A Philosophy of Domain Science & Engineering

An Interpretation of Kai Sørlander's Philosophy

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Dedicated to his well-being

Prof., Dr. Hrant Marandjian

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Vitya, we miss you

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We begin with the first part of a brief example !

1. The Example: Endurants

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

Figure 1: A Road Net

1.1. External Qualities
1.1.1. Structures

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1 There is the *universe of discourse*, UoD.
It is structured into

2 a *road net*, RN, a structure, and

3 a *fleet of automobiles*, FA, a structure.

type
1 UoD **axiom** ∀ uod:UoD · is_structure(uod).
2 RN **axiom** ∀ rn:RN · is_strucure(rn).
3 FA **axiom** ∀ fa:FA · is_structure(fa).
value
2 obs_RN: UoD → RN
3 obs_FA: UoD → FA

.

4 The road net consists of

  a. a structure, SH, of hubs and

  b. a structure, SL, of links.

5 The fleet of automobiles consists of

  a. a set, As of automobiles.

type
4a. SH **axiom** ∀ sh:SH · is_structure(sh)
4b. SL **axiom** ∀ sl:SL · is_structure(sl)
5a. As = A-**set**
value
4a. obs_SH: RN → SH
4b. obs_SL: RN → SL
5a. obs_As: FA → As

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

Figure 2: Endurant Structures and Parts

1.1.2. Parts

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6 The structure of hubs is a set, sH, of atomic hubs, H.

7 The structure of links is a set, sL, of atomic links, L.

8 The structure of automobiles is a set, sA, of atomic automobiles, A.

type
6 H, sH = H-**set** **axiom** ∀ h:H · is_atomic(h)
7 L, sL = L-**set** **axiom** ∀ l:L · is_atomic(l)
8 A, sA = A-**set** **axiom** ∀ a:A · is_atomic(a)
value
6 obs_sH: SH → sH
7 obs_sL: SL → sL
8 obs_sA: SA → sA

1.1.3. Components

.

- To illustrate the concept of components
  - we describe timber yards, waste disposal areas, road material storage yards, automobile scrap yards, end the like
  - as special "cul de sac" hubs with components.
  - Here we describe road material storage yards.

9 Hubs may contain components, but only if the hub is connected to exactly one link.

10 These "cul-de-sac" hub components may be such things as Sand, Gravel, Cobble Stones, Asphalt, Cement or other.

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

Figure 3: Hub Components

value

9 has_components: H → **Bool**

type

10 Sand, Gravel, CobbleStones, Asphalt, Cement, ...

10 KS = (Sand|Gravel|CobbleStones|Asphalt|Cement|...)-**set**

value

9 obs_components_H: H → KS

9 **pre**: obs_components_H(h) ≡ **card** mereo(h) = 1

1.1.4. Materials

- To illustrate the concept of materials
  - we describe waterways (river, canals, lakes, the open sea) along links
  - as links with material of type water.

11 Links may contain material.

12 That material is water, W.

type
12 W
value
11 obs_material: L → W
11 **pre**: obs_material(l) ≡ has_material(h)

•



Figure 4: Link Materials

1.1.5. States

13 Let there be given a universe of discourse, rts, a state.

From that state we can calculate other states.

14 The set of all hubs, hs.

15 The set of all links, ls.

16 The set of all hubs and links, hls.

17 The set of all automobiles, as.

18 The set of all parts, ps.

value

13 rts:UoD
14 hs:H-**set** ≡ obs_sH(obs_SH(obs_RN(rts)))
15 ls:L-**set** ≡ obs_sL(obs_SL(obs_RN(rts)))
16 hls:(H|L)-**set** ≡ $hs \cup ls$
17 as:A-**set** ≡ obs_As(obs_FV(rts))
18 ps:(H|L|BC|B|A)-**set** ≡ $hls \cup bcs \cup bs \cup as$

1.2. Internal Qualities

1.2.1. Unique Identifiers

19 We assign unique identifiers to all parts.

20 By a road identifier we shall mean a link or a hub identifier.

21 Unique identifiers uniquely identify all parts.

a. All hubs have distinct [unique] identifiers.

b. All links have distinct identifiers.

c. All automobiles have distinct identifiers.

d. All parts have distinct identifiers.

type
19 H_UI, L_UI, A_UI
20 R_UI = H_UI | L_UI
value
21a. uid_H: H → H_UI
21b. uid_L: L → L_UI
21c. uid_A: A → A_UI

1.2.2. Mereologies

- Mereology is the study and knowledge of parts and part relations.
- The parts here are the hubs, the links and the automobiles.

