. We shall also omit consideration of temporal properties of behaviours. Instead we shall refer to two seminal monographs: *Specifying Systems* [Lam02, Leslie Lamport] and *Duration Calculus: A Formal Approach to Real-Time Systems* [ZH04, Zhou ChaoChen and Michael Reichhardt Hansen] (and [Bj06, Chapter 15]). For a seminal book on “time in computing” we refer to the eclectic [FMMR12, Mandrioli et al., 2012]. And for seminal book on time at the epistemology level we refer to [van91, J. van Benthem, 1991].

### 7.1.4 Actors

**Definition 21 Actor:** By an **actor** we shall understand something that is capable of initiating and/or **carrying out** actions, events or behaviours ■

The notion of “*carrying out*” will be made clear in this overall section. We shall, in principle, associate an actor with each part<sup>36</sup>. These actors will be described as behaviours. These behaviours evolve around a state. The state is the set of qualities, in particular the dynamic attributes, of the associated parts and/or any possible components or materials of the parts.

### 7.1.5 Discrete Actions

**Definition 22 Discrete Action:** By a **discrete action** [WS12, Wilson and Shpall] we shall understand a foreseeable thing which deliberately and potentially changes a well-formed state, in one step, usually into another, still well-formed state, for which an actor can be made responsible ■

An action is what happens when a function invocation changes, or potentially changes a state.

### 7.1.6 Discrete Events

**Definition 23 Event:** By an **event** we shall understand some unforeseen thing, that is, some ‘not-planned-for’ “action”, one which surreptitiously, non-deterministically changes a well-formed state into another, but usually not a well-formed state, and for which no particular domain actor can be made responsible ■

Events can be characterised by a pair of (before and after) states, a predicate over these and, optionally, a *time* or *time interval*. The notion of event continues to puzzle philosophers [Dre67, Qui79, Mel80, Dav80, Hac82, Bad05, Kim93, CV96, Pi99, CV10]. We note, in particular, [Dav80, Bad05, Kim93].

<sup>36</sup>This is an example of a *transcendental deduction*.

### 7.1.7 Discrete Behaviours

**Definition 24 Discrete Behaviour:** By a **discrete behaviour** we shall understand a set of sequences of potentially interacting sets of discrete actions, events and behaviours ■

Discrete behaviours now become the *focal point* of our investigation. To every part we associate, by transcendental deduction, a behaviour. We shall express these behaviours as CSP *processes* [Hoa85]. For those behaviours we must therefore establish their means of *communication* via *channels*; their *signatures*; and their *definitions* – as *translated* from enduring parts.

## 7.2 Channels and Communication – Example Sect. 8.3.2 Pg. 45

### 7.2.1 The CSP Story:

Behaviours sometimes synchronise and usually communicate. We use the CSP [Hoa85] notation (adopted by RSL) to introduce and model behaviour communication. Communication is abstracted as the sending ( $ch ! m$ ) and receipt ( $ch ?$ ) of messages,  $m:M$ , over channels,  $ch$ .

**type** M  
**channel**  $ch:M$

Communication between (unique identifier) indexed behaviours have their channels modeled as similarly indexed channels:

**out:**  $ch[idx]!m$   
**in:**  $ch[idx]?$   
**channel**  $\{ch[ide]:M|ide:IDE\}$

where IDE typically is some type expression over unique identifier types.

### 7.2.2 From Mereologies to Channel Declarations:

The fact that a part,  $p$  of sort  $P$  with unique identifier  $p_i$ , has a mereology, for example the set of unique identifiers  $\{q_a, q_b, \dots, q_d\}$  identifying parts  $\{q_a, q_b, \dots, q_d\}$  of sort  $Q$ , may mean that parts  $p$  and  $\{q_a, q_b, \dots, q_d\}$  may wish to exchange – for example, attribute – values, one way (from  $p$  to the  $q_s$ ) or the other (vice versa) or in both directions. Figure 4 shows two dotted rectangle box diagrams. The left fragment of




Figure 4: Two Part and Channel Constallations.  $u:p$  unique id.  $p$ ;  $m:p$  mereology  $p$

the figure intends to show a 1:1 Constallation of a single  $p:P$  box and a single  $q:Q$  part, respectively,

indicating, within these parts, their unique identifiers and mereologies. The right fragment of the figure intends to show a 1:n Constallation of a single  $p:P$  box and a set of  $q:Q$  parts, now with arrowed lines connecting the  $p$  part with the  $q$  parts. These lines are intended to show channels. We show them with two way arrows. We could instead have chosen one way arrows, in one or the other direction. The directions are intended to show a direction of value transfer. We have given the same channel names to all examples,  $ch\_PQ$ . We have ascribed channel message types  $MPQ$  to all channels.<sup>37</sup> Figure 5 shows an arrangement similar to that of Fig. 4 on the previous page, but for an  $m:n$  Constallation.




Figure 5: Multiple Part and Channel Arrangements:  $u:p$  unique id.  $p; m:p$  mereology  $p$

The channel declarations corresponding to Figs. 4 and 5 are:

**channel**

- ```
[1] ch_PQ[i,j]:MPQ
[2] { ch_PQ[i,x]:MPQ | x:{j,k,...,l} }
[3] { ch_PQ[p,q]:MPQ | p:{x,y,...,z}, q:{j,k,...,l} }
```

Since there is only one index  $i$  and  $j$  for channel [1], its declaration can be reduced. Similarly there is only one  $i$  for declaration [2]:

**channel**

- ```
[1] ch_PQ:MPQ
[2] { ch_PQ[x]:MPQ | x:{j,k,...,l} }
```

12 The following description identities holds:

- ```
12 { ch_PQ[x]:MPQ | x:{j,k,...,l} } ≡ ch_PQ[j],ch_PQ[k],...,ch_PQ[l],
12 { ch_PQ[p,q]:MPQ | p:{x,y,...,z}, q:{j,k,...,l} } ≡
12 ch_PQ[x,j],ch_PQ[x,k],...,ch_PQ[x,l],
12 ch_PQ[y,j],ch_PQ[y,k],...,ch_PQ[y,l],
12 ...,
12 ch_PQ[z,j],ch_PQ[z,k],...,ch_PQ[z,l]
```

We can sketch a diagram similar to Figs. 4 on the preceding page and 5 for the case of composite parts.

### 7.2.3 Continuous Behaviours

By a **continuous behaviour** we shall understand a *continuous time* sequence of *state changes*. We shall not go into what may cause these *state changes*. And we shall not go into continuous behaviours in this paper.

<sup>37</sup>Of course, these names and types would have to be distinct for any one domain description.

### 7.3 Perdurant Signatures

We shall treat perdurants as function invocations. In our cursory overview of perdurants we shall focus on one perdurant quality: function signatures.

**Definition 25 Function Signature:** By a **function signature** we shall understand a *function name* and a *function type expression* ■

**Definition 26 Function Type Expression:** By a **function type expression** we shall understand a pair of *type expressions*, separated by a *function type constructor* either  $\rightarrow$  (for **total function**) or  $\xrightarrow{\sim}$  (for **partial function**) ■

The *type expressions* are part sort or type, or material sort or type, or component sort or type, or attribute type names, but may, occasionally be expressions over respective type names involving **-set**,  $\times$ ,  $*$ ,  $\rightarrow$  and  $|$  type constructors.

#### 7.3.1 Action Signatures and Definitions

Actors usually provide their initiated actions with arguments, say of type VAL. Hence the schematic function (action) signature and schematic definition:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{action: } & \text{VAL} \rightarrow \Sigma \xrightarrow{\sim} \Sigma \\ \text{action}(v)(\sigma) & \text{ as } \sigma' \\ \text{pre: } & \mathcal{P}(v, \sigma) \\ \text{post: } & \mathcal{Q}(v, \sigma, \sigma') \end{aligned}$$

expresses that a selection of the domain, as provided by the  $\Sigma$  type expression, is acted upon and possibly changed. The partial function type operator  $\xrightarrow{\sim}$  shall indicate that  $\text{action}(v)(\sigma)$  may not be defined for the argument, i.e., initial state  $\sigma$  and/or the argument  $v:\text{VAL}$ , hence the precondition  $\mathcal{P}(v, \sigma)$ . The post condition  $\mathcal{Q}(v, \sigma, \sigma')$  characterises the “after” state,  $\sigma':\Sigma$ , with respect to the “before” state,  $\sigma:\Sigma$ , and possible arguments ( $v:\text{VAL}$ ). Which could be the argument values,  $v:\text{VAL}$ , of actions? Well, there can basically be only the following kinds of argument values: parts, components and materials, respectively unique part identifiers, mereologies and attribute values. It basically has to be so since there are no other kinds of values in domains. There can be exceptions to the above (Booleans, natural numbers), but they are rare!

**Perdurant (action) analysis thus proceeds as follows:** identifying relevant actions, assigning names to these, delineating the “smallest” relevant state<sup>38</sup>, ascribing signatures to action functions, and determining action pre-conditions and action post-conditions. Of these, ascribing signatures is the most crucial: In the process of determining the action signature one oftentimes discovers that part or component or material attributes have been left (“so far”) “undiscovered”.

#### 7.3.2 Event Signatures and Definitions

Events are usually characterised by the absence of known actors and the absence of explicit “external” arguments. Hence the schematic function (event) signature:

**value**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{event: } & \Sigma \times \Sigma \xrightarrow{\sim} \mathbf{Bool} \\ \text{event}(\sigma, \sigma') & \text{ as } \text{tf} \\ \text{pre: } & P(\sigma) \\ \text{post: } & \text{tf} = Q(\sigma, \sigma') \end{aligned}$$

<sup>38</sup>By “smallest” we mean: containing the fewest number of parts. Experience shows that the domain analyser cum describer should strive for identifying the smallest state.



The event signature expresses that a selection of the domain as provided by the  $\Sigma$  type expression is “acted” upon, by unknown actors, and possibly changed. The partial function type operator  $\overset{\sim}{\rightarrow}$  shall indicate that event( $\sigma, \sigma'$ ) may not be defined for some states  $\sigma$ . The resulting state may, or may not, satisfy axioms and well-formedness conditions over  $\Sigma$  – as expressed by the post condition  $Q(\sigma, \sigma')$ . Events may thus cause well-formedness of states to fail. Subsequent actions, once actors discover such “disturbing events”, are therefore expected to remedy that situation, that is, to restore well-formedness. We shall not illustrate this point.

### 7.3.3 Discrete Behaviour Signatures – Sect. 8.3.3 Pg. 45

**Signatures:** We shall only cover behaviour signatures when expressed in RSL/CSP [GHH<sup>+</sup>92]. The behaviour functions are now called processes. That a behaviour function is a never-ending function, i.e., a process, is “revealed” by the “trailing” **Unit**:

behaviour: ...  $\rightarrow$  ... **Unit**

That a process takes no argument is ”revealed” by a “leading” Unit:

behaviour: **Unit**  $\rightarrow$  ...

That a process accepts channel, viz.: ch, inputs, is “revealed” as follows:

behaviour: ...  $\rightarrow$  **in** ch ...

That a process offers channel, viz.: ch, outputs is “revealed” as follows:

behaviour: ...  $\rightarrow$  **out** ch ...

That a process accepts other arguments is “revealed” as follows:

behaviour: ARG  $\rightarrow$  ...

where ARG can be any type expression:

T, T  $\rightarrow$  T, T  $\rightarrow$  T  $\rightarrow$  T, etcetera

where T is any type expression.

### 7.3.4 Attribute Access

We shall only be concerned with part attributes. And we shall here consider them in the context of part behaviours. Part behaviour definitions embody part attributes. In this section we shall suggest how behaviours embody part attributes.

- **Static attributes** designate constants, cf. Defn. 1 Pg. 22. As such they can be “compiled” into behaviour definitions. We choose, instead to list them, in behaviour signatures, as arguments.
- **Inert attributes** designate values provided by external stimuli, cf. Defn. 3 Pg. 22, that is, must be obtained by channel input: attr\_Inert\_A\_ch ?.
- **Reactive attributes** are functions of other attribute values, cf. Defn. 4 Pg. 23.
- **Autonomous attributes** must be input, cf. Defn. 6 Pg. 23, like inert attributes: attr\_Autonomous\_A\_ch ?.

- **Programmable attribute** values are calculated by their behaviours, cf. Defn. 8 Pg. 23. We list them as behaviour arguments. The behaviour definitions may then specify new values. These are provided in the position of the programmable attribute arguments in *tail recursive* invocations of these behaviours.
- **Biddable attributes** are like programmable attributes, but when provided in possibly tail recursive invocations of their behaviour the calculated biddable attribute value is *modified*, usually by some *perturbation*<sup>39</sup> of the calculated value – to reflect that although they *are prescribed* they *may fail to be observed as such*, cf. Defn. 7 Pg. 23.

