Control Flow Analysis Can Find New Flaws Too

Chiara Bodei, Mikael Buchholtz, Pierpaolo Degano, Flemming Nielson, Hanne Riis Nielson

AbstractA previous study showed how control flow analysis
can be applied to analyse key distribution protocols based on
symmetric key cryptography. We have extended both the theoretical
treatment and our fully automatic verifier to deal with protocols
based on asymmetric cryptography. This paper reports on the
application of our technique - exemplified on the Beller-Chang-Yacobi
MSR protocol, which uses both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography - and show how we discover an undocumented flaw.
TypeConference paper [With referee]
ConferenceProceedings of Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS 04)
Year2004
Electronic version(s)[pdf]
BibTeX data [bibtex]
IMM Group(s)Computer Science & Engineering