22 The mereology of a hub is a pair:

- (i) the set of all automobile identifiers that may use the hub and
- (ii) the set of unique identifiers of the links that it is connected to.

type
22 H_Mer = A_UI-**set**×L_UI-**set**
value
22 mereo_H: H → H_Mer

23 The mereology of a link is a pair:

- (i) the set of identifiers all automobiles that may use the link,
- (ii) the set of identifiers of the two distinct hubs it is connected to.

type

23 L_Mer = A_UI-**set**×H_UI-**set**

value

23 mereo_L: L → L_Mer

24 The mereology of an automobile is:

- the set of the unique identifiers of all hubs and links on which they may travel.

type

24 A_Mer = (H_UI|L_UI)-**set**

value

24 mereo_A: A $\rightarrow$ A_Mer

1.2.3. Attributes

1.2.3.1 Hubs:

We show just one attribute:

25 Hub traffic history.

- Since we can think rationally about it, it can be described.
- We model hub traffic history as an attribute:
- the recording, per unique automobile identifier,
- of the time ordered presence, APos,
- in the hub of these automobiles.

type

25 $\mathsf{H\_Traffic} = \mathsf{A\_UI} \overrightarrow{_{m}} (\mathcal{T} \times \mathsf{APos})^*$

axiom

25 $\forall\ \mathsf{ht{:}H\_Traffic,ui{:}A\_UI} \cdot \mathsf{ui} \in \mathbf{dom}\ \mathsf{ht} \Rightarrow \mathsf{time\_ordered(ht(ui))}$

value

25 $\mathsf{attr\_H\_Traffic}{:}\ {:} \rightarrow \mathsf{H\_Traffic}$

1.2.3.2 Links:

We show just one attribute:

26 Link traffic history:

- Since we can think rationally about it, it can be described.
- We model link traffic history as an attribute:
- the recording, per unique automobile identifier,
- of the time ordered positions, APos
- (along the link (from one hub to the next)), of these automobiles.

26 L_Traffic = A_UI $\overrightarrow{m}$ ($\mathcal{T}$ × APos)*

axiom

26 ∀ lt:L_Traffic,ui:A_UI · ui ∈ **dom** lt ⇒ time_ordered(lt(ui))

value

26 attr_L_Traffic: : → L_Traffic

1.2.3.3 Automobiles:

We show just a few attributes:

- We illustrate but a few attributes:

27 Automobiles have a time attribute,

28 Automobiles have dynamic positions on the road net:

a. either *at a hub* identified by some h_ui,

b. or *on a link*,

- some *fraction, frac:Fract* down an *identified link, l_ui*,
- from one of its *identified connecting hub*s, fh_ui,
- in the direction of the other *identified hub*, th_ui.

c. Automobiles, like elephants, never forget: they remember their timed positions of the past,

d. and the current position is the first element of this past !

type
27 $\mathcal{T}$
28 APos == atHub | onLink
28a. atHub :: h_ui:H_UI
28b. onLink :: fh_ui:H_UI×l_ui:L_UI×frac:Fract×th_ui:H_UI
28b. Fract = **Real**
axiom
28b. frac:Fract · 0<frac≪1
type
28c. A_Hist = (T × APos)*
value
27 attr_T: A → $\mathcal{T}$
28 attr_APos: A → APos
28c. attr_A_Hist: A → A_Hist
axiom
28d. □ ∀ a:A · **let** (_,apos) = **hd**(attr_A_Hist(a)) **in** apos = attr_APos(a) **end**

1.3. Summary

- We have illustrated the description of
  - *external qualities* of a domain:
    - *structures*,
    - *parts: composite and atomic*,
    - *components* and
    - *materials*; and
  - *internal qualities* of that domain:
    - *unique identification*,
    - *mereology* and
    - *attributes*.

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End of first part of brief example !

2. What do we mean by Domain ?

- By a *domain* we shall understand
  - a **logically describable** segment of
  - a **human assisted** reality, i.e., of the world,
    - its **natural parts** as well as **man-made artifacts:**
      - *endurants* ("still"), existing in space,
      - as well as *perdurants* ("alive"), existing also in time,
  - and where an emphasis is placed on *"human-assistedness"*,
    - that is, that there is *at least one man-made artifact*
    - and that *humans* are a primary cause for
      - change of endurant *states*
      - as well as perdurant *behaviours*

      "by means" of the man-made artifacts ■

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2.1. Examples of Domains

- **railways**,
- **road transport**,
- **container shipping**,
- **health care**,
- **document systems**,
- **oil pipelines**,
- **e-market**,
- **weather information**,
- **credit card systems**,
- **urban planning**,
- **swarms of drones**,
- et cetera, et cetera !

The paper:

- **http://www.imm.dtu.dk/~dibj/2018/philosophy/filo.pdf**

gives references.

2.2. Domains – in Contrast to other "Fields"

- Thus **domain science & engineering** is different from **automation** and **cybernetics**:
  - ⊗ their emphasis is on basing computer applications
  - ⊗ on mathematics and physics.
- **Domain science & engineering**, is also different from **optimisation** and **operations research**:
  - ⊗ their emphasis is on mathematical models of resource scheduling,
  - ⊗ but not the operational monitoring and control.
- **Domain science & engineering** is a new field
  - ⊗ as you might learn from this talk —
  - ⊗ **all it takes is an open mind !**

2.3. So what is the problem ?

- Well, we wish to make sure that our **domain analysis & description method** rests on a secure foundation, that is,
  - (1) that **composition** of descriptions "is right",
  - (2) that **elements** of descriptions are **logically founded**, and
  - **(3)** that **the descriptions cannot be otherwise expressed**.