### 7.3.5 Calculating In/Output Channel Signatures

Given a part  $p$  we can calculate the  $\text{RSL}^+\text{Text}$  that designates the input channels on which part  $p$  behaviour obtains monitorable attribute values. For each monitorable attribute,  $A$ , the text  $\llbracket \text{attr\_A\_ch} \rrbracket$  is to be “generated”. One or more such channel declaration contributions is to be preceded by the text  $\llbracket \text{in} \rrbracket$ . If there are no monitorable attributes then no text is to be yielded.

13 The function  $\text{calc\_i\_o\_chn\_refs}$  apply to parts and yield  $\text{RSL}^+\text{Text}$ .

- From  $p$  we calculate its unique identifier value, its mereology value, and its monitorable attribute values.
- If there the mereology is not void and/or there are monitorable values then a (Currying<sup>40</sup>) right pointing arrow,  $\rightarrow$ , is inserted.<sup>41</sup>
- If there is an input mereology and/or there are monitorable values then the keyword **in** is inserted in front of the monitorable attribute values and input mereology.
- Similarly for the input/output mereology;
- and for the output mereology.

**value**

```

13 calc_i_o_chn_refs: P → RSL+Text
13 calc_i_o_chn_refs(p) ≡
13a   let ui = uid_P(p),
13a     (ics,iocs,ocs) = obs_mereo_(p),
13a     atrvs = obs_attrib_values_P(p) in
13b   if ics ∪ iocs ∪ ocs ∪ atrvs ≠ {}
13b   then  $\llbracket \rightarrow \rrbracket$  end
13c   if ics ∪ atrvs ≠ {}
13c   then  $\llbracket \text{in} \rrbracket$  calc_attr_chn_refs(ui,atrvs), calc_chn_refs(ui,ichs) end
13d   if iocs ≠ {}
13d   then  $\llbracket \text{in,out} \rrbracket$  calc_chn_refs(ui,iochs) end
13e   if ocs ≠ {}
13e   then  $\llbracket \text{out} \rrbracket$  calc_chn_refs(ui,ochs) end end

```

14 The function  $\text{calc\_attr\_chn\_refs}$

- apply to a set,  $\text{mas}$ , of monitorable attribute types and yield  $\text{RSL}^+\text{Text}$ .

<sup>39</sup>– in the sense of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perturbation\\_function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perturbation_function)

<sup>40</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Currying>

<sup>41</sup>We refer to the three parts of the mereology value as the input, the input/output and the output mereology (values).

- b If  $achs$  is empty no text is generated. Otherwise a channel declaration  $attr\_A\_ch$  is generated for each attribute type whose name,  $A$ , which is obtained by applying  $\eta$  to an observed attribute value,  $\eta a$ .

14a  $calc\_attr\_chn\_refs: UI \times A\text{-set} \rightarrow RSL^+Text$

14b  $calc\_attr\_chn\_refs(ui,mas) \equiv$

14b  $\{ \llcorner attr\_{\eta a\_ch}[ui] \ggg \mid a:A \cdot a \in mas \}$

### 15 The function $calc\_chn\_refs$

- a apply to a pair,  $(ui,uis)$  of a unique part identifier and a set of unique part identifiers and yield  $RSL^+Text$ .

- b If  $uis$  is empty no text is generated. Otherwise an array channel declaration is generated.

15a  $calc\_chn\_refs: P\_UI \times Q\_UI\text{-set} \rightarrow RSL^+Text$

15b  $calc\_chn\_refs(pui,quis) \equiv \{ \llcorner \eta(pui,qui)\_ch[pui,qui] \ggg \mid qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \}$

### 16 The function $calc\_all\_chn\_dcls$

- a apply to a pair,  $(pui,quis)$  of a unique part identifier and a set of unique part identifiers and yield  $RSL^+Text$ .

- b If  $quis$  is empty no text is generated. Otherwise an array channel declaration

- $\{ \llcorner \eta(pui,qui)\_ch[pui,qui]:\eta(pui,qui)M \ggg \mid qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \}$

is generated.

16a  $calc\_all\_chn\_dcls: P\_UI \times Q\_UI\text{-set} \rightarrow RSL^+Text$

16a  $calc\_all\_chn\_dcls(pui,quis) \equiv$

16a  $\{ \llcorner \eta(pui,qui)\_ch[pui,qui]:\eta(pui,qui)M \ggg \mid qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \}$

The  $\eta(pui,qui)$  invocation serves to prefix-name both the channel,  $\eta(pui,qui)\_ch[pui,qui]$ , and the channel message type,  $\eta(pui,qui)M$ .

- 17 The overloaded  $\eta$  operator is here applied to a pair of unique identifiers.

17  $\eta: (UI \rightarrow RSL^+Text) \mid ((X\_UI \times Y\_UI) \rightarrow RSL^+Text)$

17  $\eta(x\_ui,y\_ui) \equiv (\llcorner \eta x\_ui \eta y\_ui \ggg)$

Repeating these channel calculations over distinct parts  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$  of the same part type  $P$  will yield “similar” behaviour signature channel references:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ PQ\_ch[p_{1ui},qui] \mid p_{1ui}:P\_UI, qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \} \\ & \{ PQ\_ch[p_{2ui},qui] \mid p_{2ui}:P\_UI, qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \} \\ & \dots \\ & \{ PQ\_ch[p_{nui},qui] \mid p_{nui}:P\_UI, qui:Q\_UI \cdot qui \in quis \} \end{aligned}$$

These distinct single channel references can be assembled into one:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ PQ\_ch[pui,qui] \mid pui:P\_UI, qui:Q\_UI : -pui \in puis, qui \in quis \} \\ & \textbf{where} \text{ puis} = \{ p_{1ui}, p_{2ui}, \dots, p_{nui} \} \end{aligned}$$

As an example we have already calculated the array channels for Fig. 5 Pg. 32 – cf. the left, the **Parts**, of that figure – cf. Items [1–3] Pages 32–32. The identities Item 12 Pg. 32 apply.

## 7.4 Discrete Behaviour Definitions – Example Sect. 8.3.4 Pg. 46


We associate with each part,  $p:P$ , a behaviour name  $\mathcal{M}_p$ . Behaviours have as first argument their unique part identifier:  $\mathbf{uid}_P(p)$ . Behaviours evolves around a state, or, rather, a set of values: its possibly changing mereology,  $\mathbf{mt}:MT$  and the attributes of the part.<sup>42</sup> A behaviour signature is therefore:

$$\mathcal{M}_p: \mathbf{ui}:UI \times \mathbf{me}:MT \times \mathbf{stat\_attr\_typs}(p) \rightarrow \mathbf{ctrl\_attr\_typs}(p) \rightarrow \mathbf{calc\_i\_o\_chn\_refs}(p) \mathbf{Unit}$$

where (i)  $\mathbf{ui}:UI$  is the unique identifier value and type of part  $p$ ; (ii)  $\mathbf{me}:MT$  is the value and type mereology of part  $p$ ,  $\mathbf{me} = \mathbf{obs\_mereo\_P}(p)$ ; (iii)  $\mathbf{stat\_attr\_typs}(p)$ : static attribute types of part  $p:P$ ; (iv)  $\mathbf{ctrl\_attr\_typs}(p)$ : controllable attribute types of part  $p:P$ ; (v)  $\mathbf{calc\_i\_o\_chn\_refs}(p)$  calculates references to the **input**, the **input/output** and the **output** channels serving the attributes shared between part  $p$  and the parts designated in its mereology  $\mathbf{me}$ . Let  $P$  be a composite sort defined in terms of endurant<sup>43</sup> sub-sorts  $E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n$ . The behaviour description *translated* from  $p:P$ , is composed from a behaviour description,  $\mathcal{M}_p$ , relying on and handling the unique identifier, mereology and attributes of part  $p$  to be *translated* with behaviour descriptions  $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_n$  where  $\beta_1$  is *translated* from  $e_1:E_1$ ,  $\beta_2$  is *translated* from  $e_2:E_2$ , ..., and  $\beta_n$  is *translated* from  $e_n:E_n$ . The domain description *translation* schematic below “formalises” the above.

### Process Schema 1

Abstract  $\mathbf{is\_composite}(p)$



Expression  $\mathcal{B}_p(\mathbf{ui}, \mathbf{me}, \mathbf{sta}, \mathbf{pa})$  stands for the *behaviour definition body* in which the names  $\mathbf{ui}$ ,  $\mathbf{me}$ ,  $\mathbf{sta}$ ,  $\mathbf{pa}$  are bound to the *behaviour definition head*, i.e., the left hand side of the  $\equiv$ . Endurant sorts  $E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n$  are obtained from the `observe_endurant_sorts` prompt, Page 14. We informally explain the  $\mathbf{Translate}_{p_i}$  function. It takes endurants and produces  $\mathbf{RSL}^+\mathbf{Text}$ . Resulting texts are bracketed:  $\langle\langle \mathbf{rsl\_text} \rangle\rangle$  For the case that an endurant is a structure there is only its elements to compile; otherwise Schema 2 is as Schema 1.

### Process Schema 2

<sup>42</sup>We leave out consideration of possible components and materials of the part.

<sup>43</sup>\_ structures or composite

**Abstract is\_structure(e)**

```

value
  TranslateP(p) ≡
    TranslateP1(obs_endurant_sorts_P1(p))
    <<> TranslateP2(obs_endurant_sorts_P2(p))
    <<> ...
    <<> TranslatePn(obs_endurant_sorts_Pn(p))

```

Let P be a composite sort defined in terms of the concrete type **Q-set**. The process definition compiled from  $p:P$ , is composed from a process,  $\mathcal{M}_P$ , relying on and handling the unique identifier, mereology and attributes of process  $p$  as defined by P operating in parallel with processes  $q:\mathbf{obs\_part\_Qs}(p)$ . The domain description “compilation” schematic below “formalises” the above.

**Process Schema 3****Concrete is\_composite(p)**

```

type
  Qs = Q-set
value
  qs:Q-set = obs_part_Qs(p)
  TranslateP(p) ≡
    let ui = uid_P(p), me = obs_mereo_P(p),
        sa = stat_attr_vals(p), ca = ctrl_attr_vals(p),
        ST = stat_attr_typs(p), CT = ctrl_attr_typs(p),
        IOR = calc_i_o_chn_refs(p), IOD = calc_all_ch_dcls(p) in
    << channel
      IOD
      value
         $\mathcal{M}_P: P\_UI \times MT \times ST \ CT \ IOR \ Unit$ 
         $\mathcal{M}_P(ui, me, sa)ca \equiv \mathcal{B}_P(ui, me, sa)ca \gg$ 
        { <<, >> TranslateQ(q) | q:Q·q ∈ qs }
    end

```

**Process Schema 4****Atomic is\_atomic(p)**

```

value
  TranslateP(p) ≡
    let ui = uid_P(p), me = obs_mereo_P(p),
        sa = stat_attr_vals(p), ca = ctrl_attr_vals(p),
        ST = stat_attr_typs(p), CT = ctrl_attr_typs(p),
        IOR = calc_i_o_chn_refs(p), IOD = calc_all_chs(p) in
    << channel
      IOD
      value
         $\mathcal{M}_P: P\_UI \times MT \times ST \ PT \ IOR \ Unit$ 

```

$$\text{end} \quad \mathcal{M}_P(ui, me, sa)ca \equiv \mathcal{B}_P(ui, me, sa)ca \triangleright$$

### Process Schema 5

#### Core Process

The core processes can be understood as never ending, “tail recursively defined” processes:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{B}_P: & \text{uid:P\_UI} \times \text{me:MT} \times \text{sa:SA} \\ & \rightarrow \text{ct:CT} \\ & \rightarrow \text{in in\_chns(p) in\_out in\_out\_chns(me) Unit} \\ \mathcal{B}_P(p)(ui, me, sa)(ca) & \equiv \text{let } (me', ca') = \mathcal{F}_P(ui, me, sa)ca \text{ in } \mathcal{M}_P(ui, me', sa)ca' \text{ end} \\ \mathcal{F}_P: & \text{P\_UI} \times \text{MT} \times \text{ST} \rightarrow \text{CT} \rightarrow \text{in\_out\_chns(me)} \rightarrow \text{MT} \times \text{CT} \end{aligned}$$

We refer to [Bjø16f, Process Schema V: Core Process (II), Page 40] for possible forms of  $\mathcal{F}_P$ .

## 7.5 Running Systems – Example Sect. 8.3.5 Pg. 48

It is one thing to define the behaviours corresponding to all parts, whether composite or atomic. It is another thing to specify an initial configuration of behaviours, that is, those behaviours which “start” the overall system behaviour. The choice as to which parts, i.e., behaviours, are to represent an initial, i.e., a start system behaviour, cannot be “formalised”, it really depends on the “deeper purpose” of the system. In other words: requires careful analysis and is beyond the scope of the present paper. We refer to the example, Sect. 8.3.5 Pages 48–48.

## 7.6 Concurrency: Communication and Synchronisation

Process Schemas I, II, III and V (Pages 37, 38, 38 and 39), reveal that two or more parts, which temporally coexist (i.e., at the same time), imply a notion of *concurrency*. Process Schema IV, Page 38, through the RSL/CSP language expressions  $ch!v$  and  $ch?$ , indicates the notions of *communication* and *synchronisation*. Other than this we shall not cover these crucial notion related to *parallelism*.

## 7.7 Summary and Discussion of Perdurants

The most significant contribution of Sect. 7 has been to show that for every domain description there exists a normal form behaviour — here expressed in terms of a CSP process expression.

### 7.7.1 Summary

We have proposed to analyse perdurant entities into actions, events and behaviours – all based on notions of state and time. We have suggested modeling and abstracting these notions in terms of functions with signatures and pre-/post-conditions. We have shown how to model behaviours in terms of CSP (communicating sequential processes). It is in modeling function signatures and behaviours that we justify the enduring entity notions of parts, unique identifiers, mereology and shared attributes.

### 7.7.2 Discussion

The analysis of perdurants into actions, events and behaviours represents a choice. We suggest skeptical readers to come forward with other choices.

## 8 A Methodology Example: A Transport System




Figure 6: A Road Transport System

### 8.1 Endurants – Sect. 3.2 Pg. 7

#### 8.1.1 The Discourse – Sect. 2.2 Pg. 5

The universe of discourse is *road transport systems*. We analyse & describe not the class of all road transport systems but a representative subclass, UoD, is *structured* into such notions as a road net, RN, of hubs, H, (intersections) and links, L, (street segments between intersections); a fleet of vehicles, FV, *structured* into companies, BC, of buses, B, and pools, PA, of private automobiles, A (et cetera); et cetera. See Fig. 6

#### 8.1.2 Structures & Parts – Sect. 3.2.3 Pg. 8

See Description Prompt 1, Pg. 14.

- 18 There is the *universe of discourse*, UoD. It is structured into
- 19 a *road net*, RN, a structure, and
- 20 a *fleet of vehicles*, FV, a structure.

```

type
18 UoD axiom ∃ uod:UoD • is_structure(uod).
19 RN axiom ∃ rn:RN • is_structure(rn).
20 FV axiom ∃ fv:FV • is_structure(fv).
value
19 obs_RN: UoD → RN
20 obs_FV: UoD → FV

```

#### 8.1.3 Parts – Sect. 3.3.4 Pg. 10

See Description Prompt 1, Pg. 14.

- 21 The road net consists of
- a a structure, SH, of hubs and
  - b a structure, SL, of links.
- 22 The fleet of vehicles consists of
- a a structure, SBC, of *bus companies*, and
  - b a structure, PA, a *pool of automobiles*.

```

type
21a SH axiom ∃ sh:SH • is_structure(sh)
21b SL axiom ∃ sl:SL • is_structure(sl)
22a SBC axiom ∃ sbc:SBC • is_structure(sbc)
22b PA axiom ∃ pa:PA • is_structure(pa)
value
21a obs_SH: RN → SH
21b obs_SL: RN → SL
22a obs_BC: FV → BC
22b obs_PA: FV → PA

```

See Description Prompt 2, Pg. 15.

- 23 The structure of hubs is a set, sH, of atomic hubs, H.
- 24 The structure of links is a set, sL, of atomic links, L.
- 25 The structure of busses is a set, sBC, of composite bus companies, BC.
- 26 The composite bus companies, BC, are sets of busses, sB.
- 27 The structure of private automobiles is a set, sA, of atomic automobiles, A.



```

type
23 H, sH = H-set axiom  $\forall h:H \bullet \text{is\_atomic}(h)$ 
24 L, sL = L-set axiom  $\forall l:L \bullet \text{is\_atomic}(l)$ 
25 BC, BCs = BC-set axiom  $\forall bc:BC \bullet \text{is\_composite}(bc)$ 
26 B, Bs = B-set axiom  $\forall b:B \bullet \text{is\_atomic}(b)$ 
27 A, sA = A-set axiom  $\forall a:A \bullet \text{is\_atomic}(a)$ 
value
23 obs_sH: SH  $\rightarrow$  sH
24 obs_sL: SL  $\rightarrow$  sL
25 obs_sBC: SBC  $\rightarrow$  BCs
26 obs_Bs: BCs  $\rightarrow$  Bs
27 obs_sA: SA  $\rightarrow$  sA

```

### 8.1.4 Components – Sect. 3.5 Pg. 12

See Description Prompt 3, Pg. 16.

To illustrate the concept of components we describe timber yards, waste disposal areas, road material storage yards, automobile scrap yards, and the like as special “cul de sac” hubs with components. Here we describe road material storage yards.

- 28 Hubs may contain components, but only if the hub is connected to exactly one link.
- 29 These “cul-de-sac” hub components may be such things as Sand, Gravel, Cobble Stones, Asphalt, Cement or other.

```

value
28 has_components: H  $\rightarrow$  Bool
type
29 Sand, Gravel, CobbleStones, Asphalt, Cement, ...
29 KS = (Sand|Gravel|CobbleStones|Asphalt|Cement|...)-set
value
28 obs_components_H: H  $\rightarrow$  KS
28 pre: obs_components_H(h)  $\equiv$  card mereo(h) = 1

```

### 8.1.5 Materials – Sect. 3.6 Pg. 12

See Description Prompt 4, Pg. 17.

To illustrate the concept of materials we describe waterways (river, canals, lakes, the open sea) along links as links with material of type water.

- 30 Links may contain material.
- 31 That material is water, W.

```

type
31 W
value
30 obs_material: L  $\rightarrow$  W
30 pre: obs_material(l)  $\equiv$  has_material(h)

```

### 8.1.6 States – Sect. 3.8 Pg. 13

- 32 Let there be given a universe of discourse, *rts*. It is an example of a state.

From that state we can calculate other states.

- 33 The set of all hubs, *hs*.
- 34 The set of all links, *ls*.
- 35 The set of all hubs and links, *hls*.
- 36 The set of all bus companies, *bcs*.
- 37 The set of all busses, *bs*.
- 38 The map from the unique bus company identifiers, see Item 44c Pg. 41, to the set of all the identifies bus company’s buses, *bc\_ui\_bs*.
- 39 The set of all private automobiles, *as*.
- 40 The set of all parts, *ps*.

```

value
32 rts:UoD
33 hs:H-set  $\equiv$  obs_sH(obs_SH(obs_RN(rts)))
34 ls:L-set  $\equiv$  obs_sL(obs_SL(obs_RN(rts)))
35 hls:(H|L)-set  $\equiv$  hs $\cup$ ls
36 bcs:BC-set  $\equiv$  obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts))))
37 bs:B-set  $\equiv$   $\cup$ {obs_Bs(bc)|bc:BC  $\bullet$  bc  $\in$  bcs}
38 bc_ui_bs:(BC_UI  $\xrightarrow{map}$  B-set)  $\equiv$ 
38 [ uid_BC(bc)  $\mapsto$  obs_Bs(bc) | bc:BC  $\bullet$  bc  $\in$  bcs ]
39 as:A-set  $\equiv$  obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts))))
40 ps:(H|L|BC|B|A)-set  $\equiv$  hls $\cup$ bcs $\cup$ bs $\cup$ as

```

### 8.1.7 Unique Identifiers – Sect. 5.1 Pg. 18

#### Part Identifiers:

- 41 We assign unique identifiers to all parts.
- 42 By a road identifier we shall mean a link or a hub identifier.
- 43 By a vehicle identifier we shall mean a bus or an automobile identifier.
- 44 Unique identifiers uniquely identify all parts.
  - a All hubs have distinct [unique] identifiers.
  - b All links have distinct identifiers.
  - c All bus companies have distinct identifiers.
  - d All busses of all bus companies have distinct identifiers.
  - e All automobiles have distinct identifiers.
  - f All parts have distinct identifiers.

```

type
41 H_UI, L_UI, BC_UI, B_UI, A_UI
42 R_UI = H_UI | L_UI
43 V_UI = B_UI | A_UI
value
44a uid_H: H  $\rightarrow$  H_UI
44b uid_L: L  $\rightarrow$  L_UI
44c uid_BC: H  $\rightarrow$  BC_UI
44d uid_B: H  $\rightarrow$  B_UI
44e uid_A: H  $\rightarrow$  A_UI

```

#### Extract Parts from Their Unique Identifiers:

- 45 From the unique identifier of a part we can retrieve,  $\emptyset$ , the part having that identifier.

```

type
45 P = H | L | BC | B | A
value
45  $\emptyset$ : H_UI  $\rightarrow$  H | L_UI  $\rightarrow$  L | BC_UI  $\rightarrow$  BC | B_UI  $\rightarrow$  B | A_UI  $\rightarrow$  A
45  $\emptyset$ (ui)  $\equiv$  let p:(H|L|BC|B|A)  $\bullet$  p  $\in$  ps  $\wedge$  uid_P(p) = ui in p end

```

**Unique Identifier Constants:** We can calculate:

- 46 the set,  $h_{uis}$ , of unique hub identifiers;
- 47 the set,  $l_{uis}$ , of unique link identifiers;
- 48 the map,  $hl_{uim}$ , from unique hub identifiers to the set of unique link identifiers of the links connected to the zero, one or more identified hubs,
- 49 the map,  $lh_{uim}$ , from unique link identifiers to the set of unique hub identifiers of the two hubs connected to the identified link;
- 50 the set,  $r_{uis}$ , of all unique hub and link, i.e., road identifiers;
- 51 the set,  $bc_{uis}$ , of unique bus company identifiers;
- 52 the set,  $b_{uis}$ , of unique bus identifiers;
- 53 the set,  $a_{uis}$ , of unique private automobile identifiers;
- 54 the set,  $v_{uis}$ , of unique bus and automobile, i.e., vehicle identifiers;
- 55 the map,  $bcb_{uim}$ , from unique bus company identifiers to the set of its unique bus identifiers; and
- 56 the (bijjective) map,  $bbc_{uim}$ , from unique bus identifiers to their unique bus company identifiers.

**value**

- 46.  $h_{uis}:H\_UI\text{-set} \equiv \{\text{uid}_H(h)|h:H \bullet h \in hs\}$
- 47.  $l_{uis}:L\_UI\text{-set} \equiv \{\text{uid}_L(l)|l:L \bullet l \in ls\}$
- 50.  $r_{uis}:R\_UI\text{-set} \equiv h_{uis} \cup l_{uis}$
- 48.  $hl_{uim}:(H\_UI \xrightarrow{map} L\_UI\text{-set}) \equiv$   
 $[h_{ui} \mapsto \text{luis}(h_{ui}):H\_UI, \text{luis}:L\_UI\text{-set} \bullet h_{ui} \in h_{uis}]$   
 $\wedge (\_ \text{luis}, \_) = \text{mereo}_H(\eta(h_{ui}))$  [cf. Item 63]
- 49.  $lh_{uim}:(L+UI \xrightarrow{map} H\_UI\text{-set}) \equiv$   
 $[l_{ui} \mapsto \text{huis}$  [cf. Item 64]  
 $| h_{ui}:L\_UI, \text{huis}:H\_UI\text{-set} \bullet l_{ui} \in l_{uis}]$   
 $\wedge (\_ \text{huis}, \_) = \text{mereo}_L(\eta(l_{ui}))]$
- 51.  $bc_{uis}:BC\_UI\text{-set} \equiv \{\text{uid}_{BC}(bc)|bc:BC \bullet bc \in bcs\}$
- 52.  $b_{uis}:B\_UI\text{-set} \equiv \cup\{\text{uid}_B(b)|b:B \bullet b \in bs\}$
- 53.  $a_{uis}:A\_UI\text{-set} \equiv \{\text{uid}_A(a)|a:A \bullet a \in as\}$
- 54.  $v_{uis}:V\_UI\text{-set} \equiv b_{uis} \cup a_{uis}$
- 55.  $bcb_{uim}:(BC\_UI \xrightarrow{map} B\_UI\text{-set}) \equiv$   
 $[bc_{ui} \mapsto \text{buis}$   
 $| bc_{ui}:BC\_UI, bc:BC \bullet$   
 $bc \in bcs \wedge bc_{ui} = \text{uid}_{BC}(bc)$   
 $\wedge (\_ \text{buis}) = \text{mereo}_{BC}(bc)]$
- 56.  $bbc_{uim}:(B\_UI \xrightarrow{map} BC\_UI) \equiv$   
 $[b_{ui} \mapsto bc_{ui}$   
 $| b_{ui}:B\_UI, bc_{ui}:BC\_UI \bullet$   
 $bc_{ui} = \text{dom}bcb_{uim} \wedge b_{ui} \in bcb_{uim}(bc_{ui})]$

**Uniqueness of Part Identifiers:** See Sect. 5.5 Pg. 27.

We must express the following axioms:

- 57 All hub identifiers are distinct.
- 58 All link identifiers are distinct.
- 59 All bus company identifiers are distinct.
- 60 All bus identifiers are distinct.
- 61 All private automobile identifiers are distinct.
- 62 All part identifiers are distinct.