- For that, (1 2, **3**), we turn to **philosophy**.
- **Can it give us advice ?**

- But let us first look at (1) **compositions** and (2) **elements** !

3. A Preview of Description Composition and Elements

3.1. "Standard" Domains

- Figure 6 Slide 32 illustrates
  - a **composition** of descriptions –
    - the various "branches" of the diagram,
  - and their **elements** –
    - the nodes of the diagram.



Figure 5: An Initial Upper Ontology for Domains

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

Figure 6: An Initial Upper Ontology for Domains

- Figure 6 Slide 32 intends to show that
  - domains consists of
    - **endurants** (E_i) and
    - **perdurants**;
  - that endurants are either
    - **discrete** or
    - **continuous**; and that
  - discrete endurants are either
    - **structures**,
    - **parts**, or
    - **compoments**;
- That is: that domains possibly contain all these kinds of elements.
- Let's review Fig. 6 Slide 32, now Fig. 7 Slide 34

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

Figure 7: An Initial Upper Ontology for Domains

3.2. Influences from Studies of Philosophy, I

- Our *study of philosophy*
  - *unmistakably mandates us to express*
  - *(— something that all sensible people know —)*
  - *but only rational, philosophical reasoning can mandate*

  that
  - besides the ***discrete endurants*** of
    - *structures*,
    - *parts* and
    - *components*,

    (already shown)
  - there are also **living species: plants** and **animals**!

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

Figure 8: An Upper Ontology for Domains with **Living Species**

3.3. Influences from Studies of Philosophy, II

- **Humans** (are animals) and humans create **artifacts**.

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

Figure 9: An Upper Ontology for Domains with **Artifacts**

3.4. A Quick Review !

- So you can see
  - what we have "developed"
  - I "flip" the three stages quickly:

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

Figure 10: An Initial Upper Ontology for Domains

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

Figure 11: An Upper Ontology for Domains with **Artifacts**

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

Figure 12: And an Upper Ontology for Domains with **Living Species**

3.5. Domain Science & Engineering is Different

- As you might now see, the concerns of **domain science & engineering** are different from those of
  - **automation** and **cybernetics**,
  - **optimisation** and **operations research**
  - the sciences & engineering of **electricity**,
  - the sciences & engineering of **electronics**,
  - the sciences & engineering of **chemistry**,
  - the sciences & engineering of **mechanics**,
  - the sciences & engineering of **aerodynamics**,
  - et cetera

4. Endurant Qualities: External and Internal

4.1. External Qualities

- By *external qualities* of *endurants* we man
  - whether they are *discrete* or *continuous*
  - and, if discrete, whether they are
    - *structures*,
    - *physical* parts
    - *artifacts* or
    - *components*;
- and if physical parts or artifacts whether they are
  - *atomic* or
  - *composite*.
- All of these external qualities
  - are observable
  - but can be justified from a point of view of Philosophy.

4.2. Internal Qualities

- Usually internal qualities are not observable.

4.2.1. Unique Identification

- We can (abstractly) speak of
  - discrete endurants
  - having unique identifies.
- From the point of view of philosophy
  - uniqueness of discrete endurants
  - follows from our ability to express
  - one predicate of one discrete endurant and
  - a therefrom different predicate of another discrete endurant.
- The two discrete endurants
  must therefore have distinct identification.

4.2.2. Mereology

- **Mereology** is the study and knowledge of parts and part relations.
  - Mereology, as a logical/philosophical discipline, can perhaps best be attributed to the Polish mathematician/logician Stanisław Leśniewski [1].

4.2.3. Attributes

- To recall: there are three sets of **internal qualities**:
  - unique part identifiers,
  - part mereology and
  - attributes.
- Unique part identifiers and part mereology are rather definite kinds of internal endurant qualities.
- Part attributes form a more "free-wheeling" sets of **internal qualities**.
- Possessing attributes types and values
  - form a main basis for expressing propositions about endurants
  - and are thus central to our study of domain science & engineering.

5. Preview: First Lessons of Philosophy for Domain Science & Engineering

- We show how the domain analysis & description calculi of [2]
  - satisfy the Philosophy of Kai Sørlander ,
  - but also that Sørlander's Philosophy mandates
  - consistent extensions to the calculi
  - in order to form a more complete "whole".
- Where discrete parts were just that,
  we must now distinguish between three kinds of parts:
  - (i) **physical parts**,
  - (ii) **living species parts**, and
  - (iii) **artifacts**.

5.1. Physical Parts

- (i) **Physical parts** are parts that are not made by man,
  - but are in *space* and *time*;
  - parts that are subject to the *laws* of physics as formulated by for example *Newton* and *Einstein*,
  - and also subject to the *principle of causality* and *gravitational pull*.
  - They are the parts we treated in [2].