<sup>44</sup>This is just another way of saying that the meaning of hub mereologies involves the unique identifiers of all the vehicles that might pass through the hub `is_of_interest` to it

<sup>45</sup>... its link identifiers designate the links, zero, one or more, that a hub is connected to `is_of_interest` to both the hub and that these links is interested in the hub.

<sup>46</sup>... the hubs are not “proactive”, i.e., that the universe of discourse have no parts that are interested in the hub.

<sup>47</sup>that the bus might pass through

<sup>48</sup>that the automobile might pass through

**axiom**

- 57  $\text{card } hs = \text{card } h_{uis}$
- 58  $\text{card } ls = \text{card } l_{uis}$
- 59  $\text{card } bcs = \text{card } bc_{uis}$
- 60  $\text{card } bs = \text{card } b_{uis}$
- 61  $\text{card } as = \text{card } a_{uis}$
- 62  $\text{card } \{h_{uis} \cup l_{uis} \cup bc_{uis} \cup b_{uis} \cup a_{uis}\}$   
 $= \text{card } h_{uis} + \text{card } l_{uis} + \text{card } bc_{uis} + \text{card } b_{uis} + \text{card } a_{uis}$

## 8.1.8 Mereology – Sect. 5.2 Pg. 19

See Description Prompt 6, Pg. 20

We refer to 19.

- 63 The mereology of hubs is a triple: (i) the set of all bus and automobile identifiers<sup>44</sup>, (ii) the set of unique identifiers of the links that it is connected to and the set of all unique identifiers of all vehicle (buses and private automobiles),<sup>45</sup>, and (iii) an empty set.<sup>46</sup>
- 64 The mereology of links is a triple: (i) the set of all bus and automobile identifiers, (ii) the set of the two distinct hubs they are connected to, and (iii) an empty set.
- 65 The mereology of a bus company is a triple: (i) an empty set, (ii) empty set, and (iii) and set the unique identifiers of the buses operated by that company.
- 66 The mereology of a bus is a triple: (i) the set of the one single unique identifier of the bus company it is operating for, (ii) an empty set, and (iii) the unique identifiers of all links and hubs<sup>47</sup>.
- 67 The mereology of an automobiles is a triple: (i) an empty set, (ii) an empty set, and (iii) the set of the unique identifiers of all links and hubs<sup>48</sup>.
- 68 Empty sets are modeled as empty sets of tokens where tokens are further undefined.

**type**

- 68  $ES = \text{TOKEN-set}$
- 68 **axiom**  $\forall es:ES \bullet es = \{\}$
- 63  $H\_Mer = V\_UI\text{-set} \times L\_UI\text{-set} \times ES$
- 63 **axiom**  $\forall (vuis, luis, \_):H\_Mer \bullet \text{luis} \subseteq l_{uis} \wedge \text{vuis} = v_{uis}$
- 64  $L\_Mer = V\_UI\text{-set} \times H\_UI\text{-set} \times ES$
- 64 **axiom**  $\forall (vuis, huis, \_):L\_Mer \bullet$   
 $\text{vuis} = v_{uis} \wedge \text{huis} \subseteq h_{uis} \wedge \text{card huis} = 2$
- 65  $BC\_Mer = ES \times ES \times B\_UI\text{-set}$
- 65 **axiom**  $\forall (\_ \text{buis}):H\_Mer \bullet \text{buis} = b_{uis}$
- 66  $B\_Mer = BC\_UI \times ES \times R\_UI\text{-set}$
- 66 **axiom**  $\forall (bc_{ui}, \_ \text{ruis}):H\_Mer \bullet bc_{ui} \in bc_{uis} \wedge \text{ruis} = r_{uis}$
- 67  $A\_Mer = ES \times ES \times R\_UI\text{-set}$
- 67 **axiom**  $\forall (\_ \text{ruis}, \_):A\_Mer \bullet \text{ruis} = r_{uis}$

**value**

- 63  $\text{mereo}_H: H \rightarrow H\_Mer$
- 64  $\text{mereo}_L: L \rightarrow L\_Mer$
- 65  $\text{mereo}_{BC}: BC \rightarrow BC\_Mer$
- 66  $\text{mereo}_B: B \rightarrow B\_Mer$
- 67  $\text{mereo}_A: A \rightarrow A\_Mer$

We can express some additional axioms, in this case for relations between hubs and links:

- 69 If hub,  $h$ , and link,  $l$ , are in the same road net,
- 70 and if hub  $h$  connects to link  $l$  then link  $l$  connects to hub  $h$ .

**axiom**

```

69  $\forall h:H, l:L \bullet h \in hs \wedge l \in ls \Rightarrow$ 
   let ( $\_luis, \_$ ) = mereo.H(h), ( $\_huis, \_$ ) = mereo.L(l) in
70  $uid\_L(l) \in luis \Rightarrow uid\_H(h) \in huis$  end

```

More mereology axioms need to be expressed – but we leave, to the reader, to narrate and formalise those.

**8.1.9 Attributes – Sect. 5.3 Pg. 21**

We treat part attributes, sort by sort. See Description Prompt 7, Pg. 22

**Hubs:** We show just a few attributes:

- 71 There is a hub state. It is a set of pairs,  $(l_f, l_r)$  of link identifiers, where these link identifiers are in the mereology of the hub. The meaning of the hub state, in which, e.g.,  $(l_f, l_r)$  is an element, is that the hub is open, “green”, for traffic from link  $l_f$  to link  $l_r$ . If a hub state is empty then the hub is closed, i.e., “red” for traffic from any connected links to any other connected links.
- 72 There is a hub state space. It is a set of hub states. The meaning of the hub state space is that its states are all those the hub can attain. The current hub state must be in its state space.
- 73 Since we can think rationally about it, it can be described, hence it can model, as an attribute of hubs a history of its traffic: the recording, per unique bus and automobile identifier, of the time ordered presence in the hub of these vehicles.
- 74 The link identifiers of hub states must be in the set,  $l_{uis}$ , of the road net’s link identifiers.

```

type
71  $H\Sigma = (L\_UI \times L\_UI)\text{-set}$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
axiom
71  $\forall h:H \bullet obs\_H\Sigma(h) \in obs\_H\Omega(h)$ 
type
72  $H\Omega = H\Sigma\text{-set}$  [static, Df.1 Pg.22]
73  $H\_Traffic$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
73  $H\_Traffic = (A\_UI | B\_UI) \xrightarrow{m} (\mathcal{T} \times VPos)^*$ 
axiom
73  $\forall ht:H\_Traffic, ui:(A\_UI | B\_UI) \bullet ui \in dom\ ht$ 
73  $\Rightarrow time\_ordered(ht(ui))$ 
value
71  $attr\_H\Sigma: H \rightarrow H\Sigma$ 
72  $attr\_H\Omega: H \rightarrow H\Omega$ 
73  $attr\_H\_Traffic: : \rightarrow H\_Traffic$ 
axiom
74  $\forall h:H \bullet h \in hs \Rightarrow$ 
74 let  $h\sigma = attr\_H\Sigma(h)$  in
74  $\forall (l_{ui}, l'_{ui}): (L\_UI \times L\_UI) \bullet (l_{ui}, l'_{ui}) \in h\sigma$ 
74  $\Rightarrow \{l_{ui}, l'_{ui}\} \subseteq l_{uis}$  end
value
73  $time\_ordered: \mathcal{T}^* \rightarrow Bool$ 
73  $time\_ordered(tp1) \equiv \dots$ 

```

**Links:** We show just a few attributes:

- 75 There is a link state. It is a set of pairs,  $(h_f, h_r)$ , of distinct hub identifiers, where these hub identifiers are in the mereology of the link. The meaning of a link state in which  $(h_f, h_r)$  is an element is that the link is open, “green”, for traffic from hub  $h_f$  to hub  $h_r$ . Link states can have either 0, 1 or 2 elements.
- 76 There is a link state space. It is a set of link states. The meaning of the link state space is that its states are all those the which the link can attain. The current link state must be in its state space. If a link state space is empty then the link is (permanently) closed. If it has one element then it is a one-way link. If a one-way link,  $l$ , is imminent on a hub whose mereology designates that link, then the link is a “trap”, i.e., a “blind cul-de-sac”.
- 77 Since we can think rationally about it, it can be described, hence it can model, as an attribute of links a history of its traffic: the recording, per unique bus and automobile identifier, of the time ordered positions along the link (from one hub to the next) of these vehicles.

- 78 The hub identifiers of link states must be in the set,  $h_{uis}$ , of the road net’s hub identifiers.

```

type
75  $L\Sigma = H\_UI\text{-set}$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
axiom
75  $\forall l\sigma:L\Sigma \bullet card\ l\sigma = 2$ 
75  $\forall l:L \bullet obs\_L\Sigma(l) \in obs\_L\Omega(l)$ 
type
76  $L\Omega = L\Sigma\text{-set}$  [static, Df.1 Pg.22]
77  $L\_Traffic$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
77  $L\_Traffic = (A\_UI | B\_UI) \xrightarrow{m} (\mathcal{T} \times (H\_UI \times Frac \times H\_UI))^*$ 
77  $Frac = Real$ , axiom  $frac:Frac \bullet 0 < frac < 1$ 
value
75  $attr\_L\Sigma: L \rightarrow L\Sigma$ 
76  $attr\_L\Omega: L \rightarrow L\Omega$ 
77  $attr\_L\_Traffic: : \rightarrow L\_Traffic$ 
axiom
77  $\forall lt:L\_Traffic, ui:(A\_UI | B\_UI) \bullet ui \in dom\ ht$ 
77  $\Rightarrow time\_ordered(ht(ui))$ 
78  $\forall l:L \bullet l \in ls \Rightarrow$ 
78 let  $l\sigma = attr\_L\Sigma(l)$  in
78  $\forall (h_{ui}, h'_{ui}): (H\_UI \times K\_UI) \bullet$ 
78  $(h_{ui}, h'_{ui}) \in l\sigma \Rightarrow \{h_{ui}, h'_{ui}\} \subseteq h_{uis}$  end

```

**Bus Companies:** Bus companies operate a number of lines that service passenger transport along routes of the road net. Each line being serviced by a number of busses.

- 79 Bus companies have a physical, i.e., “real, actual” time attribute.
- 80 Bus companies create, maintain, revise and distribute [to the public (not modeled here), and to busses] bus time tables, not further defined.

```

type
79  $\mathcal{T}$  [inert, Df.3 Pg.22]
80  $BusTimTbl$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
value
79  $attr\_T: BC \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ 
80  $attr\_BusTimTbl: BC \rightarrow BusTimTbl$ 

```

There are two notions of time at play here: the inert “real” or “actual” time as an inert attribute provided by some outside “agent”; and the calendar, hour, minute and second time designation occurring in some textual form in, e.g., time tables..

**Busses:** We show just a few attributes:

- 79 Buses have a time attribute.
- 81 Busses run routes, according to their line number,  $ln:LN$ , in the
- 82 bus time table,  $btt:BusTimTbl$  obtained from their bus company, and and keep, as inert attributes, their segment of that time table.
- 83 Busses occupy positions on the road net:
- a either *at a hub* identified by some  $h_{ui}$ ,
  - b or *on a link*, some *fraction*,  $f:Frac$ , down an *identified link*,  $l_{ui}$ , from one of its *identified connecting hubs*,  $fh_{ui}$ , in the direction of the other *identified hub*,  $th_{ui}$ .
- 84 Et cetera.

```

type
79  $\mathcal{T}$  [inert, Df.3 Pg.22]
81  $LN$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
82  $BusTimTbl$  [inert, Df.3 Pg.22]
83  $BPos == atHub | onLink$  [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
83a  $atHub :: h_{ui}:H\_UI$ 
83b  $onLink :: fh_{ui}:H\_UI \times l_{ui}:L\_UI \times frac:Frac \times th_{ui}:H\_UI$ 
83b  $Frac = Real$ , axiom  $frac:Frac \bullet 0 < frac < 1$ 
84 ...
value
79  $attr\_T: B \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ 
82  $attr\_BusTimTbl: B \rightarrow BusTimTbl$ 
83  $attr\_BPos: B \rightarrow BPos$ 

```

**Private Automobiles:** We show just a few attributes: We illustrate but a few attributes:

79 Automobiles have a time attribute.

85 Automobiles have static number plate registration numbers.

86 Automobiles have dynamic positions on the road net:

[83a] either at a *hub* identified by some  $h_{ui}$ ,  
[83b] or on a *link*, some *fraction*,  $frac:Fract$  down an *identified link*,  $l_{ui}$ , from one of its *identified connecting hubs*,  $fh_{ui}$ , in the direction of the other *identified hub*,  $th_{ui}$ .

**type**

```
79  $\mathcal{T}$  [inert, Df.3 Pg.22]
85 RegNo [static, Df.1 Pg.22]
86 APos == atHub | onLink [programmable, Df.8 Pg.23]
83a atHub :: hui:H_UI
83b onLink :: fhui:H_UI × lui:L_UI × frac:Fract × thui:H_UI
83b Fract = Real, axiom frac:Fract • 0 < frac < 1
value
79 attr_T: A →  $\mathcal{T}$ 
85 attr_RegNo: A → RegNo
86 attr_APos: A → APos
```

Obvious attributes that are not illustrated are those of velocity and acceleration, forward or backward movement, turning right, left or going straight, etc. The *acceleration*, *deceleration*, *even velocity*, or *turning right*, *turning left*, *moving straight*, or *forward* or *backward* are seen as *command actions*. As such they denote actions by the automobile — such as pressing the accelerator, or lifting accelerator pressure or *braking*, or *turning the wheel* in one direction or another, etc. As actions they have a kind of counterpart in the velocity, the acceleration, etc. attributes.

### 8.1.10 Discussion

Observe that bus companies each have their own distinct *bus time table*, and that these are modeled as *programmable*, Item 79 on the previous page, Page 43. Observe then that busses each have their own distinct *bus time table*, and that these are model-led as *inert*, Item 82 on the preceding page, Page 43. In Items 117–118b Pg. 47 we shall see how the busses communicate with their respective bus companies in order for the busses to obtain the *programmed* bus time tables “in lieu” of their *inert* one! In Items 73 Pg. 43 and 77 Pg. 43, we illustrated an aspect of domain analysis & description that may seem, and at least some decades ago would have seemed, strange: namely that if we can think, hence speak, about it, then we can model it “as a fact” in the domain. The case in point is that we include among hub and link attributes their histories of the timed whereabouts of buses and automobiles.<sup>49</sup>

### 8.1.11 Some Axioms and Proof Obligations – Sect. 5.5 Pg. 27

Examples of axioms are given in Items 57–62 Pg. 42, Items 69–70 Pg. 42, Item 73, and in Item 77. We shall give an example of a **proof obligation** expressed as a **post condition**, related to the last two of the above axioms, in Items 109g Pg. 47 and 116 Pg. 47

Those proof obligations reflect an aspect of the concept of **transcendental deduction**: that axioms over, as here, *internal qualities of endurants* via *post conditions of perdurants* become *proof obligations*!

### 8.1.12 Discussion of Endurants – Sect. 5.6 Pg. 27

- We have chosen to model some discrete endurants
  - ◊ as structures
  - ◊ others as parts (usually composite).
- Those choices are made mostly to illustrate that the *domain analyser & describer* has a choice.

- ◊ If a choice is made to model a discrete endurant as a structure
  - then it entails that the *domain analyser & describer* does not wish to “implement” that discrete endurant as a behaviour separate from its sub-endurants;
- ◊ If the choice is made to model a discrete endurant as a part
  - then it entails that the *domain analyser & describer* wishes to “implement” that discrete endurant as a behaviour separate from its sub-endurants.
- The following discrete endurants which are modeled as structures above, could, instead, if modeled as parts, have the entailed behaviours reflect the following possibilities:

- ◊ *road net*,  $rn:RN$ : The road net behaviour could be that of a road net authority charged with building, servicing, operating and maintaining the road net. Building and maintaining the road net could mean the insertion of new or removal of old links or hubs. Operating the road net could mean the gathering of bus and automobile traffic statistics, the setting of hub states (traffic signal monitoring and control), etc.
- ◊ *aggregate of bus companies*,  $sbc:SBC$ : The composite aggregate of bus companies could be that of a public transport authority charged with establishing, servicing, operating and maintaining a common bus time table, etc.
- ◊ *aggregate of private automobiles*,  $ps:PA$ : The aggregate of private automobiles could be that of one or more *automobile clubs*, etc.

## 8.2 Transcendentality – Sect. 6 Pg. 28

We refer to Sect. 6 on Page 28 Defn. 18 Page 28.


**Example 19 A Case of Transcendentality:** We refer to the following example: We can speak of a bus in at least three senses:

- The bus as it is being maintained, serviced, refueled;
- the bus as it “speeds” down its route; and
- the bus as it “appears” (listed) in a bus time table.

The three senses are:

- as a part,
- as a behaviour, and
- as an attribute<sup>50</sup> ■

## 8.3 Perdurants – Sect. 7 Pg. 29



In the figure above we “symbolically”, i.e., the “...”, show the following parts: each individual hub, each individual link, each individual bus company, each individual bus, and each individual automobile – and all of these. The idea is that those are the parts for which we shall define behaviours. That figure, however, and in contrast to Fig. 6 Pg. 40, shows the

<sup>49</sup>In this day and age of road cameras and satellite surveillance these traffic recordings may not appear so strange: We now know, at least in principle, of technologies that can record approximations to the hub and link traffic attributes.

<sup>50</sup>in this case rather: as a fragment of an attribute

composite parts as not containing their atomic parts, but as if they were “free-standing, atomic” parts. That shall visualise the transcendental interpretation as atomic part behaviours not being somehow embedded in composite behaviours, but operating concurrently, in parallel.

### 8.3.1 Constants and States – Sect. 7.1.1 Pg. 29

**Constants:** We refer to Sect. 7.1.1 Pg. 29, and to App. 8.1.6 Pg. 41 We assume, as a constant, an arbitrarily selected universe of discourse,  $uod$ , and calculate from  $uod$  all its endurants.

```

value
32 rts:UoD [32]
33 hs:H-set ≡ H-set ≡ obs_sH(obs_SH(obs_RN(rts))) [33]
34 ls:L-set ≡ L-set ≡ obs_sL(obs_SL(obs_RN(rts))) [34]
35 hls:(H/L)-set ≡ hs\ls [35]
36 bcs:BC-set ≡ obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts)))) [36]
37 bs:B-set ≡ ∪{obs_Bs(bc)|bc:BC•bc ∈ bcs} [37]
38 as:A-set ≡ obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts)))) [38]

```

**Indexed States:** We shall

- 87 index bus companies,
- 88 index buses, and
- 89 index automobiles

using the unique identifiers of these parts.


```

type
87 BCui
88 Bui
89 Aui
value
87 ibcs:BCui-set ≡
87 { bcui | bc:BC, bc:BCui:BCui • bc ∈ bcs ∧ ui = uid_BC(bc) }
88 ibs:Bui-set ≡
88 { bui | b:B, b:Bui:Bui • b ∈ bs ∧ ui = uid_B(b) }
89 ias:Aui-set ≡
89 { aui | a:A, a:Aui:Aui • a ∈ as ∧ ui = uid_A(a) }

```

### 8.3.2 Channels – Sect. 7.2 Pg. 31

We shall argue for hub-to-link channels based on the mereologies of those parts. Hub parts may be topologically connected to any number, 0 or more, link parts. Only instantiated road nets knows which. Hence there must be channels between any hub behaviour and any link behaviour. Vice versa: link parts will be connected to exactly two hub parts. Hence there must be channels from any link behaviour to two hub behaviours. See the figure below:



**Channel Message Types:** We ascribe types to the messages offered on channels.

- 90 Hubs and links communicate, both ways, with one another, over channels,  $hL\_ch$ , whose indexes are determined by their mereologies.
- 91 Hubs send one kind of messages, links another.
- 92 Bus companies offer timed bus time tables to buses, one way.
- 93 Buses and automobiles offer their current, timed positions to the road element, hub or link they are on, one way.

```

type
91 H_L_Msg, L_H_Msg
90 H_L_Msg = H_L_Msg | L_F_Msg
92 BC_B_Msg = T × BusTimTbl
93 V_R_Msg = T × (BPos/APos)

```

**Channel Declarations:** ...

- 94 This justifies the channel declaration which is calculated to be:

```

channel
94 { hL_ch[hui,lui]:H_L_Msg
94 | hui:H_UI,lui:L_UI•i ∈ huiS^j ∈ lhuim(hui) }
94 ∪
94 { hL_ch[hui,lui]:L_H_Msg
94 | hui:H_UI,lui:L_UI•lui ∈ luiS^i ∈ lhuim(lui) }

```

We shall argue for bus company-to-bus channels based on the mereologies of those parts. Bus companies need communicate to all its buses, but not the buses of other bus companies. Buses of a bus company need communicate to their bus company, but not to other bus companies.

- 95 This justifies the channel declaration which is calculated to be:

```

channel
95 { bc_b_ch[bcui,bui]:BC_B_Msg
95 | bcui:BC_UI, bui:B_UI •
95 bcui ∈ bcuiS ∧ bui ∈ buiS }
95 { bc_b_ch[bcui,bui]|bcui:BC_UI,bui:B_UI•bcui ∈ bcuiS^j ∈ buiS } : BC_B_MSG
95 { bc_b_ch[bcui,bui]|bcui:BC_UI,bui:B_UI•bcui ∈ bcuiS^j ∈ buiS } : BC_B_MSG

```

We shall argue for vehicle to road element channels based on the mereologies of those parts. Buses and automobiles need communicate to all hubs and all links.

- 96 This justifies the channel declaration which is calculated to be:

```

channel
96 { v_r_ch[vui,rui]:V_R_Msg | vui:V_UI,rui:R_UI•vui ∈ vuiS^rui ∈ ruiS }

```

The channel calculations are described on Pages 35–36.

### 8.3.3 Behaviour Signatures – Sect. 7.3.3 Pg. 34

We first decide on names of behaviours. In Sect. 7.4, Pages 37–39, we gave schematic names to behaviours of the form  $\mathcal{M}_p$ . We now assign mnemonic names: from part names to names of transcendentially interpreted behaviours and then we assign signatures to these behaviours.

- 97  $hub_{h_{ui}}$ :
  - a there is the usual “triplet” of arguments: unique identifier, mereology and static attributes;
  - b then there are the programmable attributes;
  - c and finally there are the input/output channel references: first those allowing communication between hub and link behaviours,
  - d and then those allowing communication between hub and vehicle (bus and automobile) behaviours.

```

value
97 hubhui:
97a hui:H_UI × (vuis,luis,_) : H_Mer × H_Ω
97b → (HΣ × H_L_Traffic)
97c → in,out { hui_ch[hui,lui] | lui:L_UI:lui ∈ luis }
97d { ba_r_ch[hui,vui] | vui:V_UI•vui ∈ vuis } Unit
97a pre: vuis = vuis ∧ luis = luis

```

98  $link_{hui}$ :

- a there is the usual “triplet” of arguments: unique identifier, mereology and static attributes;
- b then there are the programmable attributes;
- c and finally there are the input/output channel references: first those allowing communication between hub and link behaviours,
- d and then those allowing communication between link and vehicle (bus and automobile) behaviours.

**value**

```

98  $link_{hui}$ :
98a  $l_{hui}:L\_UI \times (vuis,huis,\_):L\_Mer \times L\Omega$ 
98b  $\rightarrow (L\Sigma \times L\_Traffic)$ 
98c  $\rightarrow \mathbf{in,out} \{ h\_L\_ch[h\_lui,l\_lui] \mid h\_lui:H\_UI:h\_lui \in huis \}$ 
98d  $\{ ba\_r\_ch[l\_lui,v\_lui] \mid v\_lui:(B\_UI|A\_UI) \bullet v\_lui \in vuis \}$  Unit
98a pre:  $vuis = v_{uis} \wedge huis = h_{uis}$ 

```

99  $bus\_company_{bc_{hui}}$ :

- a there is here just a “doublet” of arguments: unique identifier and mereology;
- b then there is the one programmable attribute;
- c and finally there are the input/output channel references: first the input time channel,
- d then the input/output allowing communication between the bus company and buses.

**value**

```

99  $bus\_company_{bc_{hui}}$ :
99a  $bc_{ui}:BC\_UI \times (\_,\_,buis):BC\_Mer$ 
99b  $\rightarrow BusTimTbl$ 
99c  $\rightarrow \mathbf{in} \text{ attr\_T\_ch}$ 
99d  $\mathbf{in,out} \{ bc\_b\_ch[bc_{ui},b_{ui}] \mid b_{ui}:B\_UI \bullet b_{ui} \in buis \}$  Unit
99a pre:  $buis = b_{uis} \wedge huis = h_{uis}$ 

```

100  $bus_{b_{hui}}$ :

- a there is here just a “doublet” of arguments: unique identifier and mereology;
- b then there are the programmable attributes;
- c and finally there are the input/output channel references: first the input time channel, and the input/output allowing communication between the bus company and buses,
- d and the input/output allowing communication between the bus and the hub and link behaviours.

**value**

```

100  $bus_{b_{hui}}$ :
100a  $b_{ui}:B\_UI \times (bc_{ui},\_,ruis):B\_Mer$ 
100b  $\rightarrow (LN \times BTT \times BPOS)$ 
100c  $\rightarrow \mathbf{in} \text{ attr\_T\_ch} \mathbf{in,out} \{ bc\_b\_ch[bc_{ui},b_{ui}] \}$ 
100d  $\{ ba\_r\_ch[r_{ui},b_{ui}] \mid r_{ui}:(H\_UI|L\_UI) \bullet r_{ui} \in v_{uis} \}$  Unit
100a pre:  $ruis = r_{uis} \wedge bc_{ui} \in bc_{uis}$ 

```

101  $automobile_{a_{ui}}$ :

- a there is the usual “triplet” of arguments: unique identifier, mereology and static attributes;
- b then there is the one programmable attribute;
- c and finally there are the input/output channel references: first the input time channel,
- d then the input/output allowing communication between the automobile and the hub and link behaviours.