5.2. Living Species

- (ii) The **living species parts**,
  - **plants** and **animals**;
  - still subject to the laws and principles of physics,
  - but additionally **unavoidably** endowed with such properties as **causality of purpose**,
  - **Animals additionally** have
    - **sensory organs**,
    - **means of motion**,
    - **instincts**,
    - **incentives** and
    - **feelings**.
  - *We can speak of these [red] "things", but maybe we cannot measure them !*

5.3. Humans

- Among animals we single out **humans** as parts that are further characterisable:
  - possessing **language**,
  - **learning skills**,
  - being **consciousness**, and
  - having **knowledge**.

- These aspects were somehow, by us, subsumed
  - in our analysis & description by partially
  - endowing *physical parts* with such properties.

5.4. Artifacts

- (iii) **Artifacts** are the parts made by humans.
  - *Artifacts* have a usual set of attributes
  - of the kind *physical parts* can have;
  - but in addition they have a *distinguished attribute:*
    - **attr_Intent** – expressed as a set of intents
    - by the *humans* who constructed them according to some *purpose*.
  - This more-or-less "standard" *property of intents*
    - determines a form of **counterpart** to the *gravitational pull* of *physical parts*
    - namely, what we shall refer to as **intentional "pull"**.

5.5. Influences from Studies of Philosophy, III

5.5.1. Transcendental Deductions

- A transcendental argument
  - is a deductive philosophical argument
  - which takes a manifest feature of experience as granted,
  - and articulates which must be the case
  - so that experience as such is possible.

- Transcendental deductions we introduced into philosophy by **Immanuel Kant** – around 1772.

5.5.2. An Example

- The **bus** standing there is an **endurant**.
- The **bus** "speeding down" its route is a **perdurant**.
- The **bus** as it is listed in the time-table is an **attribute**.

- When we claim
  - that the *endurant* (bus)
  - is the "same" as the *perdurant* (bus)
- then our "claim" is a *transcendental deduction* !

5.5.3. Another Example

- We speak of
  - **syntax:** f.ex.: of **programs** in a programming language, and of
  - **semantics:** f.ex.: the **compiled code** of a (the) program.
- The latter can only by claimed so by a *transcendental deduction!*

- Thus all *abstract interpretations* of computer program texts:
  - static analysis,
  - model checks,
  - program verification,
  - execution,
  - et cetera
- are *transcendental deductions!*

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End of Overview

Now to Philosophy itself !

6. The Kai Sørlander Philosopy

6.1. Basic Issues

- We present an account of
  how the Kai Sørlander Philosopy is argued.
- The question is
  - **'what are the necessary characteristics of**
  - **each and every possible world**
  - **and our situation in it'.**
- To carry out his reasoning Sørlander
  establishes a number of criteria.

6.1.1. The Inescapable Meaning Assignment

The Inescapable Meaning Assignment

- The *The Inescapable Meaning Assignment* is the recognition of the mutual dependency between
  - *the meaning of designations and*
  - *the consistency relations between propositions.*

6.1.1.1 An Example: Stacks

Meaning of Designations: Narrative

29 Stacks, s:S, have elements, e:E;

30 the empty_S operation takes no arguments and yields a result stack;

31 the is_empty_S operation takes an argument stack and yields a Boolean value result.

32 the stack operation takes two arguments: an element and a stack and yields a result stack.

33 the unstack operation takes an non-empty argument stack and yields a stack result.

34 the top operation takes an non-empty argument stack and yields an element result.

Consistency Relations: Narrative 1

35 an empty_S stack is_empty,
and a stack with at least one element is not;

36 unstacking an argument stack, stack(e,s), results in the stack s; and

37 inquiring as to the top of a non-empty argument stack, stack(e,s), yields e.

Meaning of Designations: Formal 2

type
29. E, S
value
30. empty_S: **Unit** → S
31. is_empty_S: S → **Bool**
32. stack: E × S → S
33. unstack: S $\stackrel{\sim}{\to}$ S
34. top: S $\stackrel{\sim}{\to}$ E

Consistency Relations: Formal

35. is_empty(empty_S()) = **true**
35. is_empty(stack(e,s)) = **false**
36. unstack(stack(e,s)) = s
37. top(stack(e,s)) = e

End of Example

- **The next 4–5 “slides” may be “rough going” !**

- That ***the inescapable meaning assignment*** is required in order to answer the question of how the world must necessarily be can be seen from the following
  - It makes it possible to distinguish between necessary and empirical propositions
  - **A proposition is necessary** if its truth value depends only on the meaning of the designators by means of which it is expressed

Example 1 A Proposition which is Necessary:

- *The link (i.e. the street segment)*
- *is 100 meters long* ■

- **A proposition is empirical** if its truth value does not so depend.
- An empirical proposition must therefore refer to something which exists independently of its designators, and it must predicate something about the thing to which it refers

Example 2 A Proposition which is Empirical:

- *The link (i.e. the street segment)*
- *is the longest link in the road net* ■

- The definition
  - *"the world is all that is the case;*
  - *all that can be described in true propositions"*

  satisfies *the inescapable meaning assignment*.
- That which is described in `necessary` propositions is that which is common to [all] possible worlds.
- A concrete world is all that can be described in true `empirical` propositions

6.1.2. Primary Objects

- An empirical proposition
  - must refer to an independently existing thing and
  - must predicate something about that thing.
- On that basis it is then possible to
  - deduce how those objects
  - that can be directly referred to in simple empirical propositions
  - must necessarily be.
- Those things are referred to as `primary objects`.
- A deduction of the `inevitable characteristics`
  of a possible world
  is thus identical to
  a deduction of how primary objects must necessarily be.

6.1.3. Two Requirements to the Philosophical Basis

- Two demands have been put to the philosophical basis for our quest.
  - It must not contain empirical preconditions;
  - and the foundation must not consistently be refuted. It must not consistently be false.

- **The inescapable meaning assignment** satisfies this basis.

6.1.4. The Possibility of Truth

- Where Kant builds on the *contradictory* dichotomy of
  - *Das Ding an sich* and
  - *Das Ding für uns*,

  that is, the possibility of *self-awareness*,
- Kai Sørlander builds on the *possibility of truth*:
  - Since the possibility of truth cannot in a consistent manner be denied
  - we can hence assume the **contradiction principle:**
  - 'a proposition and its negation cannot both be true'.
- We assume that the contradiction principle is a *necessary truth.*

6.1.5. The Logical Connectives

- Sørlander now deduces the logical connectives:
  - *conjunction* ('and' $\wedge$),
  - *disjunction* ('or', $\vee$), and
  - *implication* ($\Rightarrow$ or $\supset$).
- That is, they are not taken for granted:
  - They can be deduced!

6.1.6. Necessity and Possibility

- A *proposition* is *necessarily true*,
  - **if** its truth follows from the definition of of the designations by means of which it is expressed;
  - **then** it must be true under all circumstances.
- A *proposition* is *possibly true*,
  - if its *negation*
  - is not *necessarily true*.

6.1.7. Empirical Propositions

- An *empirical proposition*
  - refers to an independently existing entities
  - and predicates something that can be
  - either true or false
  - about the referenced entity.

6.2. The Logical Conditions for Describing Physical Worlds

- **So**
  - **which are the logical conditions**
  - **of descriptions of any world ?**
- In [3] and [4] Kai Sørlander ,
  - through a series of transcendental deductions "unravels" the following **logical conditions:**
  - *symmetry* and *asymmetry*
  - *transitivity* and *intransitivity*,
  - **space:** *direction*, *distance*, ...
  - **time:** *before*, *after*, ...
  - **states** and **causality**,
  - **kinematics, dynamics**, ...
  - **Newton's laws**, et cetera.

- We shall summarise Sørlander's deductions.
- To remind the listener:
  - the issue is that of deducing how
  - the *primary entities*
  - must necessarily be.

6.2.1. Symmetry and Asymmetry

- There can be **different** *primary entities*.
  - Entity A is *different* from entity B
    - if A can be ascribed a predicate
    - in-commensurable with a predicate ascribed to B.
  - *Different from* is a *symmetric predicate*.
  - If entity A is *identical* to entity B
    - then A cannot be ascribed a predicate
    - which is in-commensurable
    - with any predicate that can be ascribed to B;

    and then B is identical to A.
  - *Equal to* is a **symmetric predicate**.

6.2.2. Transitivity and Intransitivity

- If A is identical to B and B is identical to C
  - then A is identical to C
  - with ***identity*** then being a ***transitive relation***.
  - The relation ***different from*** is not transitive
  - it is an **transitive relation**.

6.2.3. Space

- The two relations *asymmetric* and *symmetric*, by a transcendental deduction, can be given an interpretation:
  - The relation (spatial) *direction* is asymmetric; and
  - the relation (spatial) *distance* is symmetric.
  - From these relations are derived the relation *in-between*.
  - Direction, distance and in-between can,
    - by a transcendental argument,
    - be understood as spatial relations.
- Hence we must conclude that *primary entities exist in space.*
- **Space is therefore an unavoidable characteristic of any possible world**.
- From the direction and distance relations one can derive *Euclidean Geometry*.

6.2.4. States

- We must assume that primary entities
  may be ascribed predicates which are not logically required.
  - That is, they may be ascribed predicates
    - incompatible with predicates which they actually satisfy —
    - in order for it to be logically possible,
    - that one-and-the-same ***primary entity***
    - can be ascribed incompatible predicates,
    - if any primary entity can exist in different ***state***s.
  - A ***primary entity*** may be
    - in ***one state*** where it can be ascribed one predicate,
    - and in ***another state*** where it can be ascribed another
    - incompatible predicate.
- **Any entity in every possible world**
  may attain different states.