**value**

```

101  $automobile_{a_{ui}}$ :
101a  $a_{ui}:A\_UI \times (\_,\_,ruis):A\_Mer \times rn:RegNo$ 
101b  $\rightarrow apos:APOS$ 
101c  $\rightarrow \mathbf{in} \text{ attr\_T\_ch}$ 
101d  $\mathbf{in,out} \{ ba\_r\_ch[a_{ui},r_{ui}] \mid r_{ui}:(H\_UI|L\_UI) \bullet r_{ui} \in ruis \}$  Unit
101a pre:  $ruis = r_{uis} \wedge a_{ui} \in a_{uis}$ 

```

### 8.3.4 Behaviour Definitions – Sect. 7.4 Pg. 37

We define the behaviours in a different order than the treatment of their signatures. We “split” definition of the automobile behaviour into the behaviour of automobiles when positioned at a hub, and into the behaviour of automobiles when positioned at on a link. In both cases the behaviours include the “idling” of the automobile, i.e., its “not moving”, standing still.

#### Automobiles:

102 We abstract automobile behaviour at a Hub (hui).

103 The vehicle remains at that hub, “idling”,

104 informing the hub behaviour,

105 or, internally non-deterministically,

a moves onto a link,  $t_{li}$ , whose “next” hub, identified by  $th_{ui}$ , is obtained from the mereology of the link identified by  $tl_{ui}$ ;

b informs the hub it is leaving and the link it is entering of its initial link position,

c whereupon the vehicle resumes the vehicle behaviour positioned at the very beginning (0) of that link,

106 or, again internally non-deterministically,

107 the vehicle “disappears — off the radar”!

```

102  $automobile_{a_{ui}}(a_{ui},(\{ \},(ruis,vuis),\{ \}),rn)$ 
102  $(apos:atH(fh_{ui},h_{ui},tl_{ui})) \equiv$ 
103  $(ba\_r\_ch[a_{ui},h_{ui}] \mid (attr\_T\_ch?,atH(fh_{ui},h_{ui},tl_{ui})));$ 
104  $automobile_{a_{ui}}(a_{ui},(\{ \},(ruis,vuis),\{ \}),rn)(apos)$ 
105  $\sqcap$ 
105a  $(\mathbf{let} (\{ fh_{ui},th_{ui} \},ruis') = mereo\_L(\not\exists(tl_{ui})) \mathbf{in}$ 
105a  $\mathbf{assert}: fh_{ui} = h_{ui} \wedge ruis = ruis'$ 
102  $\mathbf{let} onl = (tl_{ui},h_{ui},0,th_{ui}) \mathbf{in}$ 
105b  $(ba\_r\_ch[a_{ui},h_{ui}] \mid (attr\_T\_ch?,onl(onl))) \parallel$ 
105b  $ba\_r\_ch[a_{ui},tl_{ui}] \mid (attr\_T\_ch?,onl(onl)))$ ;
105c  $automobile_{a_{ui}}(a_{ui},(\{ \},(ruis,vuis),\{ \}),rn)$ 
105c  $(onl(onl)) \mathbf{end\ end})$ 
106  $\sqcap$ 
107 stop

```

108 We abstract automobile behaviour on a Link.

a Internally non-deterministically, either

- i the automobile remains, “idling”, i.e., not moving, on the link,
- ii however, first informing the link of its position,

b or

i **if** if the automobile’s position on the link *has not yet reached the hub*, **then**

A then the automobile moves an arbitrary small, positive **Real**-valued **increment** along the link

B informing the hub of this,

C while resuming being an automobile at the new position, or

ii **else**,

A while obtaining a “next link” from the mereology of the hub (where that next link could very well be the same as the link the vehicle is about to leave),



B the vehicle informs both the link and the imminent hub that it is now at that hub, identified by  $th_{ui}$ ,

C whereupon the vehicle resumes the vehicle behaviour positioned at that hub;

c or

d the vehicle “disappears — off the radar” !

```

108 automobileui(aui,({},ruis,{}),rno)
108 (vp:onL(fhui,lui,f,thui)) ≡
108(a)ii (ba_rch[thui,ui]!atH(lui,thui,nxt_lui) ;
108(a)i automobileui(aui,({},ruis,{}),rno)(vp)
108b □
108(b)i (if notyet.athub(f)
108(b)i then
108(b)iA (let incr = increment(f) in
102 let onl = (tlui,hui,incr,thui) in
108(b)iB ba_rch[lui,aui] ! onL(onl) ;
108(b)iC automobileui(aui,({},ruis,{}),rno)
108(b)iC (onL(onl))
108(b)i end end)
108(b)ii else
108(b)iiA (let nxt_lui:L_UI•nxt_lui ∈ mereoH(/θ(thui)) in
108(b)iiB ba_rch[thui,ui]!atH(lui,thui,nxt_lui) ;
108(b)iiC automobileui(aui,({},ruis,{}),rno)
108(b)iiC (atH(lui,thui,nxt_lui)) end)
108(b)i end)
108c □
108d stop
108(b)iA increment: Fract → Fract

```

**Hubs:** We model the hub behaviour vis-a-vis vehicles: buses and automobiles.

109 The hub behaviour

- a non-deterministically, externally offers
- b to accept timed vehicle positions —
- c which will be at the hub, from some vehicle,  $v_{ui}$ .
- d The timed vehicle hub position is appended to the front of that vehicle’s entry in the hub’s traffic table;
- e whereupon the hub proceeds as a hub behaviour with the updated hub traffic table.
- f The hub behaviour offers to accept from any vehicle.
- g A **post** condition expresses what is really a **proof obligation**: that the hub traffic,  $ht'$  satisfies the **axiom** of the enduring hub traffic attribute Item 73 Pg. 43.

```

value
109 hubui(hui,(, (luis,vuis)),hω)(hσ,ht) ≡
109a □
109b { let m = ba_rch[hui,vui] ? in
109c assert: m=(,atHub(,hui,))
109d let ht' = ht † [hui ↦ ⟨m⟩ht(hui)] in
109e hubui(hui,(, (luis,vuis)),(hω))(hσ,ht')
109f | vui:V_UI•vui∈vuis end end }
109g post: ∀ vui:V_UI•vui ∈ dom ht' ⇒ timeordered(ht'(vui))

```

**Links:** Similarly we model the link behaviour vis-a-vis vehicles.

- 110 The link behaviour non-deterministically, externally offers
- 111 to accept timed vehicle positions —
- 112 which will be on the link, from some vehicle,  $v_{ui}$ .
- 113 The timed vehicle link position is appended to the front of that vehicle’s entry in the link’s traffic table;
- 114 whereupon the link proceeds as a link behaviour with the updated link traffic table.

115 The link behaviour offers to accept from any vehicle.

116 A **post** condition expresses what is really a **proof obligation**: that the link traffic,  $lt'$  satisfies the **axiom** of the enduring link traffic attribute Item 77 Pg. 43.

```

110 linkui(lui,(, (huis,vuis),),lω)(lσ,lt) ≡
110 □
111 { let m = ba_rch[lui,vui] ? in
112 assert: m=(,onLink(,lui,))
113 let lt' = lt † [lui ↦ ⟨m⟩lt(lui)] in
114 linkui(lui,(huis,vuis),hω)(hσ,lt')
115 | vui:V_UI•vui∈vuis end end }
116 post: ∀ vui:V_UI•vui ∈ dom lt' ⇒ timeordered(lt'(vui))

```

**Bus Companies:** We model bus companies very rudimentary. Bus companies keep a fleet of buses. Bus companies create, maintain, distribute bus time tables. Bus companies deploy their buses to honor obligations of their bus time tables. We shall basically only model the distribution of bus time tables to buses. We shall not cover other aspects of bus company management, etc.

- 117 Bus companies non-deterministically, internally, chooses among
  - a updating their bus time tables
  - b whereupon they resume being bus companies, albeit with a new bus time table;
- 118 “interleaved” with
  - a offering the current time-stamped bus time table to buses which offer willingness to received them
  - b whereupon they resume being bus companies with unchanged bus time table.

```

99 buscompanybcui(bcui,(,buis,)) (btt) ≡
117a (let btt' = update(btt,...) in
117b buscompanybcui(bcui,(,buis,)) (btt') end )
118 □
118a ( [ [ bc_bch[bcui,bui] ! btt | bui:B_UI•bui∈buis
118b buscompanybcui(bcui,(,buis,)) (attrTch?,btt) } ] )

```

**Buses:** We model the interface between buses and their owning companies — as well as the interface between buses and the road net, the latter by almost “carbon-copying” all elements of the automobile behaviour(s).

- 119 The bus behaviour chooses to either
  - a accept a (latest) time-stamped buss time table from its bus company –
  - b where after it resumes being the bus behaviour now with the updated bus time table.
- 120 or, non-deterministically, internally,
  - a based on the bus position
    - i if it is at a hub then it behaves as prescribed in the case of automobiles at a hub,
    - ii else, it is on a link, and then it behaves as prescribed in the case of automobiles on a link.

```

119 busbui(bui,(, (bcui,ruis),)) (ln,btt,bpos) ≡
119a (let btt' = b_bch[bui,bcui] ? in
119b busbui(bui,(, (bcui,ruis),)) (ln,btt',bpos) end)
120 □
120a (case bpos of
120(a)i atH(flui,hui,tlui) →
120(a)i atHbusbui(bui,(, (bcui,ruis),)) (ln,btt,bpos),
120(a)ii aonL(fhui,lui,f,thui) →
120(a)ii onLbusbui(bui,(, (bcui,ruis),)) (ln,btt,bpos)
120a end)

```



The  $\text{atH\_bus}_{b_{ui}}$  behaviour definition is a simple transcription of the  $\text{automobile}_{a_{ui}}$  (atH) behaviour definition: mereology expressions being changed from  $\text{to}$  to  $\text{,}$ , programmed attributes being changed from  $\text{atH}(f_{l_{ui}}, h_{a_{ui}}, t_{l_{ui}})$  to  $(\text{ln}, \text{btt}, \text{atH}(f_{l_{ui}}, h_{a_{ui}}, t_{l_{ui}}))$ , channel references  $a_{ui}$  being replaced by  $b_{ui}$ , and behaviour invocations renamed from  $\text{automobile}_{a_{ui}}$  to  $\text{bus}_{b_{ui}}$ . So formula lines 103–108d below presents “nothing new”!

```

120(a)i atH_bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, (bc_{ui}, ruis), _)
120(a)i (ln, btt, atH(f_{l_{ui}}, h_{a_{ui}}, t_{l_{ui}})) ≡
103 (ba_r_ch[b_{ui}, h_{ui}] ! (attr_T_ch?, atH(f_{l_{ui}}, h_{a_{ui}}, t_{l_{ui}})));
104 bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, ({}), (bc_{ui}, ruis), ({}))(ln, btt, bpos)
119a ∥
105a (let ({} fh_{ui}, th_{ui}), ruis') = mereo_L(∅(t_{l_{ui}})) in
105a assert: fh_{ui} = h_{ui} ∧ ruis = ruis'
102 let onl = (t_{l_{ui}}, h_{ui}, 0, th_{ui}) in
105b (ba_r_ch[b_{ui}, h_{ui}] ! (attr_T_ch?, onL(onl))) ∥
105b ba_r_ch[b_{ui}, t_{l_{ui}}] ! (attr_T_ch?, onL(onl));
105c bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, ({}), (bc_{ui}, ruis), ({}))
105c (ln, btt, onL(onl)) end end )
108c ∥
108d stop

```

The  $\text{onL\_bus}_{b_{ui}}$  behaviour definition is a similar simple transcription of the  $\text{automobile}_{a_{ui}}$  (onL) behaviour definition. So formula lines 103–108d below presents “nothing new”!

121 – this is the “almost last formula line”!

```

120(a)ii onL_bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, (bc_{ui}, ruis), _)
120(a)ii (ln, btt, bpos: onL(f_{l_{ui}}, l_{ui}, f, th_{ui})) ≡
103 (ba_r_ch[b_{ui}, h_{ui}] ! (attr_T_ch?, bpos);
104 bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, ({}), (bc_{ui}, ruis), ({}))(ln, btt, bpos)
119a ∥
108(b)i (if not_yet_at_hub(f)
108(b)i then
108(b)iA (let incr = increment(f) in
102 let onl = (t_{l_{ui}}, h_{ui}, incr, th_{ui}) in
108(b)iB ba_r_ch[l_{ui}, b_{ui}] ! onL(onl);
108(b)iC bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, ({}), (bc_{ui}, ruis), ({}))
108(b)iC (ln, btt, onL(onl))
108(b)i end end)
108(b)ii else
108(b)iiA (let n_{l_{ui}}: L_UJ * n_{t_{ui}} ∈ mereo_H(∅(th_{ui})) in
108(b)iiB ba_r_ch[th_{ui}, b_{ui}] ! atH(l_{ui}, th_{ui}, n_{t_{ui}});
108(b)iiC bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, ({}), (bc_{ui}, ruis), ({}))
108(b)iiC (ln, btt, atH(l_{ui}, h_{ui}, n_{t_{ui}}))
108(b)iiA end)end)
108c ∥
121 stop

```

### 8.3.5 A Running System – Sect. 7.5 Pg. 39

**Preliminaries:** We recall the *hub*, *link*, *bus company*, *bus* and the *automobile states* first mentioned in Sect. 3.8 Page 41.

```

value
33 hs: H-set ≡ obs_sH(obs_SH(obs_RN(rts)))
34 ls: L-set ≡ obs_sL(obs_SL(obs_RN(rts)))
36 bcs: BC-set ≡ obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts))))
37 bs: B-set ≡ ∪{obs_Bs(bc) | bc: BC ∈ bcs}
39 as: A-set ≡ obs_BCs(obs_SBC(obs_FV(obs_RN(rts))))

```

**Starting Initial Behaviours:** We are reaching the end of this domain modeling example. Behind us there are narratives and formalisations 18 Pg. 40 – 121 Pg. 48. Based on these we now express the signature and the body of the definition of a “system build and execute” function.

122 The system to be initialised is

- a the parallel composition ( $\parallel$ ) of
- b the distributed parallel composition ( $\parallel\{\dots\}$ ) of

- c all the hub behaviours,
- d all the link behaviours,
- e all the bus company behaviours,
- f all the bus behaviours, and
- g all the automobile behaviours.

```

value
122 initial_system: Unit → Unit
122 initial_system() ≡
122c ∥ { hub_{h_{ui}}(h_{ui}, me, hω)(htrf, hσ)
122c | h: H • h ∈ hs,
122c h_{ui}: H_UJ • h_{ui} = uid_H(h),
122c me: H_Met • me = mereo_H(h),
122c hω: HΩ • hω = attr_HΩ(h),
122c htrf: H_Traffic • htrf = attr_H_Traffic_H(h),
122c hσ: HΣ • hσ = attr_HΣ(h) ∧ hσ ∈ hω
122c }
122a ∥
122d { link_{l_{ui}}(l_{ui}, me, lω)(ltrf, lσ)
122d | l: L • l ∈ ls,
122d l_{ui}: L_UJ • l_{ui} = uid_L(l),
122d me: L_Met • me = mereo_L(l),
122d lω: LΩ • lω = attr_LΩ(l),
122d ltrf: L_Traffic • ltrf = attr_L_Traffic_H(l),
122d lσ: LΣ • lσ = attr_LΣ(l) ∧ lσ ∈ lω
122d }
122a ∥
122e { bus_company_{bc_{ui}}(bc_{ui}, me)(btt)
122e | bc: BC • bc ∈ bcs,
122e bc_{ui}: BC_UJ • bc_{ui} = uid_BC(bc),
122e me: BC_Met • me = mereo_BC(bc),
122e btt: BusTimTbl • btt = attr_BusTimTbl(bc)
122e }
122a ∥
122f { bus_{b_{ui}}(b_{ui}, me)(ln, btt, bpos)
122f | b: B • b ∈ bs,
122f b_{ui}: B_UJ • b_{ui} = uid_B(b),
122f me: B_Met • me = mereo_B(b),
122f ln: LN • pln = attr_LN(b),
122f btt: BusTimTbl • btt = attr_BusTimTbl(b),
122f bpos: BPos • bpos = attr_BPos(b)
122f }
122a ∥
122g { automobile_{a_{ui}}(a_{ui}, me, rn)(apos)
122g | a: A • a ∈ as,
122g a_{ui}: A_UJ • a_{ui} = uid_A(a),
122g me: A_Met • me = mereo_A(a),
122g rn: RegNo • rno = attr_RegNo(a),
122g apos: APos • apos = attr_APos(a)
122g }

```

### 8.3.6 Intentional “Pull”

We illustrate the concept of *intentional “pull”* cf. definition on Page 25:

- 123 *automobiles* include the *intent* of ‘transport’.
- 124 and so do *hubs* and *links*.

```

123 attr_intent: A → ('transport' | ...) -set
124 attr_intent: H → ('transport' | ...) -set
124 attr_intent: L → ('transport' | ...) -set

```

*Manifestations* of ‘transport’ is reflected in *automobiles* having the automobile position attribute, APos, Item 86 Pg. 44, *hubs* having the *hub traffic* attribute, H\_Traffic, Item 73 Pg. 43, and in *links* having the *link traffic* attribute, L\_Traffic, Item 77 Pg. 43.

- 125 Seen from the point of view of an automobile there is its own traffic history, A\_Hist, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed automobile’s positions;

- 126 seen from the point of view of a hub there is its own traffic history, H\_Trf Item 73 Pg.43, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed maps from automobile identities into automobile positions; and
- 127 seen from the point of view of a link there is its own traffic history, L\_Trf Item 77 Pg. 43, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed maps from automobile identities into automobile positions.

The *intentional* “pull” of these manifestations is this:

- 128 The union, i.e. proper merge of all automobile traffic histories, AllATH, must now be identical to the same proper merge of all hub, AllHTH, and all link traffic histories, AllLTH.

**type**

- 125 A\_Hi = ( $\mathcal{T} \times APos$ )\*  
 73 H\_Trf = A\_UI  $\overrightarrow{m}$  ( $\mathcal{T} \times APos$ )\*  
 77 L\_Trf = A\_UI  $\overrightarrow{m}$  ( $\mathcal{T} \times APos$ )\*  
 128 AllATH =  $\mathcal{T} \overrightarrow{m}$  (AUI  $\overrightarrow{m}$  APos)  
 128 AllHTH =  $\mathcal{T} \overrightarrow{m}$  (AUI  $\overrightarrow{m}$  APos)

- 128 AllLTH =  $\mathcal{T} \overrightarrow{m}$  (AUI  $\overrightarrow{m}$  APos)

**axiom**

- 128 **let** allA = mrg\_AllATH({(a,attr\_A\_Hi(a))|a:A•a ∈ as}),  
 128 allH = mrg\_AllHTH({attr\_H\_Trf(h)|h:H•h ∈ hs}),  
 128 allL = mrg\_AllLTH({attr\_L\_Trf(l)|l:L•h ∈ ls}) **in**  
 128 allA = mrg\_HLT(allH,allL) **end**

We leave the definition of the four merge functions to the reader !

We now discuss the concept of *intentional* “pull”. We endow each automobile with its history of timed positions and each hub and link with their histories of timed automobile positions. These histories are facts! They are not something that is laboriously recorded, where such recordings may be imprecise or cumbersome<sup>51</sup>. The facts are there, so we can (but may not necessarily) talk about these histories as facts. It is in that sense that the purpose (‘transport’) for which man let automobiles, hubs and link be made with their ‘transport’ intent are subject to an *intentional* “pull”. **It can be no other way: if automobiles “record” their history, then hubs and links must together “record” identically the same history!** ■

## 8.4 Example Index

### 8.4.1 Sorts

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| BC         | 26, 40  |
| FV         | 20, 40  |
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| SH         | 21a, 40 |
| sH         | 23, 40  |
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| sL         | 24, 40  |
| UoD        | 18, 40  |

### 8.4.2 Types

| Attribute Types                        |         |
|----------------------------------------|---------|
| A: A..Hi                               | 125, 49 |
| A: APos == atHub onLink [programmable] | 86, 44  |
| A: RegNo [static]                      | 79, 44  |
| A: T [inert]                           | 79, 44  |
| B: BPos [programmable]                 | 83a, 43 |
| B: BusTimTbl [programmable]            | 82, 43  |
| B: LN [programmable]                   | 81, 43  |
| B: T [inert]                           | 83a, 43 |
| BC: BusTimTbl [programmable]           | 80, 43  |
| BC: T [inert]                          | 79, 43  |
| H: HΩ [static]                         | 72, 43  |
| H: HΣ [programmable]                   | 71, 43  |
| H: H..Traffic [programmable]           | 73, 43  |
| H: H..Trf [programmable]               | 73, 49  |
| L: LΩ [static]                         | 75, 43  |
| L: LΣ [programmable]                   | 75, 43  |
| L: L..Traffic [programmable]           | 77, 43  |
| L: L..Trf [programmable]               | 77, 49  |

Mereology Types

|                                     |        |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| A..Mer = ES × ES × R..UI-set        | 67, 42 |
| B..Mer = BC..UI × ES × R..UI-set    | 66, 42 |
| BC..Mer = ES × ES × B..UI-set       | 65, 42 |
| H..Mer = V..UI-set × L..UI-set × ES | 63, 42 |
| L..Mer = V..UI-set × H..UI-set × ES | 64, 42 |

Types

|                                          |         |
|------------------------------------------|---------|
| A: atHub::H..UI                          | 83a, 44 |
| A: Frac = <b>Real</b>                    | 83b, 44 |
| A: onLink::H..UI × L..UI × Fract × H..UI | 83b, 44 |
| B: atHub::H..UI                          | 83a, 43 |
| B: Frac = <b>Real</b>                    | 83b, 43 |
| B: onLink::H..UI × L..UI × Fract × H..UI | 83b, 43 |
| ES = <b>TOKEN-set</b>                    | 68, 42  |

Unique Identifier Types

|                     |        |
|---------------------|--------|
| A..UI               | 43, 41 |
| B..UI               | 43, 41 |
| BC..UI              | 43, 41 |
| H..UI               | 41, 41 |
| H..UI               | 42, 41 |
| L..UI               | 42, 41 |
| L..UI               | 43, 41 |
| R..UI               | 42, 41 |
| R..UI = H..UI L..UI | 42, 41 |
| V..UI               | 43, 41 |
| V..UI = B..UI A..UI | 43, 41 |

### 8.4.3 Functions

Extract Functions

|   |        |
|---|--------|
| ∅ | 45, 41 |
|---|--------|

Observe Attributes

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| A: attr..APos       | 86, 44  |
| A: attr..Intent     | 123, 48 |
| A: attr..RegNo      | 85, 44  |
| A: attr..T          | 79, 44  |
| B: attr..BPos       | 83, 43  |
| B: attr..BusTimTbl  | 82, 43  |
| B: attr..T          | 79, 43  |
| BC: attr..BusTimTbl | 80, 43  |
| BC: attr..T         | 79, 43  |
| H: attr..HΩ         | 72, 43  |
| H: attr..HΣ         | 71, 43  |
| H: attr..H..Traffic | 73, 43  |
| H: attr..Intent     | 123, 48 |
| L: attr..Intent     | 123, 48 |
| L: attr..LE         | 75, 43  |
| L: attr..L..Traffic | 77, 43  |

Observe Mereology

|           |        |
|-----------|--------|
| mereo..A  | 67, 42 |
| mereo..B  | 66, 42 |
| mereo..BC | 65, 42 |
| mereo..H  | 63, 42 |

<sup>51</sup> or thought technologically in-feasible – at least some decades ago!

|                                           |         |                          |        |
|-------------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------|--------|
| mereo_L                                   | 64, 42  | <i>hls</i>               | 35, 41 |
| Observe Part Sorts                        |         | <i>hs</i>                | 33, 41 |
| obs_BC                                    | 22a, 40 | <i>ls</i>                | 34, 41 |
| obs_FV                                    | 20, 40  | <i>ps</i>                | 40, 41 |
| obs_Ms                                    | 26, 41  |                          |        |
| obs_PA                                    | 22b, 40 |                          |        |
| obs_RN                                    | 19, 40  | Unique Id. Constants     |        |
| obs_sA                                    | 27, 41  | <i>a<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 53, 42 |
| obs_sBC                                   | 25, 41  | <i>b<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 52, 42 |
| obs_SH                                    | 21a, 40 | <i>bbc<sub>uim</sub></i> | 56, 42 |
| obs_sH                                    | 23, 41  | <i>bc<sub>uis</sub></i>  | 51, 42 |
| obs_SL                                    | 21b, 40 | <i>ccb<sub>uim</sub></i> | 55, 42 |
| obs_sL                                    | 24, 41  | <i>h<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 46, 42 |
| Observe Unique Identifiers                |         | <i>hl<sub>uim</sub></i>  | 48, 42 |
| uid_A                                     | 44e, 41 | <i>l<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 47, 42 |
| uid_B                                     | 44d, 41 | <i>lh<sub>uim</sub></i>  | 49, 42 |
| uid_BC                                    | 44c, 41 | <i>r<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 50, 42 |
| uid_H                                     | 44a, 41 | <i>v<sub>uis</sub></i>   | 54, 42 |
| uid_L                                     | 44b, 41 |                          |        |
| Other Functions                           |         |                          |        |
| time_ordered                              | 73, 43  |                          |        |
| System Initialisation Function            |         | <b>8.4.5 Channels</b>    |        |
| initial_system: <b>Unit</b> → <b>Unit</b> | 122, 48 | Channel Message Types    |        |
|                                           |         | BC_L_Msg=(T×BusTimTbl)   | 91, 45 |
|                                           |         | H_L_Msg                  | 90, 45 |
|                                           |         | HL_Msg=H_L_Msg L_F_Msg   | 90, 45 |
|                                           |         | L_H_Msg                  | 90, 45 |
|                                           |         | V_R_Msg=(T×(BPos APos))  | 92, 45 |
|                                           |         | Channels                 |        |
|                                           |         | bc_b_ch[i,j]:BC_L_Msg    | 95, 45 |
|                                           |         | hl_ch[i,j]:HL_Msg        | 94, 45 |
|                                           |         | v_r_ch[i,j]:V_R_Msg      | 96, 45 |