6.2.5. Time

- Two such different states
  must necessarily be ascribed different incompatible predicates.
  - But how can we ensure so ?
  - Only if states stand in an asymmetric relation to one another.
  - This state relation is also transitive.
  - So that is an indispensable property of any world.
  - By a transcendental deduction we say that
    primary entities exist in time.
- **So every possible world must exist in time**.

6.2.6. Causality

States are related by the ***time relation***s "before" and "after".

- These are asymmetric and transitive relations.
- But how can it be so ?
- Propositions about primary entities at different times
  - must necessarily be logically independent of one another.
  - This follows from the possibility that a primary entity
  - necessarily be ascribed different, incompatible predicates at different times.
  - It is therefore logically **impossible**
    - from the primary entities alone to deduce
    - how a primary entity is at on time point
    - to how it is at another time point.

- How, therefore, can these predicates
  - supposedly of one and the same entity
  - at different time points
  - be about the ***same entity*** ?
- There can be no logical implication about this!
- Transcendentally therefore there must be a ***non-logical implicative***
  - between propositions about
  - properties of a primary entity
  - at different times.

- Such an *non-logical implicative*
  - must depend on *empirical circumstances*
  - subject to which the primary entity exists.
- There are no other circumstances.
- If the state on a primary entity changes
  - then there must be changes in its "circumstances"
  - whose consequences are that the primary entity changes state.
  - And such "circumstance"–changes **will imply primary entity state changes**.

- We shall use the term **'cause'**
  - for a preceding "circumstance"–change
  - that implies a state change of a primary entity.
- So now we can conclude
  - *that every change of state of a primary entity*
  - *must have a cause,*

  and
  - *that "equivalent circumstances"*
  - *must have "equivalent effects".*
- This form of implication is called **causal implication**.
- And the principle of implication for **causal principle**.

So every possible world enjoys the *causal principle*.

- Kant's transcendental deduction is fundamentally built on the the *possibility of self-awareness*.
- Sørlander 's transcendental deduction is fundamentally built on the *possibility of truth*.
- In Kant's thinking the *causal principle* is a prerequisite for possibility of self-awareness.
- In this way Sørlander avoids Kant's *solipsism*, i.e.,
  - *"that only one's own mind is sure to exist"*

  a solipsism that, however, flaws Kant's otherwise great thinking.

6.2.7. Rejection, also, of Hegel's Philosophy

- Just as we reject
  - *Descartes,*
  - *Locke's,*
  - *Hume's,* and
  - *Spinoza's,*
  - *Berkeley's,*
  - *Kant's*

  Philosophies – *as leading to* **contradictions**,
- so we must reject *Hegel's* Philosophy:
  - We must reject Hegel's *thesis, antithesis, synthesis.*
  - By relativising philosophy wrt. history Hegel has removed necessity.
  - By thus postulating that
    - *"it is an eternal truth that we cannot achieve eternal truths"*.

  Hegel's main contribution ends up in **contradiction**.

6.2.8. Kinematics

- So *primary entities* exist in *space* and *time*.
  - They must have *spatial extent* and *temporal extent*.
  - They must therefore be able to *change* their *spatial properties*.
  - Both as concerns *form* and *location*.
  - But a spatial change in form presupposes a change in location – as the more fundamental.
  - A *primary entity* which changes location is said to be *moving*.
  - If a *primary entity* which does not change location is said to be *resting*.

- The *velocity* of a primary entity expresses the distance and direction it moves in a given time interval.
- Change in velocity of a primary entity is called its *acceleration*.
- Acceleration involves either
  - change in velocity, or
  - change in direction of movement, or
  - both.

- **So far Sørlander has reasoned us to fundamental concepts of kinematics.**

6.2.9. Dynamics

- When we "add" causality" to kinematics we obtain ***dynamics***.
  - We can do so, because primary entities are in time.
  - Kinematics imply that that a primary entity changes when it goes from being at rest to moving.
  - Likewise when it goes from movement to rest. Et cetera.
  - So a primary entity has same state of movement if it has same velocity and moves in the same direction.
  - Primary entities change state of movement if they change velocity or direction.
- So, combining kinematics and the principle of causality,
  - we can deduce that
  - **if** a primary entity changes state of movement
  - **then** there must be a cause, and we call that cause a **force**.

6.2.10. Newton's Laws

Newton's First Law:

- Combining *kinematics* and the *principle of causality*,
  - and the therefrom deduced concept of *force*,
  - we can deduce that any *change of movement*
  - is proportional[1] to the *force*.
  - This implies that a primary entity which
    - is not under the influence of an external force
    - will continue in the same state of movement.
- **This is Newton's First Law**.

[1] Observe that we have "only" said: *proportional*, meaning also directly proportional, not whether it is logarithmically, or linearly, or polynomially, or exponentially, ..., so.