### 8.4.4 Values

#### Part Constants

|            |        |
|------------|--------|
| <i>as</i>  | 39, 41 |
| <i>bcs</i> | 36, 41 |
| <i>bs</i>  | 37, 41 |

### 8.4.6 Behaviours

#### Behaviours

|                                                                                                                                                                                                 |         |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| automobile <sub>ui</sub> : a_ui:A_UI×(L_...rui):A_Mer×RegNo<br>→ apos:APos → in attr_T_ch, out {ba_r_ch[a_ui,r_ui] r_ui:R_UI•r_ui∈rui}Unit                                                      | 101, 46 |
| bus_company <sub>bc<sub>ui</sub></sub> : bc_ui:BC_UI×(L_...buis):BC_Mer<br>→ in attr_T_ch, out {bc_b_ch[bc_ui,b_ui] b_ui:B_UI•b_ui∈buis}Unit                                                    | 99, 46  |
| bus <sub>b<sub>ui</sub></sub> : b_ui:B_UI×(bc_ui,...rui):B_Mer<br>→ bpos:BPos → in attr_T_ch, out {ba_r_ch[b_ui,r_ui] r_ui:R_UI•r_ui∈rui}Unit                                                   | 100, 46 |
| hub <sub>h<sub>ui</sub></sub> : h_ui:H_UI×(vuis,luis,...):H_Mer×HΩ<br>→ (HΣ×H_L_Traffic)<br>→ in {ba_r_ch[h_ui,v_ui] v_ui:V_UI•v_ui∈vuis} → in,out {h_l_ch[h_ui,l_ui] l_ui:L_UI•l_ui∈luis}Unit  | 97, 45  |
| link <sub>l<sub>ui</sub></sub> : l_ui:L_UI×(vuis,huis,...):L_Mer×LΩ<br>→ (LΣ×L_L_Traffic)<br>→ in {ba_r_ch[l_ui,v_ui] v_ui:V_UI•v_ui∈vuis} → in,out {h_l_ch[h_ui,l_ui] h_ui:H_UI•h_ui∈huis}Unit | 98, 46  |

## 9 Closing

### 9.1 What Have We Achieved?

A step-wise *method*, its *principles*, *techniques*, and a series of *languages* for the rigorous development of domain models has been presented. A seemingly large number of domain concepts has been established: *entities*, *endurants* and *perdurants*, *discrete* and *continuous* endurants, *structure*, *part*, *component* and *material* endurants, *living species*, *plants*, *animals*, *humans* and *artifacts*, *unique identifiers*, *mereology* and *attributes*.

A concept of *transcendental deduction* has been introduced. It is used to justify the interpretation of *endurant parts* as *perdurant behaviours* – a la CSP. A new concept of *intentional “pull”* has been introduced. It applies, in the form of attributes, to humans and artifacts. It “corresponds”, in a way, to *gravitational pull*; that concept invites further study. The pair of gravitational pull and intentional “pull” appears to lie behind the determination of the mereologies of parts; that possibility invites further study.

Finally it is shown how CSP *channels* can be calculated from enduring mereologies, and how the form of *behaviour arguments* can be calculated from respective attribute categorisations.

The domain concepts outlined above form a *domain ontology* that applies to a wide variety of domains. An example, Sect. 8, is tied, section-by-section to the unfolding of the method and the domain ontology.

## 9.2 Issues of Philosophy

Three issues of philosophy are of concern here: the “nature” of the definition of the analysis prompts; the *transcendental deduction* whereby *parts* are interpreted as *behaviours*; and the *intentional “pull”* whereby seemingly “unrelated” parts are indeed “related”! They all relate to *what can be described*.

### 9.2.1 What Can Be Described

As for the first, consider the analysis prompts:

|                           |                            |                            |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| a. is_ entity, 6          | i. is_ part, 10            | q. has_ materials, 13      |
| b. is_ endurant, 6        | j. is_ atomic, 10          | r. is_ artifact, 13        |
| c. is_ perdurant, 7       | k. is_ composite, 10       | s. observe_ endurants, 14  |
| d. is_ discrete, 7        | l. is_ living_ species, 11 | t. has_ concrete_ type, 15 |
| e. is_ continuous, 7      | m. is_ plant, 11           | u. has_ mereology, 19      |
| f. is_ physical_ part, 8  | n. is_ animal, 11          | v. attribute_ types, 21    |
| g. is_ living_ species, 8 | o. is_ human, 12           |                            |
| h. is_ structure, 9       | p. has_ components, 12     |                            |

When you read the texts that explain when phenomena can be considered entities, entities can be considered endurants or perdurants, endurants can be considered discrete or continuous, discrete endurants can be considered structures, parts or components, et cetera, then you probably, expecting to read a technical/scientific paper, realise that those explanations are not precise in the sense of such papers.

Many of our definitions are taken from [LFCO87, The Oxford Shorter English Dictionary] and from the Internet based [Zal16, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].

In technical/scientific papers definitions are expected to be precise, but can be that only if the definer has set up, beforehand, or the reported work is based on a precise, in our case mathematical framework. That can not be done here. There is no, a priori given, model of the domains we are interested in.

This raises the more general question, such as we see it: “*which are the absolutely necessary and unavoidable bases for describing the world?*” This is a question of philosophy. We shall not develop the reasoning here. Instead we refer to the forthcoming [Bjø18a, Philosophical Issues in Domain Modeling]. That work is based on [Sør94, Sør97, Sør02, Sør16].

### 9.2.2 The Transcendental Deduction

The interpretation of *endurant parts* as *perdurant behaviours* represents a *transcendental deduction* – and must, somehow, be rationally justified. the justification is here seen as exactly that: a *transcendental deduction* It seems that transcendental deductions abound: when compiling program texts into machine code, in transitions from syntax to semantics to pragmatics, and in any abstract interpretation of formal texts. We refer to the forthcoming [Bjø18a, Philosophical Issues in Domain Modeling].

### 9.2.3 The Intentional “Pull”

This last concept is merely a suggestion. A serious paper cannot solve all issues.

## 9.3 Two Frequently Asked Questions

*How much of a DOMAIN must or should we ANALYSE & DESCRIBE ?* When this question is raised, after a talk of mine over the subject, and by a colleague researcher & scientist I usually reply: *As large a domain as possible !* This reply is often met by this *comment* (from the audience) *Oh ! No, that is not reasonable !* To me that comment shows either or both of: the questioner was not asking as a researcher/scientist, but

as an engineer. Yes, an engineer needs only analyse & describe up to and slightly beyond the “border” of the domain-of-interest for a current software development – but a researcher cum scientist is, of course, interested not only in a possible requirements engineering phase beyond domain engineering, but is also curious about the larger context of the domain, in possibly establishing a proper domain theory, etc.

*How, then, should a domain engineer pursue DOMAIN MODELING ?* My answer assumes a “state-of-affairs” of domain science & engineering in which domain modeling is an established subject, i.e., where the **domain analysis & description** topic, i.e., its methodology, is taught, where there are “text-book” examples from relevant fields – that the domain engineers can rely on, and in whose terminology they can communicate with one another; that is, there is an acknowledged *body of knowledge*. My answer is therefore: the domain engineer, referring to the relevant *body of knowledge*, develops a domain model that covers the domain and the context on which the software is to function, just, perhaps covering a little bit more of the context, than possibly necessary — just to be sure. Until such a “state-of-affairs” is reached the domain model developer has to act both as a domain scientist and as a domain engineer, researching and developing models for rather larger domains than perhaps necessary while contributing also to the **domain science & engineering body of knowledge**.

## 9.4 On How to Pursue Domain Science & Engineering

We set up a dogma and discuss a ramification. One thing is the doctrine, the method for **domain analysis & description** outlined in this paper. Another thing is its practice. I find myself, when experimentally pursuing the modeling of domains, as, for example, reported in [Bjø00, BGP02, Bjø03, PSB03, SPB03, Bjø13b, Bjø13a, Bjø07, Bjø95, Bjø17a, Bjø16e, Bjø17c, Bjø17b], **not following the doctrine!** That is: (i) in not first, carefully, exploring parts, components and materials, the external properties, (ii) in not then, again carefully settling issues of unique identifiers, (iii) then, carefully, the issues of mereology, (iv) followed by careful consideration of attributes, then the transcendental deduction of behaviours from parts; (v) carefully establishing channels: (v.i) their message types, and (v.ii) declarations, (vi) followed by the careful consideration of behaviour signatures, systematically, one for each transcendently deduced part, (vii) then the careful definition of each of all the deduced behaviours, and, finally, (iix) the definition of the overall system initialisation. No, instead I falter, get diverted into exploring “*this & that*” in the domain exploration. And I get stuck. When despairing I realise that I must “*slavically*” follow the doctrine. When reverting to the strict adherence of the doctrine, I find that I, very quickly, find my way, and the domain modeling get’s *unstruck!* I remarked this situation to a dear friend and colleague, Dr. Ole N. Oest. His remark stressed what was going on: the **creative** engineer **took possession**, the **exploring**, sometimes **sceptic** scientist **entered the picture**, the well-trained engineer **lost ground in the realm of imagination**. But perhaps, in the interest of **innovation etc.** it is necessary to be **creative** and **sceptic** and **lose ground** – for a while! I knew that, but had sort-of-forgotten it! *I thank Ole N. Oest for this observation.*

## 9.5 Related Work

The present paper is but one in a series on the topic of *domain science & engineering*. With this paper the author expects to have laid a foundation. With the many experimental case studies, referenced in Example 1 on Page 5, the author seriously think that reasonably convincing arguments are given for this *domain science & engineering*. We comment on some previous publications: [Bjø10a, Bjø16b] explores additional views on analysing & describing domains, in terms of *domain facets: intrinsics, support technologies, rules & regulations, scripts, management & organisation, and human behaviour*. [Bjø09a, Bjø18b] explores relations between Stanisław Leśhnieiski’s mereology and ours. [Bjø08, Bjø16d] shows how to rigorously transform domain descriptions into software system requirements prescriptions. [Bjø16c] discusses various interpretations of domain models: as bases for demos, simulators, real system monitors and real system monitor & controllers. [Bjø09b] is a compendium of reports around the management and engineering of

software development based in domain analysis & description. These reports were the result of a year at JAIST: Japan Institute of Science & Technology, Ishikawa, Japan.

## 9.6 Tony Hoare’s Summary on ‘Domain Modeling’

In a 2006 e-mail, in response, undoubtedly to my steadfast – perhaps conceived as stubborn – insistence, on domain engineering, Tony Hoare summed up his reaction to domain engineering as follows, and I quote<sup>52</sup>:

“There are many unique contributions that can be made by domain modeling.

- 1 The models describe all aspects of the real world that are relevant for any good software design in the area. They describe possible places to define the system boundary for any particular project.
- 2 They make explicit the preconditions about the real world that have to be made in any embedded software design, especially one that is going to be formally proved.
- 3 They describe the whole range of possible designs for the software, and the whole range of technologies available for its realisation.
- 4 They provide a framework for a full analysis of requirements, which is wholly independent of the technology of implementation.
- 5 They enumerate and analyse the decisions that must be taken earlier or later in any design project, and identify those that are independent and those that conflict. Late discovery of feature interactions can be avoided.”

All of these issues were covered in [Bjø06, Part IV].

## 10 Acknowledgements

I thank colleagues in China, Germany, France, Norway and Sweden: Yamine Ait Ameer, Dominique Méry, Andreas Harmfeldt, Magne Haveraaen, Otthein Herzog, Steve McKeever and Yang ShaoFa. Their comments on recent papers and their acting as sounding boards for the case studies that lead to a number of clarifications, simplifications and solidifications of the *domain analysis & description* method of [Bjø16f] now reported in the present paper are much appreciated. I thank Wang ShuLin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences for incisive questions answers to which are found, in particular, in Sect. 5.5 of this paper. And I thank Ole N. Oest for some remarks that lead to my remarks in Sect. 9.4 on Page 52.

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