Newton's Second Law:

- That a certain, non-zero force implies change of movement,
  - imply that the primary entity
  - must excert a certain ***resistance*** to that change.
  - It must have what we shall call a certain ***mass***.[2]
  - From this it follows that
    the change in the state of movement of a primary entity.
    - not only is proportional to the excerted force,
    - but also inversely proportional[3] to the mass of that entity.
- **This is Newton's Second Law**.

[2] ***Mass*** refers loosely to the amount of ***matter*** in an entity. This is in contrast to ***weight*** which refers to the ***force*** exerted on an entity by ***gravity***.
[3] Cf. Footnote 1 [on the facing slide].

Newton's Third Law:

- In a possible world,
  - the forces that affect primary entities must come from "other" primary entities.
  - Primary entities are located in different volumes of space.
  - Their location may interfere with one another in the sense at least of "obstructing" their mutual movements –
  - leading to clashes.
  - In principle we must assume that even primary entities "far away from one another" obstruct.
  - If they clash it must be with *oppositely directed and equal forces.*
- **This is Newton's Third Law.**

6.2.11. Gravitation and Quantum Mechanics

Mutual Attraction:

- How can primary entities possibly be the *source* of *force*s that *influence* one another?
- How can primary entities at all have a *mass*[4] such that it requires *force*s to change their *state of movement*?
- The answer must be that primary entities *excert* a *mutual influence* on one another –
- that is there is a *mutual attraction*.

[4] cf. Footnote 2 Slide 87

Gravitation:

- This must be the case for all primary entities.
- This must mean that all primary entities
- can be characterised by
- a *universal mutual attraction*:
- a *universal gravitation*

Finite Propagation – A Gravitational Constant:

- Thus *mutual attraction* must *propagate* at a certain, finite, velocity.
- If that velocity was infinite, then it is everywhere and cannot therefore have its source in concretely existing primary entities.
- But having a finite velocity implies that there must be a *propagational speed limit*.
- It must be a *constant of nature*.

Gravitational "Pull":

- The nature of ***gravitational "pull"*** can be deduced, basically as follows:
  - *Primary entities must basically consist of elements*
  - *that attract one another, but which are **stable**,*
  - *and that is only possible if it is, in principle,*
  - ***impossible to describe these elementary particles precisely.***
  - *If there is a fundamental limit to how these basic particles*
  - *can be described, then it is also precluded that they can undergo continuous change.*
- *Hence there is a basis for stability despite mutual attraction.*
  - *There must be a foundational limit for* **how precise these descriptions can be** —
  - *which implies that* **the elementary particle as a whole can be described statistically**

Quantum Mechanics:

- The rest is physics:
  - unification of quantum mechanics and Einstein's special relativity has been done;
  - unification of gravitation with Einstein's general theory of relativity has still to be done.

A Summary:

- Philosophy lends to physics its results
  - a necessity that physics cannot give them.
- Experiments have shown that Einstein's results –
  - with propagation limits –
  - indeed hold for this world.
- Philosophy shows that
  every possible world is subject to a fixed propagation limit.
- Philosophy also shows that for a possible world to exist
  it must be built from elementary particles
  which cannot be individually described (with Newton's theory)

6.3. The Logical Conditions for Describing Living Species

6.3.1. Purpose, Life and Evolution

Causality of Purpose:

- **If** there is to be *the possibility of language and meaning*,
  - **then** there must exist primary entities
    - which are *not entirely encapsulated within the physical conditions*;
    - that they are stable and
    - can influence one another.
- This is only possible if such primary entities are
  - subject to a *supplementary causality*
  - *directed at the future*: a **causality of purpose**
- These primary entities are here called **living species**.

Living Species:

- What can be deduced about them ?
  - **They must have some form they can be developed to reach**
  - **which they must be causally determined to maintain**.
  - This **development** and **maintenance** must further in **an exchange of matter with an environment**. ...
  - It must be possible that living species occur in one of two forms:
    - one form which is characterised by **development, form** and **exchange**,
    - and another form which, **additionally**, can be characterised by the ability to **purposeful movement**s.
- The first we call **plant**s, the second we call **animal**s.

6.3.1.1 Animate Entities:

- For an animal to purposefully move around
  - there must be "additional conditions" for such self-movements to be in accordance with the principle of causality:
    - **(i)** they must have **sensory organ**s sensing among others the immediate purpose of its movement;
    - **(ii)** they must have **means of motion** so that it can move; and
    - **(iii)** they must have **instinct**s, **incentive**s and **feeling**s as causal conditions that what it senses can drive it to movements.
  - And all of this **in accordance with the laws of physics.**

6.3.1.2 Animal Structure:

- Animals, to possess these three kinds of "additional conditions",
  - must be built from special units which have an inner relation to their function as a whole;
  - Their **purposefulness** must be built into their physical building units,
  - that is, as we can now say, their **genome**s.
  - That is, animals are built from genomes which give them the **inner determination** to such building blocks for **instinct**s, **incentive**s and **feeling**s.
- Similar kinds of deduction can be carried out with respect to plants.
- **Transcendentally one can deduce basic principles of evolution** but not their details.

6.3.2. Consciousness, Learning and Language

- The existence of animals is a necessary condition for there being language and meaning in any world.
  - That there can be **language** means that animals are capable of *developing language*.
  - And this must presuppose that animals can **learn** *from their experience.*
  - To learn implies that animals can **feel** pleasure and distaste.
  - One can therefore deduce that animals must possess such building blocks whose inner determination is a basis for learning and **consciousness**.

Language:

- Animals with higher social interaction
  - uses **signs**, eventually developing a **language**.
  - These languages adhere to
    the same system of defined concepts
    which are a prerequisite for any description of any world:
    - **namely the system**
    - **that philosophy lays bare from a basis**
    - **of transcendental deductions** and
    - **the principle of contradiction** and
    - **its implicit meaning theory**.

6.3.3. Humans, Consciousness and Knowledge

- **A human is an animal which has a language.**
- Humans must be **conscious**
  - of having **knowledge** of its concrete situation,
  - and as such that person can have knowledge about what he feels
  - and eventually that person can know whether what he feels is true or false.
  - Consequently *a human can describe his situation correctly*.

6.3.4. Responsibility

- In this way one can deduce that **humans**
  - can thus have **memory**
  - and hence can have **responsibility** ,
  - be **responsible** .
  - Further deductions lead us into **ethics** .

And here we end our Philosophy Discourse

7. The Example Continued: Intentional "Pull"

- We refer to the example of Sect. 1.
- The *human-assistedness* of our main example
  - is reflected in the *automobile* artifacts.
  - We do not describe, i.e. model, humans.
  - Instead we let automobiles subsume human character.
- The *artifacts* of our main example are those of
  - the road net and
  - the autombiles.

38 To automobiles we ascribe an *intent* of *transport*.

39 And to road hubs and links we ascribe an *intent* of *transport*.

40 Seen from the point of view of an automobile there is its own traffic history, A_Hist Item 28c. Slide 21, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed automobile’s positions;

41 seen from the point of view of a hub there is its own traffic history, H_Traffic Item 25 Slide 19, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed maps from automobile identities into automobile positions; and

42 seen from the point of view of a link there is its own traffic history, L_Traffic Item 26 Slide 20, which is a (time ordered) sequence of timed maps from automobile identities into automobile positions.

- The *intentional “pull”* of these manifestations is this:

43 The union, i.e. proper merge of all automobile traffic histories, AllATH, must now be identical to the same proper merge of all hub, AllHTH, and all link traffic histories, AllLTH.

type

28c., pp.21 A_Hist = $(\mathcal{T} \times \text{APos})^*$

25, pp.19 H_Traffic = A_UI $\overrightarrow{m}$ $(\mathcal{T} \times \text{APos})^*$

26, pp.20 L_Traffic = A_UI $\overrightarrow{m}$ $(\mathcal{T} \times \text{APos})^*$

43 AllATH = $\mathcal{T}$ $\overrightarrow{m}$ (AUI $\overrightarrow{m}$ APos)

43 AllHTH = $\mathcal{T}$ $\overrightarrow{m}$ (AUI $\overrightarrow{m}$ APos)

43 AllLTH = $\mathcal{T}$ $\overrightarrow{m}$ (AUI $\overrightarrow{m}$ APos)

axiom

43 **let** allA = proper_merge_into_AllATH($\{$(a,attr_A_Hist(a))|a:A·a $\in as\}$),

43 allH = proper_merge_into_AllHTH($\{$attr_H_Traffic(h)|h:H·h $\in hs\}$),

43 allL = proper_merge_into_AllLTH($\{$attr_L_Traffic(l)|l:L·h $\in ls\}$) **in**

43 allA = H_and_L_Traffic_merge(allH,allL) **end**

- We leave the definition of the merge functions to the listener!

- We now discuss the concept of ***intentional "pull"***.
- To each automobile we can, of course, associate its history of timed positions and
- to each hub and link, similarly their histories of timed automobile positions.
- These histories are facts !
- They are not something that is laboriously recorded,
  where such recordings may be imprecise or cumbersome[5].
- The facts are there, so we can, but may not necessarily,
  talk about these histories as facts.
- It is in that sense that the purpose (`'transport'`)
  - for which man let automobiles, hubs and link be made
  - with their `'transport'` intent
  - are subject to an *intentional "pull"*.
- It can be no other way: if automobiles "record" their history, then hubs and links must together "record" identically the same history ! ■

[5] or thought technologically in-feasible – at least some decades ago!

- We have tentatively proposed a concept of ***intentional "pull"***.
  - That proposal is in the form, I think, of
  - a transcendental deduction;
  - it has to be further studied.

8. Closing

- We have introduced two major and **new**, concepts:
  - (i) **domain analysis & description** *as a precursor to software development*; and
  - (ii) **philosophy** *as a basis for determining major elements on a domain analysis & description method*.
- We claim these, (i) and (ii), as **new** elements of computer science.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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

Lunch with Viktor Petrovich, April 25, 2015, Dom Literatow

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